The autonomy of culture : a cultural-philosophical analysis by Niemand, Johannes R.
  
 
THE AUTONOMY OF CULTURE: A CULTURAL-
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Johannes R. Niemand 
 
 
 
Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoter: Professor Anton A. van Niekerk 
 
 
December 2013 
 i
DECLARATION 
 
By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the 
work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author 
thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and 
publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party 
rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for 
obtaining any qualification. 
 
 
 
December 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2013 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 ii
ABSTRACT 
 
Multicultural conflicts pervade our world and have sparked considerable 
debate about their possible resolution. We argue that how culture is 
conceptualized is crucial to the continued dialogue about multicultural 
conflicts. Specifically, we argue that approaches that argue for the protection 
of cultures run into significant problems if they do not employ a conception of 
cultures as delineated entities. However, we also hold that the notion that 
cultures cannot be distinct in any way, does very little to contribute to 
dialogue. From the very beginning, it excludes the notion of a culture that is to 
be protected and thus stops the dialogue there and then. To be true to the 
principle of audi ad alteram partem, approaches to multicultural conflicts must 
conceive of an alternative model, provided that such a model is logically 
possible. This may provide the dialogue with a much needed point of common 
understanding from which to proceed. Accordingly, we develop a model of 
culture whereby it is possible to delineate cultures. In this model, a culture can 
be delineable in a manner analogous to how we delineate persons. Our model 
of personal delineation suggests a dual structure whereby a trivial personal 
boundary contains a unity of conflict within the person. In persons, this unity of 
conflict lies in the relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings. This 
relationship must be characterised by self-referential decisions and the 
capacity to make self-referential decisions is central to our definition of 
personal autonomy. In cultures, we argue that multicultural conflicts provide 
the necessary conditions that enable us to conceptualize trivial boundaries in 
cultures in terms of the communicative relationships between members of a 
particular culture. Multicultural conflicts prompt self-categorizations by 
individuals and such self-categorizations are made in terms of group 
membership. Though all members may not agree as to who belongs to the 
culture and who does not, the claims made about membership serve to 
differentiate the communicative relationships inside the culture from those 
outside it. Furthermore, we show that, inside this trivial boundary, a unity of 
conflict analogous to the one found in personal autonomy, can be exhibited by 
cultures. We show how a culture, through its institutions, particularly through 
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an institutionalised exit possibility, 1) may exhibit self-reference and 2) relate 
to a source of authority in the same way as a person does when making self-
referential decisions. In this regard, we argue that institutionalised exit 
possibilities embody adherence to the consensus vs. power criterion, 
according to which the dominant account of a culture is achieved through 
consensus, as opposed to through the exertion of power. Furthermore, we 
argue that with a strong analogy between cultures’ and personal delineation, it 
becomes reasonable to extend concepts we usually apply to persons, such as 
fairness, attachment and viability, so that they can also apply to cultures.  We 
show that the application of these concepts clarifies certain current 
multicultural issues. The application of theses concepts also leads to the 
development of a decision making process to deal with multicultural issues.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Multikulturele konflikte kom wêreldwyd voor en het reeds aansienlike debat 
oor die resolusie van sodanige konflik ontlok. Ons voer aan dat hoe kultuur 
gekonseptualiseer word, besonder belangrik is vir die voorgesette dialoog oor 
multikulturele konflikte. Meer spesifiek voer ons aan dat benaderings wat vir 
die beskerming van kulture argumenteer, beduidende probleme ondervind 
indien dit nie `n konsepsie van kulture as delinieerbare entiteite gebruik nie. 
Die gedagte dat kulture nie op enige manier afgebaken kan word nie, dra 
egter ook weinig by tot dialoog. Dit sluit van meet af die gedagte dat kulture 
beskerm moet word, uit en staak dus die dialoog daar en dan. Ten einde 
getrou te wees aan die beginsel van audi ad alteram partem, moet 
benaderings tot multikulturele konflik `n alternatiewe model van kultuur 
bedink, mits so `n model logies moontlik is. So `n model kan die dialoog van 
`n broodnodige gemeenskaplike uitgangspunt voorsien. Ons ontwikkel 
dienooreenkomstig `n model van kultuur waarvolgens dit moontlik is om 
kulture te delinieer. Volgens hierdie model kan `n kultuur delinieer word in 
analogie met hoe persone delinieer word. Ons model van persoonlike 
deliniëring stel `n tweeledige struktuur voor, waarvolgens `n triviale 
persoonlike grens `n eenheid van konflik binne die persoon omspan. In 
persone lê hierdie eenheid van konflik in die verhouding tussen die “ek” en 
onderdrukte betekenisse. Hierdie verhouding moet deur self-referensiële 
besluite gekenmerk word. Die vermoë tot self-referensiële besluite, so voer 
ons aan, is ook die sentrale kenmerk van persoonlike outonomie. Ons voer 
aan dat multikulturele konflikte die noodsaaklike toestande skep wat ons in 
staat stel om triviale grense in kulture te definieer in terme van die 
kommunikatiewe verhoudings tussen lede van `n spesifieke kultuur. 
Multikulturele konflikte ontlok self-kategorisering deur individue en sodanige 
kategorisering word in terme van groeplidmaatskap gedoen. Hoewel alle lede 
van die kultuur nie noodwendig saamstem oor wie aan die kultuur behoort en 
wie nie, maak die bewerings wat oor lidmaatskap gemaak word dit moontlik 
om die kommunikatiewe verhoudings binne die kultuur te onderskei van dié 
buite die kultuur. Verder demonstreer ons dat, binne hierdie triviale grens, 
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kulture `n eenheid van konflik ten toon kan stel wat soortgelyk aan die 
eenheid van konflik by persoonlike outonomie is. Ons wys hoe `n kultuur, deur 
sy instellings, en vernaam deur `n geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikheid 
(‘exit possibility’) 1) self-referensie ten toon kan stel en 2) in verhouding met `n 
bron van gesag kan staan soos `n persoon wanneer s/hy self-referensiële 
besluite maak. In dié verband voer ons aan dat geïnstitusionaliseerde 
uitgangsmoontlikhede die beliggaming is van die nakoming van die 
konsensus vs. mag-kriterium, waarvolgens die dominante weergawe van `n 
kultuur bereik word deur konsensus, teenoor deur die uitoefen van mag. 
Verder voer ons aan dat `n sterk analogie tussen kulture en persone se 
deliniëring dit moontlik maak om begrippe soos regverdigheid, binding en 
lewensvatbaarheid, wat gewoonlik op persone toegepas word, op kulture toe 
te pas. Die toepassing van hierdie begrippe verbeter ons begrip van sekere 
huidige multikulturele kwessies en lei ook tot die ontwikkeling van `n 
besluitnemingsproses vir multikulturele kwessies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Multicultural conflicts pervade our world and have sparked considerable 
debate about their possible resolution. Radical and fundamentalist Islamic 
movements have caused havoc in Western societies. Such violence and the 
threat of further violence has naturally evoked political responses from the 
West and has had a significant influence on current USA and West-European 
foreign policy vis-á-vis the Middle East.  
 
Western ideas about freedom (and particularly media freedom) have come 
under increasing pressure. This pressure often stems from instances where 
the cherished idea of freedom of speech has, for some people, been taken 
too far. Threats against the life of Salmon Rushdie because of the publication 
of his The Satanic Verses in the 1980’s, as well as threats and violence 
emanating from the publication of newspaper cartoons that allegedly slander 
the prophet Mohammed in Denmark (Beukes, 2006), are indicative of serious 
(potential) conflicts in these societies – conflicts that have serious implications 
for Western practices of media freedom.  
 
Furthermore, the distinction between private and public (particularly regarding 
beliefs) has been criticised in debates about religious symbols and head gear 
in countries such as France and the Netherlands (Pillay, 2007). Another 
variant of this conflict, in Switzerland, resulted in a referendum banning the 
further construction of minarets, allegedly to protect the Swiss character of 
public spaces (Swiss referendum on mosque minarets to test freedom, 2009). 
Where the abovementioned conflicts pertain to a specific religious group, they 
share a concern for the protection of a certain character (be it Swiss, French, 
Dutch, or otherwise) in the public sphere. The character of the public sphere is 
also at stake in conflicts about language policies. The debates surrounding 
various pro-French laws in Quebec are examples of these.  
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In South Africa, political change in 1994 has established a constitution that 
values equality and respect for different cultures. Subsequently, the rights, 
respect and security that cultures are entitled to, have also become the 
subject of debate in this country. These include debates over language rights 
and communal land rights.  
 
Blade Nzimande, Minister of Higher Education in South Africa has recently 
suggested (‘Nzimande: Consider African language requirement’, 2011) that 
proficiency in reading, writing and speaking an indigenous African language 
should be made a prerequisite for studying at South African universities. It 
therefore goes further than merely ensuring that one could, if one wishes to, 
study in an indigenous language, but would force all students to be proficient 
in an indigenous language, regardless of their chosen medium of study. The 
rationale behind such a notion is to combat the marginalisation of indigenous 
languages. “(T)he marginalisation of our indigenous languages has impacted 
on the psychology of our people, contributing significantly to what the great 
Kenyan novelist, Ngugi wa Thiongo, referred to as ‘the colonialisation of the 
mind of the African people’” (Nzimande, 2012). Nzimande has been supported 
on this point by the Commission for Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (South Africa, 2012).1  
    
The battle over the place of Afrikaans as, allegedly, “primary language of 
instruction” at Stellenbosch University and the concomitant rights its speakers 
are entitled to, is another example of language issues. Elsewhere in the 
country, disputes between schools and the government about language had 
culminated into legal battles (Rademeyer, 2007). At the University of the Free 
State, another historically Afrikaans university, the racial integration of 
residences, preceding and following a nasty racist incident in one of the 
residences, had been the topic of heated debate in the printed media (De 
                                                 
1
 In this regard, also see the report by the South African Ministerial Committee on Education’s 
report on the advancement of indigenous languages (South Africa, 2005). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 3
Klerk, 2007; Fourie, 2007; Kruger, 2007; Laubscher, 2007). In this debate, the 
differences between cultures are mostly regarded as the key obstacle to the 
racial integration of residences.  
 
With regard to communal land, the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 
2010 ‘declared the Communal Land Rights Act unconstitutional’ (Law, Race 
and Gender Unit, UCT, 2010). This act gave traditional leaders power of use, 
administration and occupation of communal land. The rural communities that 
reside in the relevant areas opposed the Act, the chief objections being that 
they were not consulted in the process of drafting the Act and that their tenure 
security on the land was compromised by the Act. (Law, Race and Gender 
Unit, UCT, 2010). 
 
South Africa is also not free from cultural outrage at freedom of speech. A 
recent example is ‘The Spear’ debacle. ‘The Spear’, a satirical painting 
depicting President Zuma in a pose similar to a painting of Lenin, only with 
exposed genitals, was exhibited in the Goodman Gallery in Johannesburg in 
May 2012. The furore caused by this saw Zuma taking legal action (Subramy, 
2012) to prohibit the gallery and City Press to display the painting (the latter 
on its website). Prominent members of the ruling party and the Cabinet also 
called for its removal (May & Nagel, 2012; Ntsaluba, 2012). The painting was 
later vandalised (Boshomane, 2012).  
 
The pertinent aspect of this debacle has been the conflict between (artistic) 
freedom of expression and the right to dignity (Constitutionally Speaking, 
2012). What has given it a decidedly inter-cultural or multicultural tone is the 
defence of the President’s dignity on cultural grounds. While a politician as 
individual may be regarded - in certain places at least, and within certain 
bounds – as fair game for satirists, the damage to the President’s dignity in an 
African context is allegedly much greater due to the communal nature of 
African culture. In this regard, we quote freely from an argument by Simphiwe 
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Sesanti, Professor in Journalism and frequent public commentator on African 
values and culture:  
 
“As an African child I was taught that children should never look at 
an adult’s naked body, especially their private parts. That is 
considered disrespectful. It goes without saying, therefore, that 
children who are artistically inclined are not allowed to draw or paint 
a naked adult’s body. In terms of individualism, which is accepted 
in the West, it is perfectly normal to have arts for art’s sake. But in 
Africa, where traditionally individualism (not individuality) is frowned 
upon, and a sense of community (communalism) is promoted, art is 
not for art’s sake, but for life’s sake. 
 
This means that an artist cannot simply do as they wish without 
considering their art’s consequences for the entire community 
because the survival of the community at large is more important 
than mere pleasures of an individual. 
 
It seems, unfortunately, that Murray did not have these 
considerations when he exhibited his art. I guess that it is against 
this African cultural sensitivity that Gugu Zuma, our president’s 
daughter, an artist and actress of note in her own right, wrote 
recently that the “painting is really just the straw that broke the 
camel’s back in this notion that a black man who is associated with 
African cultures and traditions, and who does not fit the ‘perfect’ 
mould of Western values and beliefs, is less human than the next 
person.’ 
 
Her words express not just the sentiment of Msholozi’s biological 
daughter but of every child brought up in the African cultural way. 
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As an African child whose culture taught me that Msholozi is my 
own father, even if not biologically so, since he belongs to my 
father’s age group, I share Gugu’s pain.” (Sesanti, 2012) 
 
Certain cultural practices have also attracted attention, specifically that of, 
ukuthwala, polygamy - which President Zuma of South Africa practices 
(Gevisser, 2010) - and ritual bull slaughter (‘Bull Killing Judgement on Friday’, 
2009).  The most controversial of these has been the issue of ukuthwala. The 
latter is a cultural practice whereby ‘the intending bridegroom, together with 
one or two friends, would waylay the intended bride … and they would forcibly 
take her to the young man’s home’ (Ntlokwana, 2009: 4) 
 
The practice served a number of functions, amongst which to ‘persuade the 
women of the seriousness of the intent to marry her’ (Ntlokwana, 2009:4) and 
to ‘avoid the expenses of a wedding’ (Ntlokwana, 2009:4). 
 
The practice gained prominence in the media when awareness was raised 
regarding girls as young as 12 years old being forced into marriage, although 
‘Ukukthwala was never intended to apply to minors’ (Ntlokwana, 2009:4). A 
number of responses to this state of affairs can be discerned.  
 
There are those, such as Chief Mandla Mandela (also an ANC MP), who 
defend the custom, regardless of the age of the girls2 (SAPA, 2011). On the 
other hand, there are those who emphasize that the way the tradition is 
practised currently is a distortion and an abuse of the custom. They condemn 
the current practice, while maintaining the value of the (authentic) tradition as 
it was practised in the past. Such a position was taken in, for instance, by the 
                                                 
2
 Mandela was quoted as saying: "When you are going to discuss culture do not even try to 
bring in white notions as such an approach will turn things upside down. Firstly, culture has no 
age. Age is something we learnt today because of our westernisation." (SAPA, 2011) 
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Commission for Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious 
and Linguistic Communities (cf. Mapumulo, 2011).  
 
Others ask for the practice itself to be reconsidered, and adapted to the 
requirements of individual rights, so that, for instance, the practice may be 
allowed if the (adult) woman would give her consent (Mwambene & Sloth-
Nielsen, 2011: 22), while others still take a stronger position, asking for a 
outright ban (Van der Westhuizen, 2011; also see Memela, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, there is a growing sense that Western and African conceptions 
of democracy might be different (De Villiers, 2008; Scholtz, 2008). This would 
constitute an area of potential debates, disputes and even outright conflict.  
 
These issues are therefore crucial to a young democracy such as South 
Africa. In the South African context, characterised by rich diversity in different 
cultures, it is imperative to deal with such issues in a way that promotes peace 
and a sense of belonging for all the interested groups.  
 
In the philosophical study of multiculturalism (and multicultural issues and 
conflicts), the debate about the limits of tolerance has drawn much attention 
(cf. Bishop, 2004; Haarscher, 1997; Rorty, 1989, 1991; Taylor, 1994; Zolo, 
1997). An important question here is: how do we deal with something we find 
fundamentally unacceptable and reprehensible in the beliefs and practices of 
people who are “different” from ourselves – particularly when that “difference” 
is prima facie expressed in features such language, skin colour and place of 
origin? The approach historically followed by most democracies has been to 
protect an individual’s rights to strive for whatever good he may choose, as 
long as he does not interfere with others’ striving. Each one of us would then 
have space to strive for his own good; our differences can be discussed and 
debated, but are nevertheless respected. What is necessary for such an 
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approach is that all people, irrespective of their differences, adhere to the 
procedures, laws and values that enable each individual to strive for his/her 
own good.  
 
This approach still has a certain simplicity and elegance to it and intuitively (at 
least to the “Western” mind) seems to be valid. However, there seems to be a 
growing suspicion that a liberal approach does not deal that well with the 
conflicts named inter-cultural. Globalisation, improved media and 
communication and migration has put increased pressure on the co-existence 
of different societies, not just alongside one another but sometimes even 
amongst one other. “This is how we do things here,” then has an offensive, 
oppressive and authoritarian ring to it. For a liberal society that aims not to 
oppress and marginalise, this will not do. 
 
The growing awareness of the cultural conditioning involved in traditional 
liberal approaches also forces us into further investigation. Whatever the 
defence for a liberal position may be, it still rests on certain conceptions (for 
instance, that of culture) that are themselves culturally conditioned or at least 
contingent. Their validity can therefore not be writ in stone, nor does the 
pragmatic application of them seem that successful, because for those who 
do not share these conceptions, enforcing liberal values does not simply have 
the character of a necessary evil. The incorporation of those who do not share 
these conceptions into society then remains a problem. 
 
It is self-evident that an attempt to address this dilemma cannot proceed 
without dialogue and negotiation. We will argue that such a dialogue requires 
clarity on the concept of culture.  
 
On the one hand, we believe the notion that cultures cannot be distinct in any 
way, i.e. that they are necessarily vague and amorphous, does very little to 
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contribute to dialogue. From the very beginning, it excludes the notion of a 
culture that is to be protected and the dialogue thus stops there and then. To 
be true to the principle of audi ad alteram partem, liberal approaches to 
multicultural conflicts need to show that they can conceive of an alternative 
conception, provided – crucially – that such a conception is logically possible. 
This may also provide the dialogue with a much needed point of common 
understanding from which to proceed.  
 
On the other hand (as we will argue in later chapters), arguments for the 
legitimacy of protecting collective cultural goods cannot be successful without 
proceeding from a conception of cultures as distinct entities. It will require us 
to examine whether such a conception is in fact logically possible. 
Furthermore, thinking of cultures as distinct entities, we will argue, requires a 
conception of culture whereby it is possible for us to think of a culture in a 
manner analogous to the way we think of personal autonomy. However, we 
do not propose that cultures in fact have personal autonomy. This is a very 
important point to note. Our position is still a liberal position, and as such, 
individual autonomy remains axiomatic.  It is a supposition fundamental to our 
approach. Even when a liberal approach can contemplate the individual 
suffering or sacrificing himself for the collective or for a cause, it sees this 
sacrifice, has to see it, as something ultimately meaningful for the person and 
a result of the individual’s choices. Thus individual freedom remains central. 
The purpose of our analogy with personal autonomy is not to violate or extend 
this axiom. Rather, the purpose of a culture’s analogy with personal autonomy 
is to show that meaningful delineability is possible, that is, that when such an 
analogy can be completed, it makes it possible to think of cultures as distinct 
entities. 
 
In order to complete an analogy with personal autonomy, we will also need to 
clarify what is understood by personal autonomy. We do this in more detail in 
later chapters, but for now we note that, on the most basic level, autonomy 
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refers to self-regulation. Something that is autonomous is literally something 
that ‘rules itself’. In system terms, we can then speak of the autonomy of a 
system as referring to the system’s ability to regulate itself in its adaptation to 
its environment.  
 
However, a definition of autonomy cannot simply stop at self-regulation. 
Autonomy then is too broad a concept, encompassing almost all systems. 
Nature itself may then be seen as a self-regulating system. Especially in the 
context of multicultural issues, the concept of autonomy needs to be more 
specific: it needs to refer to the autonomy we traditionally ascribe to 
individuals. Self-regulation is then meant to refer specifically to the ability of 
the individual to regulate his/her own behaviour.  
 
In this regard, the person’s ability is distinct from other systems’ in that s/he is 
able to make decisions about what goals or goods s/he strives for, which rules 
s/he follows or creates for him/herself, what is important and what is not. In 
this regard, autonomy is much stronger than simple self-regulation. The 
individual does not simply maintain homeostasis with his/her environment by 
reacting to it in ways that maintain him/herself. S/he actively decides based on 
the availability of different options of action.  
 
As we will discuss in Chapter 4, such active decision making necessarily 
involves a measure of self-reference, by virtue of which the individual can 
refer to him/herself as “I”. When we refer to autonomy, we therefore refer 
specifically to self-reflective, self-regulating systems that regulate their 
adaptation to their environment through their decisions. The ability to do this is 
something we traditionally ascribe to the mental life of the individual, and 
something we traditionally do not ascribe to cultures.  
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If a dialogue is to be successful, we must investigate alternatives to such a 
conceptualisation and try to understand (bearing in mind that we have an 
already culturally conditioned pre-understanding) how such alternative 
conceptions may be comprehensible, coherent and/or valid. My suspicion is 
that in an era of multicultural contact (and/or conflict) it is necessary that we 
broaden our imagination with regard to the possibility of distinct, autonomous 
cultures. The idea needs to be examined, and that is what this dissertation 
sets out to do.  
 
The basic question here is whether we can in some way think of cultures in a 
manner analogous to how we think about personal autonomy. The problem is 
furthermore whether and how such a notion of a distinct culture could 
meaningfully feed into strategies for conflict resolution in societies marred by 
inter-cultural conflicts.  
 
One might question the use of embarking on such an investigation. What has 
sparked my interest in this issue – unlikely as it may seem – has been work 
that I have done in earlier studies on the existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard 
(Niemand, 2004, 2005, 2006). These studies, in which I inevitably came under 
the impression of the strong sense of autonomy that human beings ideally do 
or ought to attain, yielded the question as to whether an analogous sense of 
authentic and autonomous self-identity can possibly be achieved by the 
entities we call “cultures”.  
 
But why would such an application of “autonomy” to “culture” be useful and 
worthy of investigation? Why should the concept of culture be important for 
our understanding of “multicultural” issues?   
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 11
At first glance, the answer seems trivial: To deal with multiculturalism is to 
deal with a diversity of cultures; not knowing what we mean by culture is not 
knowing what we are talking about.  
 
The problem is, however, somewhat deeper. The question itself implies that 
there are such things as multicultural issues. It implies therefore, that 
something called culture is at play, is invoked and is important in the conflicts 
that characterise the arrival of the 21st century. These conflicts seemingly 
arise from differences in backgrounds, world views, perspectives, paradigms, 
beliefs, and a variety of terms that denote fundamental differences. We hold 
that how culture is conceptualised plays a crucial part in how we understand 
and deal with these issues. 
 
The question of the importance of culture has gained prominence in light of 
the apparent breakdown of the usual approach in which differences between 
people, that is, individuals were handled and legislated for.  What is coming to 
pass in writings such as that of Charles Taylor is the awareness of how a 
theory aimed at providing maximal space for everyone to live and strive 
alongside and amongst each other can in some cases turn on itself and 
seemingly point to the inhospitability of “Western”/liberal societies. This is the 
inhospitability produced by enforcing liberal values and procedural rights at 
the cost of not recognising claims to cultural rights. 
 
This inhospitability comes into play when the goods striven for are collective in 
nature. Traditional liberal approaches imply that collective goals, often named 
“cultural”, or justified on cultural grounds, cannot be allowed, or are to be 
allowed only with strict restrictions. This is so, because if a collective good is 
striven for that denies an individual to strive for his individual good, this person 
will be denied his procedural right to strive for his/her good and will be 
discriminated against on the basis of not ascribing to the collective good.  
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Therefore, collective goals are perceived as a threat to the equality and dignity 
of all members of a society.  
 
In this regard, Charles Taylor discusses the issue surrounding the cultural 
distinctness of French Canadians in some detail (Taylor, 1994: 52-61). 
Quebec had passed laws (such as those requiring that French speaking 
citizens may not send their children to English schools; that businesses of a 
specific size may not be run in English; and that signage be in French only) 
that obviously restrict individuals’ freedom of choice. The French Canadian 
drive to protect its distinct culture and identity (a collective goal) therefore 
infringes the rights of those people who do not, out of their own accord, buy 
into this drive.  
 
Provisional definition of multicultural or inter-cultural conflicts 
The tension between, along one dimension, collective and individual goods, 
and along another dimension, between private and public goods, is a central 
point in our understanding of multicultural conflict. At this point, I would like to 
offer a brief and provisional discussion of what is meant by the term 
“multicultural conflict” (the topic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5).  
 
In this regard, we note that the issues and conflicts termed “multicultural” are 
invariably characterised by claims made either to collective goods, or for 
certain goods to be represented in the public sphere. The collective or public 
good striven for by a certain group is demanded on the basis of its “cultural” 
nature and comes into conflict with the culture of secular/”Western”/liberal 
government, media or activists. It is this aspect of those conflicts we call 
“multicultural” or “inter-cultural” that is of crucial importance in this 
investigation. It is due to this aspect that we cannot simply agree to disagree: 
where “culture” is invoked, it is always used to legitimise the encroachment on 
others’ procedural rights.   
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As an example of this structure, let us consider the outrage at a Danish 
cartoon depicting Mohammed, published in Jyllands Posten in September 
2005 (Rose, 2006). Those outraged indeed call for censorship (if not 
something more drastic). This would encroach on the (Danish) individual’s 
freedom of speech and belief, but would be justified on “cultural” grounds. The 
cartoonist should obey the laws they are committed to, even if he is not, and 
should therefore refrain from what is considered blasphemy. It is something 
that in their view needs to be obeyed by all; otherwise it loses its value. For 
him to recognize their culture3, he has to relinquish one of the basic rights of a 
liberal society, namely to have and express beliefs of one’s own. Other inter-
cultural conflicts can be analysed in the same way. One of these is the French 
Canadian claim to language rights and laws and policies to protect French as 
official language.   
 
Concepts of culture 
Our point of departure in this dissertation is to argue that communitarian and 
similar arguments for the consideration of cultural goods requires a 
conceptualization of cultures as distinct entities, which can be thought of in 
ways similar to how we think of personal autonomy. In Chapter 1, we will 
demonstrate that communitarian theories share a potential stumbling block, 
that is, that their arguments need a concept of cultures as distinct entities in 
order to be successful. In doing so, we will highlight three particular problems 
their arguments need to overcome. These are: 1) the legitimacy of claims to 
cultural protection, 2) the distinctness or delineability of cultures and 3) 
cultures’ inhabitancy of public spaces.  
 
                                                 
3
 In this case, a person’s religion is also considered cultural. This does not represent a 
diminished value for religion. However, the aspect of religion that is pertinent in conflict is that 
which it shares with culture, that is, a system of beliefs and concepts that in some respects 
demands collective action and observance. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 14
Having investigated the implications of these ideas, we will demonstrate how 
communitarian and value-pluralist arguments for the consideration of cultural 
goods necessarily need to show that these three ideas are valid, in order for 
their arguments to be successful. Therefore, we argue that the success of 
their arguments hinges on a certain conceptualisation of culture. If a different, 
coherent conception of cultures as distinct entities can be found, then 
arguments for collective goods over individual liberties will at least be 
possible.   
 
We find the basis of such an alternative view of culture in a systemic view of 
culture, more specifically, in the view of culture as a system of meaning. 
Chapter 2 will discuss a provisional view of culture as system of meaning. In 
this regard, Niklas Luhman’s work on auto-poietic systems will be of 
considerable importance. By way of a critical investigation of Luhmann’s 
model, we will arrive at a conceptualization of meaning and culture that 
clarifies the relationship between the individual and his/her cultural 
background. It will also lay the groundwork for an approach to autonomy 
(which we discuss in Chapter 4) which relies on the concepts of meaning and 
self-reference. Furthermore, it will allow us to show: 
1. That the concept of culture as system of meaning allows us to 
conceptualize the cultural system as a system constituted by 
communicative relationships between individuals. This means that if we 
are to think of cultures as discernible entities, the boundaries of such 
cultures would have to be defined in terms of qualitative differences in 
the communicative relationships between those on the inside and those 
on the outside of a culture.  
2. That characteristics by which we identify and define personal 
autonomy, such as self-reference, can also logically be ascribed to 
cultures and 
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3. That, on the basis of such an analogy with personal autonomy, certain 
criteria for the legitimate occupation of public spaces and institutions 
can be generated. 
 
Other notable authors, such as Clifford Geertz and John Thompson, also 
conceptualise culture as a system of meaning or symbolic system. We prefer 
Luhmann’s approach because it adds significantly to the acuity with which we 
understand meaning, providing us with the conceptual tools with which the 
boundaries of cultures can ultimately be conceptualised (Chapter 5). 
Questions of ideology and power in communicative relationships, however, 
are not sufficiently addressed by Luhmann. Luhmann’s account, however, is 
not inconsistent with such considerations and they will be addressed in 
Chapter 6, where we discuss the requirements for a culture to be thought of in 
a manner as analogous to how we think of personal autonomy.   
 
In order to investigate an analogy between how persons and cultures can be 
delineated, we must first attend to issues of personal delineation. In Chapter 
3, we will argue that a person, unlike other entities, cannot be delineated 
simply with reference to his/her physical boundaries, but that a person has to 
be delineated both in terms of the boundaries of the (biological) organism and 
the boundaries of the psychic system. We regard Stefaan Cuypers’ theory 
about personal identity as a useful synthesis between the main traditions of 
viewing personal identity (including Derek Parfit’s approach) and we develop 
our theory against the backdrop of Cuypers’ theory of personal identity. 
However, we depart from Cuypers, when we show that a person’s self-
delineation – while claiming to give a true account of the person, including the 
goods s/he strives for – does not give a complete and accurate account of 
his/her own psychic system’s boundaries. We subsequently propose a dual 
structure of personal delineability whereby the (biological) organism’s 
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boundary contains4 the psychic system, whereas the boundaries of the 
psychic system, as asserted in the person’s self-delineation, remain 
disputable.  
 
Disputes surrounding boundaries of the psychic system hinge on the 
possibility of a person’s own account, what we will call the “I”-account, being 
inaccurate. As we will show in Chapter 3, a division within the psychic system 
between the “I” and repressed meanings is a necessary feature of meaning 
processing. Where approaches such as Cuypers’ assume an indivisible unity 
of the psyche, our approach needs to show how unity is possible despite an 
internal division. Our proposal in this regard pertains to the notion of ‘unity of 
conflict’, which we will develop in Chapter 3. We will show that repressed 
meanings can continuously be re-appropriated by the “I”.  Repressed psychic 
meanings, though repressed, are retained in memory. This means that at any 
moment in time, the psychic system’s perception of itself as a single, unitary 
“I” has to take into account 1) previously and 2) currently repressed memories, 
as well as 3) conscious memories and 4) current unrepressed psychic 
elements. In so doing, it is continuously confronted with the demand to choose 
between continuing to repress certain psychic elements or to recover them 
from consciousness, or perhaps to repress something that was once 
conscious. We will show that this process involves (1) a reflective or self-
referential quality of the “I” in order to re-appropriate a previously repressed 
meaning; and (2) having become aware of a previously repressed meaning, 
the ability to choose between two opposing meanings.  
 
In Chapter 4, we will argue that personal autonomy is defined by the self-
referential ability to choose between two opposing meanings within the 
psychic system. Thus, what is at stake for our understanding of delineation 
                                                 
4
 We use the term ‘contains’ here with some hesitation. We do not wish to imply that the 
psychic system is like a ghost in the machine, or that the organism is merely the vessel or 
container of the psychic system. We use the word to show that no meanings are interpreted 
without a corresponding bodily process. As such, no part of the psychic system is 
independent or ‘outside’ of the organism.  
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(both of persons and cultures) rests significantly on what we understand by 
the concept of personal autonomy. Chapter 4 sets out to investigate our 
understanding, particularly our “Western” understanding, of personal 
autonomy. We start our investigation by offering a basic definition of 
autonomy as self-legislation and then explore the accounts of self-legislation 
offered by two traditions of thought on this matter, respectively what we will 
call the rationalist and community-centred approaches. Each of these 
traditions attempts to find a philosophical basis for the authority by which the 
individual can legislate himself. While the rationalist tradition places this 
authority in the individual’s ability to reason, the community-based approach 
views the authority as residing in the value system of the individual’s 
community. However, both reason and community are dubious sources of 
authority. On the one hand, it is notoriously difficult in a pluralistic world to 
prove the existence of objective, universal moral laws by whose authority the 
reasonable individual will be able to act autonomously. On the other hand, any 
source that is merely local or specific to a community, struggles to show the 
difference between autonomy and simple conformism to the community’s 
status quo.  
     
The problems each of these faces leads us to consider Cuypers’ model of 
personal autonomy, which goes a long way in solving most of the problems 
faced by the abovementioned two traditions. However, like the 
abovementioned traditions, his model faces difficulties when it needs to 
consider the interaction between the individual and his/her source of authority. 
As a reaction to this, we develop what we will call a meaning-based approach. 
This approach draws strongly on the work of Kierkegaard and the concept of 
meaning we developed in Chapter 2.  
 
The work of Kierkegaard will be of particular importance here.  The radical 
individualist and non-conformist thrust of Kierkegaard’s thought has had a 
lasting influence. It is considered here to be representative of, and a 
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significant contributor to, the strict distinction between an individual and his 
background, resisting any attempt to allow an individual to be dissolved into a 
larger system.  
 
We will show that it is possible to reinterpret Kierkegaard’s account of the true 
self living in an authentic, unique relationship of faith in God in terms of 
meaning, so that the life lived in faith is a meaningful life. This reinterpretation 
will allow us to define the individual’s relationship with his/source of authority 
as one of faith. Based on our account of meaning, however, we will also be 
critical of some of Kierkegaard’s views. The meaning-base approach will show 
that the sharp distinction between an individual and his/her background needs 
to be deconstructed.  
 
What this will hopefully establish is a clearer and more nuanced view of 
autonomy that allows us to overcome the difficulties of both the rationalist and 
the community-centred approaches.  
 
Having investigated personal delineation and autonomy (and how these two 
are related), we will turn our attention to how cultures may be delineated. How 
boundaries may exist in cultural systems will be the focus of Chapter 5. In this 
regard, the analysis will include an investigation of the characteristics of so-
called multicultural conflict situations. It will be demonstrated that precisely 
these characteristics allow for the development of cultural systems with 
boundaries, that is, “cultures”. Put differently, it will be shown how cultures can 
come into existence as a response to conflict and that cultures can only be 
thought of in a coherent manner against the backdrop of conflicts that spark 
the formation of boundaries. Furthermore, we will attempt to show how the 
formation of such boundaries makes it possible for us to think of cultures as 
entities in much the same way as we do in the case of persons. We then 
compare disagreements within a “culture” with the intrapsychic conflicts in the 
unitary experience of the “I”. This leads us to consider that the unitary 
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experience of an “I” that we associate with individual identity is in fact only a 
dominant account that represses other accounts. 
 
In this regard, it is important to note that trying to delineate cultures leads us 
to the problem of how cultures, within the types of boundaries we propose, 
may retain their character while still allowing disagreement. The issue of 
delineation thus flows naturally into issues around the management of 
disagreement and dissent within cultural ranks.  
 
In this dissertation, we propose it is possible to think of cultures that can walk 
this proverbial tight rope between distinctness and internal disagreement, if 
we have a conception of culture that meets the requirements of being 
analogous to personal autonomy. Once again, we do not propose that 
cultures in fact have personal autonomy, or that cultures are, in fact, persons. 
Rather, we propose that completing the analogy allows us to meaningfully 
delineate cultures.  
 
From this basis we will attempt a comparison between the autonomous 
person and the cultures that come into existence in conflict situations, in order 
to show that what is considered as autonomy in individuals has an isomorphic 
structure in cultures. This will be the focus of Chapter 6. Specifically, we show 
how a culture 1) may exhibit self-reference and 2) relate to a source of 
authority in the same way as a person does. In this regard, it is important to 
note that we do not simply equate a culture’s authority simply with the 
authority figures in its ranks, e.g. government, religious or cultural leaders. 
The argument we develop in Chapter 6 will focus on avoiding the application 
of categories such as self-reference and authority to individuals, opting rather 
to show how such categories may be exhibited by institutions within a certain 
culture. As such, our discussion will include consideration of how power may 
intrude on the communicative relationships between individuals and lead us 
towards generating a criterion according to which a culture’s self-referential 
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capacity and the legitimacy of its claims to protection depend in large part on 
the ability of its institutions to safeguard the autonomy of its individual 
members, whereby the character of the culture that is to be protected, is not 
protected  by power, but by the free interaction of its members in a milieu free 
of power. 
 
What implications does treating cultures as distinct entities have in the way we 
approach multicultural conflicts? This will be discussed in Chapter 7. Treating 
a culture as something to be respected seems counterintuitive. Moreover, how 
an individual may treat a culture with respect is not self-evident, as our usual 
approaches mostly only respect persons. These are some of the problems 
with treating cultures as distinct entities. All derive from the general problem of 
applying ethical categories to non-personal entities or beings. With a strong 
analogy between cultures and personal autonomy, it becomes reasonable to 
extend concepts we usually apply to persons, such as fairness, attachment 
and viability so that they can also apply to cultures.  
 
Furthermore, when delineability becomes possible, that is, when we can think 
of cultures as distinct entities, many of the problems faced by communitarian 
arguments and the like can be addressed. How the model of culture we 
developed in the preceding chapters fills the gaps in communitarian 
arguments is the topic of the first section of Chapter 7. We will show how our 
model of culture allows the application of certain concepts, such as 
attachment, fairness and viability, to cultures. This, with the notion of the 
delineability of cultures, will help us to attend to some of the communitarian 
arguments’ problems. 
 
The second section of Chapter 7 will then apply the same concepts to typical 
multicultural conflicts. In this regard, we note that what we propose is not 
definitive solutions to all these cases. Each requires an in depth enquiry into 
the facts involved. What we propose pertains more to developing guidelines 
for the process such enquiries should follow. Rather than offering any 
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concrete answers, we concern ourselves with generating the right type of 
questions to ask. As we will show in section 7.2, these questions involve the 
concepts of fairness, threat and viability.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE NEED FOR DISTINCT CULTURES IN COMMUNITARIAN 
ARGUMENTS 
 
This chapter sets out to show that the concept of cultures as discrete entities 
is crucial for arguments for the protection of cultures. Though the arguments 
we have selected to discuss are often typified as ‘communitarian’ (and we 
continue to use the term for ease of denotation), the intention is not to present 
the communitarian approach in all its facets. Rather, we focus specifically on 
those arguments that argue for the protection of cultures and in this regard, 
we have selected Taylor and Kymlicka.5    
 
If we deny that cultures are distinct things, arguments for the protection of 
cultures run into serious problems. To demonstrate this, we consider the 
theories of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka respectively. In particular, we will 
demonstrate that these theories share a potential stumbling block, that is, that 
their arguments need a concept of cultures as distinct entities in order to be 
successful. In doing so, we will highlight three particular problems their 
arguments need to overcome. These are: 1) the legitimacy of claims to 
cultural protection, 2) the distinctness or delineability of cultures and 3) 
cultures’ inhabitancy of public spaces. We will conclude the chapter with some 
critical considerations regarding liberal alternatives to Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s 
                                                 
5
 The arguments of other noteworthy thinkers associated with a communitarian approach, 
such as Michael Sandel (1982), Alasdair Macintyre (1998) and Michael Walzer (1983), do not 
extend to the protection of particular cultures. In some form or another, the aforementioned 
authors’ arguments each take issue with the neutrality of the public sphere, arguing that some 
form of common or collective good needs to be considered in questions of rights and justice. 
They do not, however, argue for policies that ensure the continued existence of a particular 
culture. Moreover, it is worth noting that those thinkers often cited as examples of the 
communitarian approach, such as Michael Sandel, Alasdair Macintyre and Michael Walzer, 
are themselves uneasy with being typified as such and are in fact critical of the 
communitarian approach. As such, the term is best used only as a very loose categorisation 
and not as a representation of a unified approach. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23
theories. However, for ease of denotation, and seeing that both Taylor and 
Kymlicka’s arguments are to some extent in dialogue with so-called ‘liberal’ 
approaches to multiculturalism, we first offer a very brief working definition of 
what we understand by the term ‘liberal’. 
 
In this dissertation, reference to the term ‘liberal’ does not signify a unified, 
systematically developed conceptualization of culture, nor do we wish to 
present these ideas as such. Rather, these ideas are found in a wide variety 
of arguments that resist communitarian and value-pluralist calls for the 
consideration of cultural goods.  The more specific arguments of each author 
subsumed under the term liberal is therefore not discussed here and is not in 
the scope of this dissertation. Accordingly, we call certain approaches to 
multicultural issues liberal when they emphasise the following two related 
points: a) individual freedom, and b) a neutral public place. By emphasising 
individual freedom, and thus the individual’s freedom to choose his/her own 
goods to strive for, liberal approaches favour a public space that does not 
ascribe to any particular good, but rather enables each individual to strive for 
his/her own good. In this regard, the public space needs to be neutral.  
 
Having provided this very brief exposition, we hasten to note that the authors 
we discuss below are not necessarily ‘un-liberal’. Their theories can be 
regarded as in dialogue with these liberal notions, and, in the case of 
Kymlicka, for instance, the theories may actively seek to demonstrate that 
they are broadly compatible with liberal notions.  
 
At this point, we return to the theories of Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s arguments 
respectively. We first attend to the Taylor’s perspective. In the section devoted 
to his theory we will devote a subsection to certain problems which we will 
demonstrate also apply to Kymlicka’s theory. 
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1.1 Charles Taylor 
Taylor’s argument may be regarded as an example of a communitarian 
approach to multicultural issues. As we will show, the problems Taylor’s 
arguments face is essentially shared by all communitarian and value-pluralist 
arguments, short of radical relativism.  
 
In The Ethics of Authenticity (1991) Taylor takes issue with what he calls the 
‘subjectivation’ (Taylor, 1991:81) of the self. In particular, he takes issue with 
an atomist liberal notion whereby the autonomy of the self is defined 
exclusively by choice, without reference to the conditions whereby these 
choices would have value and significance. He argues that: 
 
‘(T)he modes that opt for self-fulfilment6 without regard (a) to the 
demands of our ties with others or (b) to demands of any kind 
emanating from something more or other than human desires or 
aspirations are self-defeating, that they destroy the conditions for 
realizing authenticity itself.’ (Taylor, 1991:35) 
 
He thus develops an alternative model of autonomy, and in doing so, he also 
connects the notion of autonomy with authenticity and recognition. We will 
now discuss these notions in more detail.  
 
Taylor tracks the notion of authenticity, and its connection to autonomy, to the 
end of the eighteenth century (Taylor, 1991:25). One thinker, according to 
Taylor, who articulated the notion of the value of autonomy was Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who linked morality with being in tune with ‘a voice of nature within 
us’ (Taylor, 1991:27). He then follows this line of thinking to Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s idea that we all have a unique way of being human (Taylor, 1991: 
28). We can thus see how a person’s unique way of being, that is, his/her way 
                                                 
6
 The term self-fulfilment here denotes the person’s striving to attain his own goods. It thus 
pertains to the autonomy of the person. 
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of being him/herself, also entails being free from external influences, and 
hence being free to decide what is important for him/her.   
 
However, Taylor holds that this decision as to what is important is only made 
possible by ‘a background of intelligibility’ (Taylor, 1991: 37). This is the idea 
of a horizon of significance. It is central to Taylor’s so-called dialogical 
conception of human life. In his view, humans are embedded in a framework 
that provides us indications of which things to value above others. Moreover, 
we are inducted into this framework through our interaction with significant 
others and vicariously, with those that have interacted with our significant 
others, hence a whole community. 
 
Moreover, while individuals have the capacity to reflect on the values given in 
their horizon of significance, even depart from them, the horizon is not the 
individual’s own creation. It has the character of being given. (Taylor, 1991: 
39; see also Smith, 2002: 41), and from this given, we decide our choices, 
even if our choices may be to depart, or rebel against this framework.  
 
 Taylor points out that, without reference to such a framework, the very idea of 
choice loses its value. ‘(U)nless some options are more significant than 
others, the very idea of self-choice falls into triviality and hence incoherence.’ 
(Taylor, 1991:39). Put differently, if everything is of equal value, a person’s 
choice of one option over the other is at best the expression of a whim. The 
choice itself holds no value and cannot count as the person’s striving for 
his/her own good. The choice, if it is to be valued, must be an expression of 
what the individual already values to be a good. Moreover, by the same 
reasoning, what the individual values is not a product purely of his/her own 
choosing, but what was given to him/her through his/her interaction with 
others.  
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Furthermore, Taylor points out that, while an individual may choose to depart 
from values given to him/her by significant others, the default position, so to 
speak, is one of treating the values as given. Put differently, the values we 
choose are valuable, not because we choose them, but because they are, in 
fact, good, regardless of whether we chose them or not. Accordingly, values  
 
‘can’t be seen, in principle and in advance, as dispensable and 
destined for supersession. If my self-exploration takes the form of 
such serial and in principle temporary relations, then it is not my 
identity I am exploring, but some modality of enjoyment.’  (Taylor, 
1991:53) 
 
We can follow Taylor’s reasoning, especially if we consider a child’s early 
development, where (rational) self-reflection on one’s given values does not 
yet occur fully. We would then argue that a specific horizon may be given 
originally, but would be open to change, as we develop, through our continued 
interaction with others, but also through our own interpretations. We can then 
see the original horizon as being present, not as an absolute entity, but ever 
present as an internalised point of departure, as the start of our journeys 
towards defining what is important to us.  
 
It is worth noting that, taking the above into account, Taylor does not show 
that continued dialogue with one’s background is a universal need. Rather, his 
argument shows that a lack of dialogue with one’s background of significance 
leads to a deteriorated, impoverished form of autonomy, while continued 
dialogue with one’s background leads to a richer form of autonomy.  
 
While we can agree with the argument thus far, its application to issues of 
recognition becomes problematic. Taylor holds that  
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‘the importance of recognition is now universally acknowledged in 
one form or the other; on an intimate plane, we are all aware how 
identity can be formed or malformed in our contact with significant 
others. On the social plane, we have a continuing politics of equal 
recognition. Both have been shaped by the growing ideal of 
authenticity, and recognition plays an essential role in the culture 
that has arisen around it.’ (Taylor, 1991:49) 
 
In this regard, Taylor uses the term identity as referring to the authentic self. 
The authentic self has been shaped by interaction with others. In terms of 
interaction, recognition can be defined as an affirming interaction, an 
interaction that confirms a measure of acceptance of the person, and affirms 
his/her value as person. However, we would point out that the interactions that 
form the authentic self need not always be in the form of recognition.  In fact, it 
is conceivable that the person’s authentic self would at times just as crucially 
involve the failure of recognition by others. Moreover, there are probably 
numerous people who claim to have no need for being mirrored and 
recognised by “their” community. However, the interplay of recognition and the 
failure of recognition can still be regarded as broadly supporting Taylor’s view, 
in the sense that, at least initially, interaction with significant others (e.g. as a 
baby) is usually accepting and affirming in nature. Departures from this 
position can then occur later in development. This is a position that is also 
broadly confirmed by our current understanding of childhood emotional 
development, where a lack of early recognition is seen to contribute to 
emotional problems in later life. (Louw & Louw, 2007: 120-121). Stephen 
Mulhall, in discussing Taylor, makes a similar point: ‘(I)ndividuals and groups 
can suffer serious damage if the people or society around them mirror back a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.’ (Mulhall, 2004: 
117).  
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Society can thus cause harm to people if it fails to recognise them. However, 
one could easily argue an opposite view, where to recognize certain people’s 
culture would actually harm other people. This argument is precisely what is at 
stake in the debate surrounding, for instance, clitoridectomy, or where any –
from a “Western” perspective - atrocious practice is defended on cultural 
grounds.  
 
Furthermore, how this recognition is to occur is another matter altogether. 
Taylor holds that the answer does not simply lie in leaving the public sphere 
as neutral as possible, as the liberal position proposes. He believes this leads 
to an impoverished self and an impoverished sense of autonomy as it flattens 
horizons of significance. He also argues that it leads to an impoverished form 
of democracy by alienating citizens from society and diluting any solidarity 
citizens may have with their society. In this dissertation, we will focus on the 
first concern mentioned above, namely the question of the individual’s 
autonomy.  
  
Taylor proposes an alternative to the neutral public sphere and its 
concomitant impoverishment of autonomy. He holds ‘that if we are properly to 
treat a human being, we have to respect (his/her) embodied, dialogical, 
temporal nature.” (Taylor, 1991: 106). Taylor thus favours an approach 
whereby to recognise a person is to recognise him in his uniqueness, thus 
focussing on difference even if an underlying principle of equality is still 
noticeable. We all need recognition and to recognise a person is to recognise 
him/her in his/her difference, therefore “(t)he universal demand (for 
recognition) powers an acknowledgement of specificity” (Taylor, 1994: 39). In 
order for every individual to be recognised, the differences between 
individuals need to be acknowledged and indeed become important.    
 
Such a notion indeed has controversial implications. Demands for recognition 
would not focus on that which is universal, but rather on that which is specific. 
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This then refers to difference in background, which is often phrased in terms 
of demands for the recognition of “cultural” identity. The goods that the people 
making these demands are striving for are collective in nature and do not aim 
to create the conditions for each to have free choice. In the context of claims 
to cultural recognition, it means (by Taylor’s reasoning) that some individual 
freedoms may need to be sacrificed for the protection of a cultural group. For 
instance, by establishing laws to protect French in public places in Quebec, 
French Canadians’ culture may be recognized, but all those who do not 
ascribe to that culture have to suffer an impingement on their procedural 
rights, such as those set out below. “It is not just a matter of having the French 
language available for those who might choose it….(I)t also involves making 
sure there is a community of people here in the future that will want to avail 
itself of the opportunity to use the French language” (Taylor, 1994: 58).  
 
In this regard, Taylor discusses the issue surrounding the cultural distinctness 
of French Canadians in some detail (Taylor, 1994: 52-61). Quebec had 
passed laws (such as those requiring that French speaking citizens may not 
send their children to English schools; that businesses of a specific size may 
not be run in English; and that signage be in French only) that obviously 
restrict individuals’ freedom of choice.7 The French Canadian drive to protect 
its distinct culture and identity (a collective goal) therefore infringes the rights 
of those people who do not, out of their own accord, buy into this drive. It is 
the “making sure”, the active protection of a “culture” that is so controversial: it 
seems that the only way to ensure the future of such a community is to coerce 
some people (who don’t want to) to belong to it by occupying public spaces 
and spheres.  
 
According to Taylor’s thinking, an approach that focuses exclusively on 
individual freedoms may serve to slowly deteriorate community. If the public 
                                                 
7
 In this case, the distinctness of the French Canadian “culture” revolves around language. In 
other cases, language is not so central. In Chapter 5 we will show how multicultural conflicts 
construct which aspects of a “culture” are regarded as central to the definition of a “culture”.  
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space is made “neutral” to protect every individual’s procedural rights, it 
impacts a community’s ability to generate interest amongst individuals to be 
part of that community and without such interest, the number of members of 
the community eventually dwindles and approaches zero. The case of 
languages in public space can be taken as a useful example of the 
disadvantages of being relegated to the private sphere. It is a well-established 
fact in linguistics and social psychology (cf. Hogg & Vaughan, 2008: 571) that 
languages that are isolated, and that lack prestige or utility in public life, run 
the risk of extinction. Moreover, languages’ prestige or utility (more 
specifically, their speakers’ perception of these), are greatly influenced by 
their prominence in the public sphere. If a language cannot, for instance, be 
used when going shopping in the city, or for academic studies, it loses its 
utility and becomes a language that is only good for private use, thus losing 
some prestige. Thus it stands to reason that a horizon of significance that has 
public presence, naturally has an advantage over horizons that do not. To a 
large extent, a cultural community’s “attractiveness” or ability to generate 
interest in being part of that cultural group is proportionate to the public space 
it occupies.  
 
Taylor’s argument therefore attempts to show how an individualist approach 
might threaten the survival of a “culture”. Such an approach would then be 
“inhospitable” (Taylor, 1994: 61) and homogenize difference. This moves 
Taylor to propose that where goods striven for are collective, they should be 
striven for collectively.  
 
Taylor argues that participation in a community is crucial for the development 
of a self. This may be true. It almost goes without saying that others play a 
crucial role in the people we become. For instance, unless one holds the view 
that the development of the self is only the unfolding of a genetic plan, one 
has to acknowledge the role of socialization in the selves we become. More 
specifically, we argue in Chapter 2 that healthy human meaning processing as 
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we know it is inconceivable without social interaction. In as much as our 
meanings shape our decisions and the narrative of our lives, our social 
interaction with others is crucial to the selves we become. Moreover, our view 
of the significance of our social interaction should not be equated to simple 
conformity to others’ views. Yet, even when we depart from values that our 
parents have taught us, the meanings we experience in our departure can 
only make sense against the backdrop of our previous communion with those 
values. 
 
In this regard, we can go along with Taylor’s argument for the importance of 
horizons of significance. However, this does not yet mean that a specific 
“culture” should be conformed to, that we should pledge allegiance to it and 
that we have a right for it to continue to exist. Moreover, Taylor fails to show 
clearly why the continued presence of the horizon of significance is necessary 
in the public sphere. Elsewhere, he acknowledges its continued role even 
when internalised:  
 
‘We define [important issues] always in dialogue with, sometimes in 
struggle against, the identities our significant others want to 
recognize in us. And even when we outgrow some of the latter – 
our parents, for instance – and they disappear from our lives, the 
conversation with them continues within us as long as we live.’ 
(Taylor, 1991: 33). 
 
This means that, even after a community’s extinction, it may still play a 
valuable role in forming the person’s self. It is perhaps an intuitive idea that 
having a dialogue is more fruitful if one’s interlocutor is not yet internalised, 
that is, still available in the flesh. But what are the grounds for this intuition? 
Why does the culture one is in dialogue with, need to be ‘out there’, so to 
speak?  
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Furthermore, if recognising members of a certain culture entails protecting 
that culture, does this serve to fix that horizon of significance as an absolute, 
flying in the face of its dynamic, dialogical nature? As a hypothetical example, 
let us consider a person belonging to a community of psycho-analysts. In his 
dialogue with this community, he finds his true self and lives a rich 
autonomous life. However, as time goes by, dissidence grows amongst the 
ranks of the analysts and some leave the community. Others grow old and 
die. In the end, only our hypothetical analyst remains, with no-one left to talk 
to about Freud. Is his life poorer for it? Yes, perhaps. However, it does not 
follow that he has a claim towards the protection of this society. Its dynamic, 
dialogical nature, which is the source of this person’s rich autonomy, also in 
times leads to its demise. Though he may never feel at home in his city again, 
there is nothing to be done about it. Society, so it appears, can at best allow 
certain communities to function. It cannot, however, act to ensure its 
continued existence. Yet it is precisely the continued existence of cultures that 
Taylor proposes.     
 
We hold that Taylor’s arguments can at best show that the public sphere 
needs to have what we will call additional neutrality. By this we mean that the 
public sphere, in addition to staying neutral, can also hold as a value a certain 
robustness in allowing people to express their attachments to their 
backgrounds, as long as this does not interfere with others’ autonomy.8 
However, this can still be regarded as a procedural value, like neutrality. Any 
public space imbued with content that exceeds this neutrality, invariably 
results in subtle infringements on individuals’ autonomy, particularly those 
individuals who do not wish to ascribe to the culture that inhabits the public 
sphere. What his arguments do not show, is that members of certain culture 
can lay claim to the culture’s continued existence. 
                                                 
8
 Jean Bethke Elshtain (2004:127-139) makes a similar point. Basing her argument on 
Taylor’s model of rich autonomy, she argues for what she calls ‘deep toleration’. This refers to 
a tolerance that resists privatisation of individuals’ goods, and maintains an openness towards 
proselytization. Michael Sandel’s arguments in Justice (2009) and Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice (1982) similarly argues against the privatization of individuals’ goods.  
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Taylor has to show that the protection of a culture is in fact legitimate. On 
what grounds can he justify it as a good? Why should a certain culture be 
protected by laws and policies, and occupy public spaces to the exclusion of 
those who are not of that culture, if it has the implication that collective goods 
can sometimes encroach on individual autonomy? Just as we can think of 
examples of people who seemingly live good lives without needing 
community, we can think of cultures committing terrible acts in the name of 
staying true to that culture. If we allow culture to be striven for as a good to the 
detriment of individual autonomy, do we not become entangled in a paralyzing 
relativism, opening the door to a wide range of atrocious practices? This is the 
problem of the legitimacy of cultural claims to protection. 
 
1.1.1 Cultures’ legitimate claims towards protection 
Firstly, as Daniel Weinstock (1994: 176) argues, given Taylor’s conception of 
the dialogical self, the liberal state best serves to maintain a healthy dialogue. 
A society where every individual’s right to strive for a certain good is 
protected, makes for richness in differences for the self to be formed in. Put 
differently, the protection of individual rights allows space for “agents of Love” 
(Rorty, 1991: 206)9 to do their work and increase understanding amongst 
different groups. The recognition of culture which an individual would want to 
claim will be best delivered in the liberal state. Following Weinstock’s view, 
recognition of culture in a liberal state does not mean granting collective 
rights. A person’s background and culture is recognised in as much as s/he is 
given the space to raise his/her views and engage in dialogue with others 
about it, the only limitation being that s/he grants others the same space.  
 
                                                 
9
 Rorty’s ‘Agents of Love’ refer to professionals such as journalists, novelists, anthropologists 
and the like, who, by providing us with deep investigations of others’ lives, increases our 
understanding and empathy for their positions.   
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This is naturally not a negation of the influence of culture. Many of Taylor’s 
critics would readily admit that we are indeed cultural beings, influenced, 
shaped and to a certain extent conditioned by culture. However, thinkers like 
Weinstock and Rorty implicitly deny that those elements in one’s cultural 
background (such as language and the particular communication networks or 
communities an individual participated in) need to be protected. They have 
played a part in forming the self, and even if they cease to exist, will still be 
present in the influence they have had on the self. Their demise does not 
make the person any less of a self. Moreover, arguments such as Rorty’s and 
Weinstock’s assume a measure of ‘detachment’ between an individual and 
his/her culture. Accordingly, culture serves its purposes (and derives its worth) 
by providing a context in which an individual can live meaningfully and 
autonomously.  
 
This has the implication of an element of choice and evaluation on the side of 
the individual. This is a line of argument Jürgen Habermas has taken in 
debates on multicultural issues (Habermas, 1986: 238-243, see also p.117). 
According to Habermas, a culture provides possibilities for meaningful living 
when an individual chooses to participate in that culture because s/he finds 
the meanings it offers valuable. As such, a culture faces the challenge of 
convincing an individual of its value. This means that a culture which 
represents an archaic way of life or which has lost relevance to individuals, 
has lost its worth.  
 
This is the idea that drives Habermas’ argument (1994) against Taylor’s 
defence of cultural survivance, which we will discuss in more detail below. A 
culture should ensure its reproduction by maintaining relevance for the 
individuals that participate in it, and not through some form of institutional 
protection. In this regard, Weinstock (1994: 176) and Guy Haarscher (1997: 
240) make similar arguments against the protection of cultures. Weinstock 
argues that a liberal regime provides the best milieu for an individual to 
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participate in cultures, because it provides for a richness of dialogue and 
variety of options for meaningful living that would be lost if, for instance, a 
person would be forced to belong only to his/her “own culture”. Similarly, 
Haarscher, with reference to Kymlicka’s idea of a “context of choice”, (see our 
discussion on this concept in the following section) argues that preserving 
contexts of choice can only be valuable if an individual also has access and 
exposure to other contexts of choice, which would rule out the justifiability of 
forcing individuals to participate in only their “own culture”. In any case, so he 
continues, such force does not really strengthen the culture or make it any 
more vital or relevant: as soon as the force is removed, such a culture withers 
because it did not legitimately convince its members of the value of 
participating in it (Haarscher, 1997: 241-242).  
 
Furthermore, the individual’s ability to “detach” him/herself from his/her culture 
implies a certain willingness to engage in rational debate about that culture. If 
a culture has worth by means of an individual’s voluntary participation in that 
culture, individuals should be able to defend or justify their choice of 
participation. Duncan Ivison (2005: 179), in his discussion of James Tulley’s 
position, notes that it is precisely due to the fact that our ideas are historically 
and culturally conditioned that we should maintain an openness to criticism 
and rational dialogue. In this regard, Chandran Kukathas (2004: 220) notes 
that open communication and debate is hindered by exaggerated claims of 
particularism. It leads to the untenable situation where anything a person says 
can only be construed as an expression of his/her culture and never be 
judged on its validity. Failing to take into account the autonomy of the 
individual in his participation with culture therefore results in the effective 
exclusion of any possibility of consensus in public debates. One could then 
argue that this would be in contradiction with the very aim of communication in 
public matters.10  
                                                 
10
 According to Habermas’ view, communicative action is action undertaken with the purpose 
to reach agreement between speakers. Participants in an argument cannot but aim at 
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The ability and willingness to rationally defend one’s participation in a culture 
also places limits on the protection from, for instance, blasphemy. As 
Haarscher (1997: 244-246) notes in his defence of freedom of speech, 
blasphemy differs from racism in that, while racism represents a crime against 
a person, blasphemy is aimed at the ideas that person holds. He therefore 
makes it clear that the person stands in a detached, evaluative relationship to 
his/her ideas and should be willing to engage in debate on it. Therefore, given 
the “detachment” that characterizes an individual’s relationship to his/her 
background, he can, indeed should continue to participate in other cultural 
resources for him to develop fully as a self.  
 
However, views such as those of Weinstock, when focussing on a culture’s 
value as background, do not account for the value a culture has for an 
individual by virtue of being the individual’s ‘own’. Thus, while he may still be 
able to participate in other cultures, he suffers, in Taylor’s view, a significant 
loss when he cannot continue to participate in his ‘own’ culture. This is the 
issue of the survival of a culture. This is a point Taylor raises (Taylor, 1994: 
57-61). The “survivance” (Taylor, 1994: 58) of one’s culture as a good cannot 
be protected by a simple procedural equality. As in the case of Quebec, a 
smaller language (which for Taylor is part of the cultural background to be 
recognised), cannot compete with a larger global language, and will be ousted 
by the latter, to the detriment of the French culture in Quebec.  
 
This leads us to a second type of criticism against Taylor, namely that the 
survival of a culture is not something that can legitimately be considered. This 
criticism holds that while individuals have a right to protection, cultures do not. 
Accordingly, Habermas draws the line where striving for cultural goods 
infringes on individual liberties. Such endeavours can be justified only 
because individuals have the freedom to choose it as a good; these cultural 
                                                                                                                                            
rationally achieved consensus, free of domination, or else they commit a performative 
contradiction (Habermas, 1986: 259). We return to this view on p. 65 and again on p. 89 
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goods may therefore not infringe on individual autonomy. Furthermore, only 
individuals can be recognised or misrecognised, included or marginalised. 
Cultures themselves cannot be recognised other than by recognising 
individuals’ unencumbered participation in a cultural community, whereby it is 
ultimately the individual who is recognised.  The moment striving for a cultural 
good infringes on an individual’s autonomy, it loses its purpose. For 
Habermas, culture has no inherent value, and only has value relative to the 
meaningful living, identity-formation and autonomy it provides for an 
individual.   
 
While Taylor and Kymlicka also argue that individual rights may not be 
compromised, the measures that they propose for cultural protection do in fact 
have subtle effects of impingement on individual rights, as we will point out 
below.  
 
Many authors critical of Taylor have serious concerns about cultural goods, as 
allowing people to strive for these may jeopardise individuals’ striving for their 
own goods.  
 
“(The) whole thrust of the ‘politics of difference’ ... is that it seeks to 
withdraw from individual members of minority groups the 
protections normally offered by the liberal states ... and [that these 
groups] should be able to discriminate with impunity against women 
or adherents or religions other than the majority” (Barry in Ivison 
2005: 173, cf. Abu-Laban, 2002: 463) 
 
As a result, individual autonomy functions as a limit to striving for cultural 
goods. This leads some authors, such as Joseph Raz (1995), to envision a 
multicultural state that provides the possibility for people to express their 
cultural identities and continue to participate in their cultures, with the sole 
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limit that such participation may not encroach on others’ individual autonomy. 
This also has the implication that a culture may not be forced on anyone and 
participation has to be voluntary.   
 
“But should we respect a culture, that is, a holistic entity? In certain 
definite circumstances, the answer might be yes: When a free 
association of individuals decide to preserve it (necessarily at the 
same time reinterpreting it), and want to go on living in what 
Kymlicka (1989, 162 ff.; 1995) calls a ‘context of choice’. But such a 
liberty (first of all the freedom of conscience) must be preserved as 
the essential value, so that the culture is not imposed on people 
and is, on the contrary, affirmed in the openness to the other. 
Actually, this openness involves the unavoidable risk of dissolution 
of one culture into the other...” (Haarscher, 1997: 239) 
   
The importance placed on individual autonomy in these criticisms of Taylor 
has certain implications for the idea of a culture’s right to survival. As 
Habermas (1994) points out in a reply to Taylor, cultures naturally compete 
with each other: the more convincing the culture, the more individuals it will 
“win over”. Whether or not an individual chooses to participate in a culture is 
dependent on the way of life the culture represents and how valuable the 
individual deems that way of life. The individual’s participation in a certain 
culture depends on how attractive, useful or fruitful the culture is perceived to 
be by the individual. In this view, a culture that continues to exist, has earned 
its right to survival and there is nothing that suggests that a culture a priori 
deserves protection against such natural processes. Moreover, the continuing 
survival of a culture should then not be secured by protection, but by making 
the culture more attractive, so to speak. The latter, and not the former, should 
be the striving of those seeking the survival of their culture.  
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That the competition between two cultures may be unfair is not voiced by 
Habermas. This seems to imply that one culture can legitimately outperform 
and expel other smaller cultures. Yet several factors can contribute to this 
competition being in a certain sense unequal. Consider, for instance, the 
competition between French and English in Quebec. English’s global reach is 
an attractive feature as it implies connectivity and access to an international 
community. Many human endeavours, be it trade, research or art, can benefit 
from such international connectivity. The language’s status as some sort of 
lingua franca, also makes it attractive for use in public spaces. As most people 
can understand it, an English public space is hospitable to people from 
virtually all corners of the earth to ply their trade in a country of their choice.  
 
These factors weigh heavily in English’s favour and it is conceivable that it 
would contribute to the ever-larger presence of English and the deterioration 
of French in public places. Moreover, it seems that once the upper hand is 
gained, “fighting back” is extremely difficult. The bigger and stronger a culture, 
the more attractive it becomes, and the bigger and stronger it becomes. This 
might seem unfair to some, but only if we assume that there should be 
something like a level playing field between cultures, assuming they could be 
treated unfairly just like people. 
 
To be fair, Taylor does not advocate a simple carte blanche for anyone to do 
anything based on culture, nor does he argue that culture should always 
trump individual autonomy. But how does one discern when to favour a 
culture over an individual, and where does one draw the line against certain 
practices? Moreover, he still needs to show why culture should be considered 
at all. Therefore, Taylor needs a conceptualisation of culture that can provide 
guidelines for how the individual relates to his/her culture and crucially, he 
needs a conceptualisation that provides for the protection of cultures as a 
legitimate good.  
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1.1.2 Distinct boundaries 
Further criticisms of Taylor’s arguments are pertinent here. Firstly Taylor’s 
concern for a person’s losing their “own” culture leaves his argument 
vulnerable to the charge of essentialism (cf. Abu-Laban, 2002). His argument 
implies that this “own” culture is something with an identity and easily 
demarcated. If culture is not homogenous and cannot be defined by essential 
features, such as, for instance, shared beliefs, to which culture does a person 
refer when s/he laments its demise and how will one go about protecting it? 
This is the problem of delineation of cultures. Put differently, it is the question 
of how we can view cultures as distinct entities. 
 
Is a culture something with discernible boundaries, that is, are there discrete 
entities called “cultures” that can be distinguished from other “cultures”? 
Critics of Taylor11 point out that cultures cannot be delineated, and that doing 
so is a form of essentialism. 
 
Yasmeen Abu-Laban (2002), for instance, criticizes Taylor and Kymlicka for 
their assumption that an individual wants to belong to one culture. For Abu-
Laban, this implies an essentialist position, that is, that “each culture has a 
unique, fixed essence that can be understood independently of context or 
intercultural relations, and which makes an ethnic group act the way it does” 
(Modood in Abu-Laban, 2002: 461). This flies in the face of the alleged 
dynamic nature of culture: individuals participate in a variety of communication 
networks that cannot all be subsumed under one culture. Rather, the variety 
of networks tends to transcend boundaries, which leads on to question how 
valid the very idea of cultural boundaries can be.  
 
Moreover, an interactionist and dynamic view of culture also posits a certain 
“detachment” between individual and culture (which we discussed in the 
                                                 
11
 As we will discuss in section 1.2., Will Kymlicka is exposed to similar types of criticism. 
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previous section).  Hereby the individual has a certain critical distance from it 
by which s/he can evaluate that culture. This process, as Habermas’ analysis 
shows, is central to the reproduction of culture. “(E)very continuation of 
tradition is selective, and precisely this selectivity must pass today through the 
filter of critique....” (Habermas, 1986: 243, see also pp. 238-243, 117).  
 
If we do not assume a metaphysical entity that everyone shares a priori, we 
must assume that the reproduction of culture takes place through 
communication, and that that which people share is arrived at by the process 
of understanding. Such communication, Habermas argues, “can only run 
along the rails of intersubjectively recognized validity claims.” (1986: 261) and 
becomes part of a shared understanding by the “affirmations and negations of 
those to whom (the communication) is addressed.” (1986: 261). Diversity and 
the interplay of agreement and disagreement therefore lie at the core of the 
development of culture. This means that defining a culture simply by an 
agreement on certain values is problematic. This also rules out the possibility 
of defining a culture by a list of essential features.  
 
Even if the rich heterogeneity in culture could be accounted for by an 
essentialist view, delineating a culture on grounds of agreement or shared 
understanding would always comprise an outdated, historical account of an 
agreement that is already up for re-interpretation, critique, validation and re-
appropriation.  
 
Now, anthropological evidence suggests an ever-present creolization and 
heterogeneity of so called cultures. (Abu-Laban, 2002: 465) and our common 
sense leads us to a similar conclusion: in the light of international migration, 
globalization and increasing cosmopolitanism, it seems inappropriate to think 
of cultures as discrete entities. Accordingly, Abu-Laban proposes a 
“multiculturalism based on equity, on the notion that cultures are dynamic and 
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differentiated, and on the idea that individuals may have multiple identities” 
(Abu-Laban, 2002: 465). 
 
This anti-essentialist position allows authors such as Abu-Laban (2002; cf 
Ivison, 2005: 173-185; cf. Zolo, 1997: 250) to charge advocates of “cultures” 
with the crime of homogenizing heterogeneity, which leaves the door open for 
stereotypes, prejudice and other types of marginalizing discourses. Any 
attempt to define a culture by means of essential features would entail cutting 
and stretching its actual heterogeneity to fit into such an essential conception. 
At best, this amounts to a generalisation, at worst a caricature of that culture. 
Thus the idea of “cultures” that can be defined by essential features defeats 
the purpose of multiculturalism, that is, to provide peaceful and respectful co-
existence in the context of different cultural backgrounds. Moreover, the anti-
essentialist position allows one to be critical of the very idea of “multicultural” 
conflicts. Construing such conflicts as disputes between “windowless monads” 
(Geertz, 2000: 75) then runs the risk of exaggerating differences, 
underestimating similarities,  ignoring nuances and variances in opinions and 
belief and generally precluding the possibility of resolving the issue at hand 
through communication. Similarly, Kukathas (2004: 220) warns about the 
dangers of an exaggerated particularism: when an individual’s belief is a 
“defining feature”, so to speak, of his/her culture (for instance: “that is a typical 
position for an Englishman to take”), it stops one from taking the validity of 
such a belief seriously and one ascribes it, writes it off, as it were, to his/her 
culture. 
 
Furthermore, an anti-essentialist position allows one to be critical of some 
aspects (like certain rituals, norms, etc.) of a culture without having to reject it 
as a whole. The argument that disallowing certain practices would threaten 
the survival of a culture does not hold when one assumes that, 1) to begin 
with the definition of such a culture is a generalization and oversimplification 
and 2) that the banning of certain practices is unlikely to significantly impede 
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individuals in participating in communication networks and maintaining other 
meanings that they hold to be valuable.   
 
“El Darer responds to (the argument that banning certain rituals will 
destroy the culture) ,...by questioning the assumption that these 
cultures can survive only by continuing clitoridectomy or 
infibulations. These cultures, she argues, are more likely to be 
transformed by war, famine, disease, urbanization and 
industrialization than by the cessation of this ancient ritual surgery” 
(Kopelman, 2005: 241). 
 
The dynamic nature of culture, following an anti-essentialist view, leads one to 
consider that the conservation of one feature of a culture has much less 
importance than those factors (such as war, or recession, etc.) that could 
actually impact on how individuals interact and participate in that culture. This 
leaves us with a view of cultures as having much more resilience than those 
calling cultural protection sometimes wish to acknowledge.  
 
1.1.3 Cultural inhabitancy of public spaces 
Without positing cultures as distinct things that can legitimately be protected, 
Taylor’s arguments do not hold. Notwithstanding the dialogical nature of the 
self, if culture itself is not a discernible thing, the survival of a “culture” cannot 
be something to be legislated for by setting boundaries and allocating 
institutions. This is the related problem of how cultures can inhabit public 
spaces.  
 
Following the difficulties with delineating cultures, some critics of Taylor’s 
arguments point out that, strictly speaking, it is not a culture that is 
accommodated in multiculturalism, but the community that shares that culture. 
The freedom thus afforded always refers to the people. Strictly speaking, then, 
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it is not a certain culture that occupies public space, but a certain community, 
(often minority) group, or individual who wants his/her views or beliefs 
recognised based on their “cultural” background (cf. Abu-Laban, 2002: 460; 
Baumeister, 2003: 753-754; Brighton, 2007: 6; Haarscher, 1997: 238-240; 
Zolo, 1997: 250).  
 
Accordingly, Raz (1995) sees an approach to multiculturalism that rests on the 
belief that individual recognition is dependent on unimpeded participation in 
one’s cultural group as applicable “in those societies in which there are 
several stable (my italics) cultural communities (my italics) both wishing and 
able to perpetuate themselves” (Raz, 1995: 173). Moreover, Raz comes to the 
conclusion that such communities, while enjoying the freedom to perpetuate 
themselves, would have to be limited in not encroaching on the individual 
rights of citizens. Communities may therefore be granted self-rule in certain 
public spaces and institutions, but with the restriction that individual autonomy 
is not breached.  
 
On this view, “cultural” goods can only refer to goods claimed by communities, 
which relegates such claims to the purely political sphere. The extent to which 
self-rule in public spaces and institutions is granted is dependent on the size 
and stability of the community.  
 
An individual from a culture with few people in a certain society then does not 
have an equally strong claim to cultural goods, and would best be advised to 
seek recognition purely within a liberal procedural equality, which is the 
response to diversity Raz calls non-discrimination (Raz, 1995: 172): This 
refers to each individual’s right not to be discriminated against based on any 
superficial characteristic (such as skin colour) or conception of the good life. 
Moreover, such an individual, given the detachability of an individual from his 
culture, must accept that the beliefs and ideas s/he holds dear are free to be 
criticised and commented on (Haarscher, 1997: 244-246). S/he cannot, 
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outside of a free association of like-minded individuals, “reserve” certain 
spaces in public society where his/her views are to be left sacred and 
untouched by criticism and/or even ridicule.   
 
Though not all authors we group together here agree with Raz as to the extent 
to which a culture should be afforded public space12, the detachment between 
individual and culture that these authors share serves to delineate the 
controversies between them. It establishes a consensus about the necessity 
of some sort of neutrality in the public sphere, so that all can be 
accommodated and treated equally (if not the same), and defines the issue to 
be debated as to how to establish such a neutrality, with some authors (such 
as Zolo) defending the more traditional notion of non-discrimination while 
others, like Raz, propose a more progressive approach to multiculturalism, 
with the restriction that individual rights may not be thus compromised.  
 
The detachment between individual and culture strictly speaking does not 
necessarily deny cultural inhabitancy of public spaces, but rather places a 
definite restriction on the extent to which a culture can inhabit public spaces. 
Here we note again that policies designed to accommodate cultures in public 
spaces do not strictly accommodate cultures but rather the communities that 
define themselves by those cultures. Furthermore, the extent to which public 
space is afforded to communities would be directly proportional to the 
communities’ size and stability. It is at this point that the anti-essentialist 
argument becomes pertinent.  
 
A consistent anti-essentialism is critical of the very idea of stable communities 
on which multiculturalism rests. The difficulties with delineating and defining 
the boundaries of a certain culture are transferred to questions of public 
                                                 
12
 In this regard, see Verhaar and Saharso’s (2004) discussion of the polemic regarding 
headscarves in the public service in Holland. See also Modood’s (2003) discussion of the 
retreat of multiculturalism in favour of ‘integration’ in European politics.  
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inhabitancy. If we cannot define a culture as a whole with discernible 
boundaries and, within those boundaries, a perfect sharing and consensus on 
the defining meanings of that culture, on which grounds will we be able to say: 
“Here, in this town/district/city/province/state, our language is the official 
language, or our cultural rules are to be adhered to”, etc.? Furthermore, 
having pointed out this problem, we also have to note that it is not clear 
exactly why it would be important to do so in the first place. Put differently, it is 
not clear why it would be important to be able to have a place where their 
culture is protected and institutionalised. This refers again to the problem of 
the legitimacy of cultural claims towards protection. 
 
As an anti-essentialist view is sceptical of the idea of cultures, it has to treat 
claims of recognition by cultures as claims made by the community, the 
leaders of which (and there may be doubt as to their legitimacy or their 
representivity of the community members’ views), are advocates for certain 
issues. These claims to recognition then have to be balanced by the necessity 
of a neutral public space.  
 
An anti-essentialist view of culture points to the necessity of providing as 
neutral as possible a public space. Given the heterogeneity within cultures, 
even within the most stable cultural communities, it is, firstly, simply 
impossible to provide for every difference in the public space, and secondly, 
imbuing public space with more culture will be to exclude some individuals. 
The answer therefore is not more culture in public spaces, but less.  
 
Naturally, some public spaces already have a cultural flavour and reflect the 
history and background of that region. So we will find, for instance, an official 
language on sign posts and in government correspondence and think nothing 
of the fact that it might not be equally accessible to everyone in the world.  Put 
differently, there is no society, no public space, where everyone will feel 
equally welcome and at home. The point is, however, that attempting to 
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recognise those that are marginalised in the process cannot, may not, 
compromise those very measures that make accommodating others at all 
possible.    
 
The best a cultural community can hope for, therefore, is that the state may 
allow a “parallel” inhabitancy, a co-habitation that does not diminish the 
neutrality of the public space (e.g. self-determination based on free 
association about certain issues that do not compromise the state’s 
commitment to the protection of individual rights). Moreover, such a co-
habitation is very heavily dependent on the demography of the culture, that is, 
the people that identify themselves by that culture. A community that is 
dispersed will have much less bargaining power for such inhabitancy rights 
than a group characterised by large numbers in a concentrated space. In this 
regard, with apology to Freud, demography is destiny. Following the anti-
essentialist and individualist view, cultural inhabitancy of public spaces has 
much more to do with political power than legitimate consideration of the 
respecting cultures. 
 
We conclude our discussion of Taylor by noting that the three problems we 
have highlighted (see sections 1.1.1-3) all involve the question of how we are 
to view cultures and individuals’ interactions with their cultures. Put differently, 
we propose that the success of Taylor’s communitarian arguments (or, for that 
matter, those of his critics) hinges on how he views cultures. For his 
arguments to succeed, Taylor thus needs to show that it is possible to have a 
conceptualisation of cultures as distinct things deserving of protection. Without 
the delineation of a distinct culture, the culture, even if considered as 
something of inherent worth, cannot be defended or protected. Without the 
possibility to delineate cultures, culture is not something we can intervene in. 
This is because no physical space or institution can be occupied by the 
culture. If no physical space or institution can be occupied by a culture, no 
policy can be changed and no boundaries can be laid within which the culture 
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may be protected. The distinctness of culture and its ability to function as 
something of worth rests on its delineable occupation of public space. For 
instance, we have to be able to say: “here, in this 
town/district/city/province/state, our language is the official language, or our 
cultural rules are to be adhered to”, etc. Furthermore, the legitimacy of 
protecting a culture is necessary to change culture from something that can 
be intervened in, to something for which intervention is justified. By adding this 
characteristic to distinctness, culture is changed from a distinct “thing” (like a 
rock) to a “thing” that deserves to be protected and survive.  
 
1.2. Will Kymlicka 
While Will Kymlicka’s arguments should not be considered communitarian – 
he is critical of communitarian approaches in general (cf. Kymlicka, 1990) – he 
does propose arguments for the protection of cultures based on the principle 
of equality. He thus attempts to show that the protection of cultures is 
consistent with a liberal framework. Nonetheless, his arguments encounter 
much of the same problems encountered by communitarians, as we will 
discuss below.  
 
Kymlicka’s arguments focus on equality as a basis for group rights. According 
to this argument, the protection of certain cultural rights may actually serve to 
increase equality. As such, he attempts to show that the protection of cultures 
is consistent with a liberal framework. In this regard, we favour Kymlicka’s 
argument over Taylor’s because his equality argument can potentially provide 
a more solid basis for the legitimacy of cultural rights. However, as we will 
show below, his argument is not without problems.  
 
Kymlicka (1989: 162) adopts a model similar to that of John Rawls and Gerald 
Dworkin in his attempt to justify the protection of cultural communities. Rawls 
argues that liberal citizenship provides the conditions needed to decide our 
goals and goods. As such, citizenship is a structure that functions as a 
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precondition for individual freedom. Kymlicka extends this idea to ‘cultural 
structures’. As we will discuss below, the idea of cultural structures is vague 
and (on some points) problematic. In Kymlicka’s argument, a cultural structure 
represents a ‘context of choice’ (1989: 164-166; 1998: 96), a framework within 
which individuals pursue their goals:  
 
“Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, 
…because it’s only through having a rich and secure cultural 
structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the 
options available to them, and intelligently examine their value.” 
(Kymlicka, 1989: 165).  
 
In this regard, Kymlicka makes an argument similar to Taylor’s on rich forms 
of (personal) autonomy. As with Taylor’s horizons of significance, contexts of 
choice are required to make choices valuable, not mere expressions of whim.  
 
Kymlicka’s extension of the liberal model to cultural structures thus forms the 
basis of his equality argument. Where members of a dominant group can 
pursue their goals with a secure cultural structure in place, members of a 
minority group have to expend effort and resources to maintain their cultural 
structures, leaving them very little energy or few resources to pursue the goals 
and lifestyle they would want to (Kymlicka, 1989: 189). They are thus 
disadvantaged, and not as a result of their choices, but as a result of 
something they had little control over, e.g. having been born into that culture. 
So, as within a Dworkinian perspective, ‘differences in resources may 
(legitimately) arise as a result of … choices’ (Kymlicka, 1989: 186), the 
inequality with regard to cultural structures is not the members of the 
minorities’ responsibility and they should be accommodated just like people 
with disabilities should be accommodated (1989:86).  
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In this regard, one has to note that differences in goods and resources may 
also be the result of fair competition, and one’s success in this may often 
relate quite strongly to factors that are not of one’s choice, but are due to 
chance: intelligence, for instance, is not distributed evenly amongst people, 
nor is numerical proficiency or ball skills, all of which can have a significant 
impact on various types of competition. Kymlicka’s analogy of a minority 
culture with a disabled person adds to his view that the individual is strongly 
attached to his culture and that to have to change it or adopt another culture, 
albeit uncomfortable and disruptive, is more similar to someone who is 
permanently disabled than to someone who, having been dealt a somewhat 
less favourable hand, simply has to deal with it and make the best of it.  We 
will discuss the notion of attachment to one’s culture below. For now, we first 
turn to some of the most important concepts and distinctions employed in his 
arguments.  
 
Kymlicka distinguishes between ‘national minorities’ and (minority) ethnic 
groups in polyethnic states. National minorities are groups that were already 
present in the country when the current state was founded, have a prior 
history of self-government, and share a common language and culture. These 
groups, according to Kymlicka have stronger claims to such special group 
representation and self-government rights. Other ethnic groups that do not 
meet these criteria, e.g. immigrant groups who enter the country voluntarily 
after its foundation, have a weaker claim to special rights.  The reason behind 
this differential treatment with reference to national minorities and other ethnic 
groups is a natural implication of Kymlicka’s equality argument. Kymlicka 
argues that national minorities were functioning as autonomous societies. 
Moreover, as they were conquered or colonised, they did not cede their 
autonomy voluntarily. Other ethnic groups are accommodated without needing 
to call for special ‘cultural rights’. The cultural rights of these groups may be 
seen as a logical extension of traditional non-discrimination (cf. our discussion 
of Raz’s ideas on pp. 43-44).  
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Kymlicka recognises that refugee communities are not adequately treated by 
the above distinctions. While we will propose (in Chapter 7) a possible 
solution to this problem, the tools we need to do so will be developed against 
the backdrop of more fundamental issues in Kymlicka’s theory, particularly 
those pertaining to the delineation of cultures.  
 
For the moment, we return to Kymlicka’s distinction between national 
minorities and other minority groups. In both the cases of national minorities 
and other minority groups, Kymlicka does not accept the transgression of 
individual liberties based on cultural grounds or on group rights. He 
distinguishes between on the one hand, external protection of groups, that is, 
ensuring their continued autonomy as a society, and on the other hand, 
internal restrictions, which he is opposed to. The possibility of members to exit 
a group when they choose to do so is therefore also an important condition 
that protects their individual rights.  
 
The distinction between national minorities and other minorities and the 
stronger rights afforded to the former hinges on the notion that national 
minorities were once independently functioning societies. They had all the 
necessary institutions to provide those members of the community a cultural 
structure, a backdrop against which they could pursue their goals and strive 
for their goods.   
   
At this point we turn to Kymlicka’s conception of culture and cultural 
structures. At times, his use of these terms can be vague and confusing, in 
our opinion. For instance, culture is sometimes used as equivalent to cultural 
structure, and sometimes not:  
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‘In one common usage, culture refers to the character of a historical 
community. On this view, changes in the norms, values, and their 
attendant institutions in one’s community … would amount to loss 
of one’s culture. However, I use culture in a very different sense, to 
refer to the cultural community, or cultural structure, itself. On this 
view, the cultural community continues to exist even when its 
members are free to modify the character of the culture, should 
they find its traditional ways of life no longer worth while.” 
(Kymlicka, 1989: 166- 167).  
 
Kymlicka then goes on to opt for the latter of these two alternatives (Kymlicka, 
1989: 167). He thus introduces the distinction between the character (or 
content) of a culture, and its structure. But what is the nature of this structure, 
if not a certain character, a value system or way of life (Kymlicka, 1998:91) 
represented by that culture? Ostensibly, he equates the cultural structure, as 
context of choice, with the cohesiveness of a community (see above quote, 
also Kymlicka, 1998:91; 96).  
 
Where Kymlicka links the cohesiveness of a cultural community with a shared 
way of life (1998:27, see also 1998: 33)13 it is not clear what the relationship 
between a culture’s content and structure is, or if it makes sense to make the 
distinction in the first place. We would argue that his definition in terms of a 
community is problematic. It means that the demise of a culture would take 
the form of, for example: ‘There are no more Zulu’s’, instead of ‘The Zulu way 
of life is extinct’. In our opinion, the latter represents a more accurate view of 
culture. Lest we confuse a culture simply with an ethnic group, surely we must 
                                                 
13
 Elsewhere, where Kymlicka discusses ‘societal cultures’, he further specifies that a societal culture ‘is 
a territorially concentrated culture centred on a shared language that is used in wide variety of societal 
institutions’ (Kymlicka, 1998: p. 27).  Following his definition of national minorities, it would imply that 
national minorities once had functioning societal cultures. Here again we see the notion of a cohesive 
community (in its territorial concentration), which is also linked to some sort of shared value system or 
way of life. 
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have some consideration that it is the way of life, the character of the culture 
that glues the community together?  
 
By making reference to shared ‘culture’ and language, Kymlicka’s theory 
exposes itself to the charge of essentialism. As such, he shares with Taylor 
the same problems regarding cultures as discernible entities (see 1.1.2 
above) and the cultural inhabitancy of public spaces (see 1.1.3 above). In 
order to protect a ‘context of choice’ and in order to introduce legislation to do 
so, one needs to be able to determine where the specific regulations he 
envisages will apply, and to whom. While Kymlicka mentions specific 
examples of well specified proposed legislation, he needs to show how these 
delineations are justified.   
 
However, his equality argument does suggest an interesting possibility of 
addressing the problem of delineation, one which we will expand on in 
Chapter 3. For the moment, it is worth noting that Kymlicka’s criteria for a 
national minority goes some way toward providing the possibility of delineating 
that group historically. The minority group ceded its sovereignty (involuntarily), 
through conquest or colonization. These conflicts create a dividing line 
between the conquerors and the conquered, so that a definition of the group 
can take the form of ‘those people whose sovereignty was taken away from 
them’, avoiding formulations that require that they share certain 
characteristics. The internal disunities and opposition (that is, between the 
group’s members) prior to that moment of conflict does not disappear, but are 
thoroughly sidelined.14 One could liken this to the supporters of provincial 
sport teams defining themselves in terms of their national team when the 
contest is with an international competitor. Moreover, and unlike the sports 
allegory we just used, this conflict has permanent effects, as it continues to 
maintain the conquered group’s marginalisation, thereby arresting an 
                                                 
14
 This is consistent with the metacontrast principle, a notion in social psychology whereby the 
differences between groups are maximised, while the differences within a group are 
minimised. (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008: 126). 
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otherwise fluid and dynamic group identification. As such, defining cultures in 
terms of historical conflicts holds some promise in avoiding the problem of 
essentialism.  
 
However promising as such a suggestion may seem, the problem of internal 
differences still poses a number of challenges. However sidelined past 
disunities may be, how should the current heterogeneity be addressed?  
 
In this regard, Kymlicka distinguishes between internal restrictions and 
external protections. The latter allows the continued existence of the society 
represented by that national minority.15  
 
‘External protections … do not raise problems of individual 
oppression. Here the aim is to protect a group’s distinct identity not 
by restricting the freedom of individual members, but by limiting the 
group’s vulnerability to the political decisions and economic power 
of the larger society’ (1998: 62-63.) 
 
As such, Kymlicka argues that external protections increase equality and are 
consistent with a liberal perspective. Internal restrictions, on the other hand, 
are at odds with liberal theory as it impinges on individual autonomy. Flowing 
from the external/internal distinction is the idea that a culture can change 
internally: the choices individual group members make can change the 
content, so to speak, of a culture, while external protections provide the 
security that the culture continues to exist at all. Put differently, that it exists is 
to be protected, while the content (such as values, norms, institutions) that 
defines it should be allowed to change as a result of the free interaction of the 
individual group members. Moreover, the protection of individual freedoms 
                                                 
15
 External protection can also be applied to immigrant groups and non-ethnic minorities 
(1998: p. 90), although this does not entail any form of self-government. Rather, it refers to 
measures ensuring these groups’ equal participation in society. 
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provide for the possibility of exit from the group, that is, that any person may 
choose to leave the group and rather be integrated into the majority.  
 
As an example of external protections, Kymlicka discussed measures applied 
to Aboriginal communities in Canada. Aboriginals in Canada are protected by 
different types of external protections, depending on the nature of the threat to 
their community. In southern Canada, where population is dense and land 
scarce, the aboriginal community requires arrangements whereby non-Indians 
would not have the right to own or stay on Indian lands. In northern Canada, 
rich in mineral resources, the influx of temporary workers could lead to the 
spending of public money on, conceivably  
 
“movie theatres, dish antennas … even a Las Vegas style resort. 
Since many aboriginal people in the north are dependent on short-
term work projects due to the seasonal nature of most of the 
economic activity in the area, such a policy [where all residents, 
regardless of permanence can vote - JRN] would force them to 
move into localities dominated by whites, and to work and live in 
another culture, in a different language….To guard against this, 
aboriginal leaders have proposed a three-to-ten-year residency 
requirement before one becomes eligible to vote for, or hold public 
office, and a guaranteed 30 per cent aboriginal representation in 
regional government with veto power over legislation affecting 
crucial aboriginal interests.” (Kymlicka, 1989: 147) 
 
External protections such as these then serve to protect a cultural structure. 
This means that, just like members of the majority, members of that culture 
can pursue their way of life without having to expend resources on ensuring 
the continued existence of their context of choice. However, this implies that 
the individual would be at a disadvantage when having to function in someone 
else’s context. S/he can’t simply move from one to the next. This attachment 
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of an individual to his/her culture is a crucial aspect of Kymlicka’s equality 
argument. Kymlicka asserts: “People are bound, in an important way, to their 
cultural communities.” (1989: 175). He then goes on to quote various research 
studies describing the disruption when people are forced to sever this 
attachment.  
 
Kymlicka has been criticised for his assertion that people have a deep bond 
with their culture. Leighton McDonald (1997: 10), for instance, points out that 
this assertion is an empirical claim. Moreover, it is one that can be falsified by 
just one person asserting something like: “Well, I don’t”. The studies he 
discussed also do not demonstrate a necessary bond, only that some have 
experienced it as disrupting.  
  
However, Kymlicka’s arguments can avoid this problem by a somewhat 
modified assertion that is more difficult to contradict: some people have this 
bond and have the need to maintain it. Those asking for the protection of their 
culture would simply lay claim to enjoy the opportunity to live within one’s own 
culture, the same opportunity that members of the majority culture enjoy 
whether they value it or not. These people are thus not treated fairly because 
their way of life does not enjoy the same opportunity to flourish as other 
people’s do. Moreover, those members of the minority who do not share this 
attachment have the option of exiting.   
 
The notion of attachment, along with the distinction between external 
protection and internal restrictions (as well as the idea of exit possibility) 
makes it possible to apply the equality argument to the problems of 
survivance encountered by Taylor’s arguments. In this regard, again, we view 
Kymlicka’s argument as an advance on Taylor’s. According to an equality 
argument, the continued existence of a person’s culture (his/her context of 
choice) may be protected on grounds of equality: members of that culture 
would be treated fairly, because they would enjoy the same opportunity to 
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practice their way of life as members of the majority do. This line of thinking, 
however, is only successful when one assumes the type of attachment to a 
culture Kymlicka does.   
 
But how would one conceptualise cultural attachment if the delineability of 
cultures is questionable? One of the core characteristics of attachment, as we 
use the term, is that it reduces the uncertainty the environment holds for any 
entity trying to survive in that environment. Attachment reduces this 
uncertainty by introducing a measure of permanence over time. One example 
would be the infant’s attachment to his mother, where the infant plays and 
explores his/her world, possibly even leaving his mother’s field of vision, yet 
still returning, certain of her continued presence and availability. For the 
concept of cultural attachment to make sense, a similar type of permanence 
over time would need to be demonstrated, while still retaining the dynamic 
and interactionist nature of culture.  
 
We thus see that, ultimately, Kymlicka’s argument encounters the same type 
of problems Taylor’s does. Except for the problem of delineability we 
discussed above, a number of other matters are pertinent. 
 
Firstly, though he is expressly opposed to the infringement of individual rights, 
some of the external measures Kymlicka proposes do have the effect of 
curtailing certain individual freedom and rights (such as voting rights in the 
examples discussed above). His distinction between external protections and 
internal restrictions does not succeed in addressing this problem. This means 
he also still needs to justify the legitimacy of cultural protection (see section 
1.1.1 above). 
 
Furthermore, his distinction between internal restrictions and external 
protections re-introduces the distinction between structure and content, which 
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(as discussed above) still encounters some problems that need to be solved: 
if culture is flexible and dynamic and if the interactions of individual group 
members may still change it, how justified can certain group members be 
when they ask for the protection of their culture? They might feel a deep bond 
with it, but does this justify the introduction of special group rights? Both 
Kymlicka and Taylor need to show why certain people’s attachment to their 
culture needs to be considered at all.  
 
Moreover, even if it is agreed that one is at a disadvantage when forced to 
adapt in another culture or to adopt a new culture, this apparent unfairness 
only makes sense when, firstly, one assumes that the minority culture if left 
undisturbed, would have flourished and would have, through the years, 
remained recognizable as that culture. To establish this would require a 
conception of culture that enables it to change in certain respects, yet remain 
identifiable as that culture. This requires clarity on the relationship between a 
culture’s structure and its content, i.e. when does a change in content possibly 
threaten the continued existence of the structure, and when is it change that is 
easily accomplished?  
 
Secondly, if one is to think of an unfair breach of attachment between an 
individual and his culture, one needs a conception of a fair breach of 
attachment. The idea of exit possibility may, at first glance, form the basis of 
such a conception: the individual breaks ties with this culture voluntarily as 
opposed to being forced to do so by conquest. However, in collective matters 
such as these, things cannot be quite so simple. If culture is seen as 
something produced between people, one’s neighbour’s attachment to the 
culture, or lack thereof, could conceivably impact the character of the public 
space one inhabits, so that one is forced to adapt. Moreover, for exit 
possibility to be a meaningful choice, some exposure to a competing culture 
needs to be assumed. This once again raises the questions: how much 
exposure is enough? When is competition between cultures fair? 
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Kymlicka’s equality argument is therefore hurt by the problems encountered 
by the distinction between structure and content. On the one hand, if cultures 
cannot be delineated into discernible entities and if one cannot say more or 
less decisively which changes to a culture are allowed, and which threaten its 
continued existence, the disadvantages faced by members of that culture  
cannot be conceived of in the same way as a (permanent) disability. 
Moreover, if culture is ultimately fluid, these disadvantages could ultimately be 
overcome – maybe not in this generation but perhaps in the next – prompting 
us to consider whether some changes may need to be enforced quicker, 
rather than protected against. Likewise, if culture cannot be delineated and if 
some relationship between this delineation and its character cannot be 
established, an individual’s attachment to his/her culture is not something that 
can be legislated for: if culture is ultimately fluid and dynamic, disruptions to 
and losses of attachment, as well as the discomfort of having to adapt to a 
more dominant cultural structure, are inevitable. Put differently: how can one 
lay claim to protect one’s culture on the basis of attachment when that which 
one is attached to is not delineable? 
 
Therefore, Kymlicka’s arguments, just like Taylor’s, require a solution to the 
problem of the delineation of cultures. Moreover, the problems of the 
legitimacy of claims to protection as well as the question of public inhabitancy 
by a culture are thereby also raised.  
 
Along with the abovementioned problem of the delineation of a culture, the 
problem of how the identity of a culture would relate to its character, the ‘way 
of life’ that presumably holds its members together (although members may 
disagree on this as well) and how this character can change without the 
‘culture’ losing its identity, also need to be addressed. As we will show in 
Chapters 3 through 6, solutions to problems of delineation often require 
further solutions to the questions of a culture’s retention of its character while 
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still allowing for internal disagreement. Put differently, though one can find 
ways of delineating cultures by constructing some form of boundary, such 
solutions are at best superficial if they cannot show how the culture that 
resides ‘within’ these boundaries manages to stay true to itself.  
 
The tension between a culture retaining a certain character, while still allowing 
for internal disagreement, is an important one if one is to apply the notion of 
attachment to the concept of ‘cultures’. Without a satisfactory answer to the 
question of how a certain character can be retained despite internal 
disagreement, it is unclear what exactly people are attached to.  
 
The abovementioned problems, we suggest, require us to conceptualise a 
culture as being able to restructure or reorganise itself. This means that we 
would have to conceive of its reorganisation not merely as the wishes and 
acts of certain individuals of that culture, but of the culture as a whole. If we 
were to conceive of such a reorganisation, not as a function of the culture 
itself but rather as the expression of the will only of certain individuals within 
that culture, it would once again expose problems with delineation, which in 
turn, make it difficult to delineate the scope of external protection. It would 
make it difficult to answer questions such as: “whose culture would be 
threatened by changes to certain elements?” and “in which public space 
should external protections be applied?”  
 
We thus see how the problems Taylor’s arguments encounter, namely the 
distinctness of cultures, the legitimacy of a claim to protect one’s culture and 
the manner in which a culture can inhabit a public space, are also 
encountered by Kymlicka’s arguments.  
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1.3 Other suggestions: Representivity and self-rule 
In the first place, innovative solutions regarding representivity and the 
differentiation of self-rule16 may represent pragmatic political solutions to the 
challenges of multiculturalism. Such solutions, however, also run into serious 
problems when the denial of distinct cultures is taken seriously. Such 
solutions imply the distinctness of different cultures. If the idea of cultures as 
distinct entities is rejected, the demonstration of the following is particularly 
problematic: 1) how is the culture that benefits from these measures defined, 
i.e. who is part of the culture and who is not? and 2) how is this culture 
delineated from general society and how is this separation justified? 
 
A second, more serious problem is the accusation of relativism. If the 
solutions in question open the door for allowing cultural rights to encroach on 
the autonomy of individuals, on what grounds do they justify this? The value-
pluralist response that a concern with autonomy is itself a “Western”, 
ethnocentric idea, does not hold in light of the Individualist-Liberal view of 
culture. So-called “Western” ideas about liberalism and autonomy should be 
evaluated not on the basis of their origin, but on the basis of rational 
argument, that is their value. It is an idea’s strength (in terms of value) that 
enables it to be cultural by convincing individuals to participate in those ideas. 
As such, they should always be up for re-evaluation.  
 
While it may be true that consensus on the value of certain ideas is difficult if 
not impossible, the alternative, a cessation of inter-cultural conversation 
based on pessimism about whether inter-cultural consensus is possible, is no 
solution at all. To allow the encroachment of individual autonomy solely on the 
basis that certain cultures do not value (individual) autonomy in the same way 
                                                 
16
 In this regard, see Andrea Baumeister’s discussion of Schachar’s idea of “transformative 
accommodation”. According to this idea, government and a minority group can divide 
jurisdiction over important matters so that no group controls all aspects of the issue. 
Baumeister uses the example of marriage, where the minority group can have a say about the 
legitimacy of the wedding, i.e. whether it is recognised as a marriage, while the state can 
have a say about the financial and custodial aspects of the marriage (Baumeister, 2003: 253-
254).  
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as the “West” can therefore not be a rational justification of encroachment of 
individual autonomy.  
   
Solutions regarding representivity and differentiation of self-rule are then 
necessarily reduced to arguments for political solidarity. Based on the fact that 
some groups in society reject “Western” values (though it is never clear 
whether such a rejection is acceptable or justified) these solutions propose 
measures that decrease the feelings of marginalization people in these groups 
feel, which contributes to stability, solidarity and peace in society (cf. 
Baumeister, 2003: 753-754; Ivison, 2005: 175-176). However, without serious 
consideration of the justification of certain groups’ rejection of individual rights, 
how and on what grounds can we weigh up the loss of individual autonomy 
against the gain of solidarity? 
  
1.4 The liberal alternative  
Given the problems Taylor, Kymlicka and others face, is a return to basic 
liberal concepts not the most satisfying solution? As mentioned in the 
Introduction to this dissertation, a liberal approach retains a certain simplicity 
and elegance to it and intuitively appears to be well-suited for accommodating 
differences and ensuring fair co-inhabitancy of public spaces.  However, what 
may appear to a “Western” mind as fair, may not be universally accepted as 
such. The growing awareness of the cultural conditioning involved in 
traditional liberal approaches and important liberal concepts also forces us 
into further investigation. Whatever the defence for a liberal position may be, it 
still rests on certain notions that are themselves culturally conditioned or at 
least contingent. One such notion is the importance placed on procedural 
rights and measures aimed at maintaining a neutral public space.  
 
This has led to criticism from communitarian and contextualist thinkers such 
as Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre. They argue that procedures can only be 
accepted as valid when it is accepted that following them is good. Proposing 
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liberal, procedural measures that lean towards the protection of individual 
autonomy can therefore be considered to be an introduction of a “Western” 
substantive good.  
 
This criticism (depending on one’s conceptualization of culture) is not 
necessarily damning and one does not need to deny the “Western” and 
cultural origin of liberal procedures to address it successfully.  
 
A rebuttal of such a criticism can take many forms that represent a wide 
variety of arguments and theoretical backgrounds. What they have in common 
is the conclusion that the cultural origin of liberal procedures does not 
constitute a convincing argument against the importance of liberal, procedural 
approach to multiculturalism. 
 
Richard Rorty (1989: 84-85; 1991: 206), for instance, represents a pragmatic 
approach to such problems.  He does not deny the “Western” origin of such 
liberal procedures, nor does he attempt to defend them on the grounds of any 
form of final reason. He simply argues that it is the best system (seen from the 
perspective of liberal democracy he espouses) we have at present that also 
provides for each person to live the life s/he chooses. So, although such 
procedures might be “ethnocentric”, it is an ethnocentrism that allows value 
pluralism. Leszek Kolakowski (1980) follows a broadly similar argument, 
though he is more willing to rationally defend the advances that “Western” 
culture has achieved for the advancement of multicultural societies.  
 
Habermas, on the other hand, argues that procedures need to be 
intersubjectively validated, that is, agreed upon by the different parties. 
Participants necessarily have to assume the possibility of consensus; if they 
do not, their interaction would cease to be rational debate. This follows from 
his theory of communicative action, which proposes that participants in an 
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argument cannot but aim at rationally achieved consensus, free of domination, 
or else they commit a performative contradiction (Habermas, 1986: 259). 
Thus, even when we debate procedures, the debate has to presuppose the 
autonomy of its participants. Procedures that protect this autonomy, then, do 
not merely represent a “Western” substantive good, but are necessary goods 
to which participants in arguments need to ascribe. 
 
“(T)he normative substance of modernity, above all self-
determination and self-realization, can be defended in a different, 
strictly post-metaphysical, form. The ideas of the Enlightenment are 
not simply pure abstractions: they are inserted into everyday 
communicative practice, and thereby into the life-world, as 
unavoidable, often counterfactual, presuppositions....”   (Habermas, 
1986: 227; see also pp. 254-259) 
 
To a certain extent, we agree with Habermas’ approach with regard to the 
importance of an assumption of the possibility of consensus. If parties to a 
debate do not strive for some form of a shared understanding, the dialogue is 
pointless. Likewise, we hold that certain forms of critique cannot be charged 
with ethnocentrism, regardless of their origin. In particular, we argue that to 
charge the use of logic as a “Western” practise, one closes down any 
possibility of rational consensus. While it is possible to regard certain 
premises as being cultural in origin, the laws of logic that govern how these 
premises lead to conclusions need not be regarded as cultural: a non-sequitur 
is as much a fallacy now in South Africa as it was 200 years ago in China.  
 
However, we believe it is possible for two participants to reach axiomatic17 
differences, fundamental disagreements about premises that are 
                                                 
17
 Principles or assumptions are regarded as axiomatic when they themselves cannot be 
proven by reason, because they are the assumptions or principles that underlie all our 
subsequent arguments. An example from Mathematics reads as follows: ‘Any real number 
added to a real number is also a real number.’  
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insurmountable by further reasoning and dialogue. Nevertheless, 
presupposing that an argument will end in this insurmountable difference is 
counterproductive, because much can be agreed upon before that point is 
reached.  
 
Where the liberal approach does not work, it is necessarily not accepted by 
one of the parties in a conflict, and, as such, has the character of being 
imposed on that party, not agreed upon by both. Likewise, even Habermas’ 
argument may serve to close up (rational) debate, rather than opening it. The 
prioritised position enjoyed by autonomy18 does very little to contribute to 
dialogue. Please note that we do not propose that valuing autonomy is to be 
abandoned. We merely suggest that, to enter this assumption into a debate 
without putting it up for scrutiny, serves to exclude from the beginning the 
notion of a culture that is to be protected alongside individual freedoms. 
Consequently, the dialogue stops there and then. To enable dialogue 
between parties in multicultural conflicts, the prioritised position of autonomy 
and the relationship between personal autonomy and cultural protection will 
need to be investigated.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that, if one can conceive of cultures in a 
manner analogous to how one views autonomous persons, then arguments 
such as Kymlicka’s would be strengthened considerably. In fact, he would 
have shown his approach to be consistent with a liberal approach and liberal 
thought would have been successfully adapted to deal with multicultural 
situations and the more traditional, restricted form would be shown to be 
inadequate. Once again, we propose that the success of the arguments, 
hinges on how culture is conceptualised.  
 
                                                 
18
 The prioritisation of autonomy refers to the fact that culture’s value is seen to be derived 
from the value it has in providing meaningful options to individuals. As such, autonomy’s 
value is primary and culture’s value is a derivative thereof. 
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1.5 Concluding remarks 
Not only does an alternative conceptualization need to address the problems 
outlined above (see sections 1.1.1-3). It has further challenges, namely to 
provide an alternative conceptualization that makes it possible to think of 
distinct cultures, while still maintaining an 1) anti-relativist and 2) anti-
essentialist stance.  
 
Firstly, the alternative conceptualization will need to show that it also makes it 
possible for rational dialogue (and perhaps consensus) between cultures to be 
reached. If not, we have to abandon totally the ideal of rational debate in 
favour of power and violence.  
 
Secondly, the alternative conceptualization will need to show that it does not 
lead to an essentialist view of culture. This is so, because anti-essentialism 
has strong empirical evidence in its favour: cultures simply aren’t 
homogenous. Moreover, as discussed above, essentialism, like relativism, 
leads to situations that exaggerate differences and comes to deny the 
possibility of meaningful debate, which does not add much to our 
enlightenment in areas of multicultural conflict. 
 
We suggest that one way out of these problems would be to employ a 
conceptualization of culture that makes it possible to delineate cultures, at the 
same time allowing for disagreement within the culture and without reducing 
the culture to a false essence. We suggest than one possible way of arriving 
at such a conceptualization is to attempt an analogy with how we view 
personal identity.  
 
As with delineation, we propose that one way of arriving at a conceptualisation 
of a culture reorganizing itself is to attempt an analogy with how we view 
personal autonomy. This will be the focus of discussion in Chapters 4 and 6. 
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In this regard, we propose, as an initial step, approaching culture as a system 
of meaning. In the following three chapters, the concept of culture as system 
of meaning will be developed with reference to the work of Niklas Luhmann. 
With reference to the problems of delineation of cultures, the legitimacy of 
claims to cultural protection and the public inhabitancy of cultures, it will be 
shown how the concept of culture as meaning-system allows for anti-
relativism and anti-essentialism while avoiding the abovementioned problems, 
by showing: 
1) That the concept of culture as system of meaning allows us to 
conceptualize the cultural system as a system constituted by 
communicative relationships between individuals and that if we are to think 
of “cultures” as discernible entities, the boundaries of such “cultures’ would 
have to be defined in terms of qualitative differences in the communicative 
relationships between those on the inside and those on the outside of a 
“culture”.  
2) That characteristics by which we identify and define personal autonomy, 
such as self-reference, can also logically be ascribed to cultures and 
3) That, on the basis of such an analogy with personal autonomy, certain 
criteria for the legitimation of occupation of public spaces and institutions 
can be generated.   
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CHAPTER 2 
CULTURE AS A SYSTEM OF MEANING 
 
In this chapter, we set out to define culture as a system of meaning. To start 
our discussion we offer an initial, provisional definition of ‘meaning’, keeping in 
mind that this definition will be extended and refined by a proposed systems 
view of meaning. 
 
2.1. Initial definition of meaning 
Our initial, provisional definition of meaning follows the conception of meaning 
as set out by H.W. Rossouw (1980). In this view, meaning refers to “the 
relation that (data) has to the understanding person” (Rossouw, 1980: 19). 
This distinguishes the process of understanding meaning from the process of 
conceptualization. In the latter, the person establishes the relations between 
phenomena as a disinterested, neutral observer. When, on the other hand, a 
person understands the meaning of some phenomenon, s/he gains clarity on 
the relevance that the phenomenon has for his/her existence. The person thus 
does not stand in a disinterested relation to the phenomenon, but is involved 
with it.  Put differently, “meaning is the way data show their relevance, their 
value for the person in his/her concrete life orientation” (Translated from the 
Afrikaans in Rossouw, 1980: 19). Therefore, meaning is always experienced 
as meaning for the person who understands the meaning; it holds value and 
relevance for his/her life. This also means that future behaviour is an inherent 
part of the meaning that was found: meaning is understood when we receive 
an ‘answer’ as to how to go forward, what to do next or how to react to 
something.     
 
The systems approach we propose in this chapter uses the above 
conceptualization of meaning as starting point. However, insights from 
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systems theory allow us to refine the concept further, which allows us to gain 
clarity on how meaning, which is understood by individual persons, relates to 
culture.  We will show that such an approach maintains the key features of our 
initial definition, with the added advantage of providing more precision on 
questions concerning the relationship between meaning, the individual and 
culture.  In this regard, we will draw on the insights of Niklas Luhmann’s work 
on so-called auto-poietic systems. However, our view differs from his in some 
key areas, which we will discuss.  
 
2.2 A systems approach to meaning 
 For the purposes of our discussion, we define a system as something 1) 
consisting of a number of elements that are in interaction with one another; 2) 
that has a boundary, that is, some form of demarcation that shows us where 
the system ends and where its environment begins, i.e. distinguishes between 
system and environment; and 3) processes inputs from its environment and 
thus produces outputs.19 Some examples will serve to elucidate point 3): a 
word processing programme, for instance, is a system that processes the 
computer user’s typing and produces text in an electronic format. Likewise, 
the respiratory system processes air from the environment and produces 
oxygenated blood.  
 
With regards to point 1) above, it is important to keep in mind that, according 
to a systems perspective, the elements in a system are not pre-given entities; 
elements only are what they are because of their relationship to one another 
(Luhmann, 1995: 20-22). “(T)here are no elements without relational 
connections or relations without elements” (Luhmann, 1995: 20).  With 
regards to point number 2), we note that the system boundary determines 
how the existence of the system is defined. If the boundary no longer exists, 
the system also ceases to exist. Such a boundary, however, does not serve to 
                                                 
19
 Point 3) is necessary to differentiate systems from mere sets. Where the elements in a set 
may be related to each other, e.g. by having common characteristics, the elements do no 
interact with one another to process inputs.  
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close off the system from its environment and cease its interaction, it simply 
demarcates which elements belong to the system and which belong to the 
environment. The system continues to interact with the environment 
nonetheless.  
 
How we think about system boundaries has been stimulated considerably by 
the work of system’s theorists on the concept of auto-poiesis. It is worthwhile 
to discuss critically the notion of so-called auto-poiesis and auto-poietic 
closure, as put forward by Niklas Luhmann. In the way in which Luhmann 
uses the term, auto-poietic systems can be defined as systems that produce 
their own elements. 
 
“Auto-poietic systems, then, are not only self-organizing systems, 
they do not only produce and eventually change their own 
structures; their self-reference applies to the production of …(their) 
components as well…Thus, everything used … by the system is 
produced … by the system itself.” (Luhmann, 2003: 66).  
 
By creating their own elements, systems also continuously re-introduce the 
boundary between system and environment. The system does not create its 
own environment. For instance, from our example above, the word processing 
programme does not produce the user’s finger movements on the keyboard. 
However, whatever is given by the environment is not given as an element of 
the system. Rather the system processes the given as an element, which then 
becomes part of the system and its functioning. For instance, the word 
processing programme processes typing as digital data. The data are the 
elements, not the finger movements. Put differently, the data are elements of 
the system, while the finger movements are part of the system’s environment. 
Moreover, only the data, not the finger movements, are used in the system’s 
functioning. The programme’s process thus establishes what systems 
theorists refer to as auto-poietic closure: the boundary between system and 
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environment is at once open (because interaction between system and 
environment still continues freely) and closed: only the elements the system 
has itself created are included in the system’s functioning. 
 
Likewise, just as the word processing programme processes typing as data, 
so systems of meaning process experiences as meaningful, as we will discuss 
in more detail below. In the case of systems of meaning we can therefore 
state that systems of meaning interpret experiences given by the environment. 
As such, the new meaning becomes part of the system and helps determine 
how subsequent events are interpreted. The system, however, does not 
produce the actual experiences, it only interprets them as meaning. These 
‘meanings’ (according to Luhmann’s account) are then the elements of the 
system. By interpreting events as meaningful, the system re-introduces the 
difference between system and environment and establishes its own 
boundary (Luhmann, 2003: 67).  
 
At the risk of getting ahead of the discussion, we feel it is important to note 
here that we believe Luhmann’s application of the term auto-poiesis to be 
problematic. Luhmann applies the concept to the ideas of psychic and societal 
systems. Both are systems of meaning, but whereas the psychic system auto-
poietically produces consciousness through the interpretation of experiences, 
societal systems auto-poietically produce communications by interpreting the 
actions between subjects as communication. We will discuss our proposed 
definition of psychic systems later. For now, it is perhaps helpful to think of the 
psychic system as to some extent synonymous with what we would 
traditionally refer to as the subject. Furthermore we will also propose that 
Luhmann’s ‘societal systems’ be replaced by what we will call ‘cultural 
systems’ and discuss our definition of the concept.  
 
In applying the concept of auto-poiesis to psychic and societal systems, we 
believe Luhmann relies too heavily on an analogy with biological systems 
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(where the idea was developed). In biological systems, the body continuously 
creates new cells (its elements), replacing dead cells and thus continuously 
re-establising itself as a system (the body) distinct from its environment 
(everything that is not the body). Luhmann’s over-reliance on this model leads 
him to posit ‘meanings’ as the elements produced in psychic and cultural 
systems. This is problematic. As we will discuss in more detail in section 2.3, 
we believe that the system’s interpretation of experience given by the 
environment can be conceptualised with more clarity as an activation of a 
system of distinctions. These distinctions are then the proper elements of a 
system of meaning, and, bearing in mind that they exist only in their relation to 
other distinctions, are ‘created’ only though a process of restructuring the 
whole system. One could then argue that it is a process more aptly described 
as self-organisation or self-structuring through which the whole system is 
‘renewed’, rather than introducing the idea that elements were continuously 
created. However, notions of self-organisation or self-structuring retain the 
idea of the system/environment boundary being introduced every time the 
system as a whole is renewed. Such notions also retain the idea of the system 
being at once open and closed. The system is open because it continues to 
interact with the environment and is influenced by changes in the 
environment, but is also closed because it is never the experience itself but 
only (for instance) its representation as an activation of a system of 
distinctions that is included in the system’s functioning.      
 
2.2.1. Luhmann’s account of meaning 
Despite our reservations about the application of the concept of auto-poiesis. 
Luhmann’s approach to meaning provides us with a useful starting point to 
develop a systemic view of meaning. In applying a systems approach to the 
concept of meaning, Luhmann (1995: 28-29) retains the basic features of our 
initial definition of meaning. In accordance with a systemic view, he treats 
meaning as something pertaining to the relationship between the system and 
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its environment. As we will discuss below, this relationship entails a reduction 
of complexity.  
 
Luhmann starts his account of meaning with a phenomenological analysis of 
how experience is encountered by the system. The main feature of this 
experience is that of extreme complexity. With the term ‘complexity’, Luhmann 
refers to the fact that the environment presents the system with such a vast 
variety of elements and relations between elements, that it forces the system 
to select a reduced number of elements and relations to attend to (Luhmann, 
1995: 28-29). It thus refers to the impossibility of attending at once to all 
possible ways of relating the elements in its environment. An implication of 
complexity (as Luhmann describes it) is therefore a need to make a selection 
and focus on certain elements while relegating others to the periphery.  
 
Moreover, meaning must be distinguished from other forms of reducing 
complexity, because other organic systems, for instance the lungs, also select 
from a manifold of data (i.e. blood, different minerals, carbon dioxide, etc.) by 
only allowing one type of data (oxygen) to be processed (Luhmann, 1990: 26).  
 
Meaning is differentiated from other types of selection by its dual structure. 
Firstly, meaning is the form of selection that allows the actual given data of 
experience to also refer beyond itself to other possibilities of experience.  For 
instance, if we were to experience ‘a dog barking at us’ (and by identifying it 
as such we have already ordered the experience), this would already refer to 
the potential experience of what we expect a dog might do, what barking is 
associated with (e.g. aggression or fear) and what would most likely happen if 
we were to try and approach the dog or aggravate it further. Thus, by ordering 
the actual given data, we have allowed it to refer to these potential 
experiences. This is done, as we shall see in more detail later, through the 
system’s participation in a complex network of negations.  
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Luhmann sees the inclusion of potential experience as having an adaptive 
function: without it the individual/system would be restricted continually to the 
actual data and it would have very little capability in regulating behaviour and 
directing experience. Including potential experience allows the system a far 
greater extent of regulation and direction of experience (Luhmann, 1990: 26-
27), for instance by being able to make predictions, have expectations, make 
assumptions, and various other heuristic cognitive techniques we use in day 
to day existence.  
 
Secondly, meaning is the ordering of experience that then selects from this 
overabundant complexity (both actual data and potential experience) by 
bracketing out certain actual and potential experiences, while focusing on 
others.  
 
Meaning thus refers to the way the system orders the experience given by the 
environment. By doing so, the system reduces the complexity of the 
environment, so that the system can have a “conscious grasp” (Luhmann, 
1990: 44), almost like a map, of how it stands in relation to the environment, 
providing it with means to orientate itself in its environment (Luhmann, 1990: 
49). In this regard, we can see that, despite putting it in systemic terms, 
Luhmann retains the basic aspect of meaning as serving to orientate the 
person in his/her world, which shows the person what to make of things and 
what to do next. That Luhmann uses systemic terms instead of the usual 
‘subject’ or ‘person’ living in ‘the world’ owes to the fact that he regards both 
subject and world to be produced auto-poietically and therefore considers the 
systemic terms to be more basic and fundamental. It also allows him to argue 
that systems of meaning could refer to both individuals and societal systems. 
Luhmann refers to both the individual and the social system as meaning 
constituting systems (Luhmann, 1995: 37, 51).  As we’ll show, this is 
somewhat problematic, and needs a clearer distinction between the individual 
and the social system. For the time being, we propose that we think of 
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meaning as something experienced only by the person or more specifically, 
the ‘psychic system’.  
 
Before moving on to the next section, some criticism of Luhmann’s approach 
is pertinent and needs to be addressed here. Luhmann’s approach, while 
being a systems approach, is also simultaneously a functional approach, 
defining meaning in terms of the system’s adaptation to its environment. This 
has opened it to criticism from Habermas, who argues that the systems 
approach is a technocratic approach. If meaning is defined in terms of its 
adaptive function, efficacy, self-survival and growth would come to dominate 
values such as consent, fairness and agreement (Habermas, 1989: 301-302).  
 
Habermas argues for an intersubjective approach where participants in a 
conversation act with the goal of reaching agreement (Habermas, 1986), 
implicitly opening the statements they make to scrutiny according to the norms 
of truth, rightfulness and truthfulness. What is true, rightful and truthful is 
defined as what would be agreed upon by participants in an ideal speech 
situation, where the only force is the rational force of the better argument.  
 
As our discussion of Luhmann’s approach will show, an intersubjective 
approach to meaning is incorporated in his account of meaning. Agreement 
and disagreement between people is thus an essential part of his theory of 
meaning. Yet Luhmann’s approach is not only an intersubjective theory of 
meaning. He starts from a phenomenological analysis of how experience is 
processed as meaning by the system. As such, the ‘function’ of meaning is 
none other than what we proposed in our initial definition of this chapter, that 
is, to orientate the person in his world. To typecast his theory as technocratic 
is in our view not fair. Given that some form of intersubjective agreement is 
already at play in our meanings, the values that we have are not self-serving 
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just because it provides us with a meaningful way to live.20 Moreover, by 
retaining the idea that meaning functions to orientate one’s life, a functional 
systems approach has the advantage over a purely intersubjective approach 
in that it allows us to conceptualize cases where interlocutors cannot, despite 
the utmost willingness and rational capacity, agree on values, because they 
simply find it impossible to apply it to their own lives.  
   
Therefore, we argue that Luhmann’s theory cannot be faulted merely for its 
functional approach. In contrast, our critique of Luhmann’s theory is aimed at 
his understanding of systems of meaning as auto-poietic (as discussed) 
above, and his conceptualisation of ‘meanings’ as the elements of system. We 
will argue, in the following section, that positing ‘meanings’ as the elements of 
the system causes unnecessary complication and leads to a lack of clarity in 
the distinction between psychic and societal systems.  
 
2.2.2. The system’s ordering of experience  
While retaining the essence of our initial definition of meaning, a Luhmannian 
systems perspective holds certain key advantages when we start to consider 
how the system accomplishes the ordering of experience. This needs to be 
done with reference to the question of what we regard as the elements and 
relations between elements of the system. This will allow us more precision in 
defining the relationship between individual, meaning and culture.  
 
What Luhmann’s systemic view of meaning proposes is that (a) meaning 
needs identity to retain its dual operation of adding potential experience to 
actual given data and then selecting from it; and (b) identity (and thus 
meaning) is necessarily constructed with reference to 1) an independent 
                                                 
20
 A systems approach to meaning therefore still dictates an interpretive rather than an 
explanatory approach to the study of meaning. One example is Clifford Geertz, exemplary of 
an interpretive approach in cultural anthropology, who also employs a systems view when he 
defines culture as “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means 
of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
toward life" (1973:89).  
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environment or world, 2) other subjects and 3) a temporal dimension that 
makes duration of identity possible21. If it does not, meaning loses its adaptive 
function.  
 
As discussed above, part of the structure of meaning is that it allows the 
actual given experience to refer beyond itself to potential experience. 
Reference to other possibilities of experience is made possible by the process 
of what Luhmann calls ‘identification’ (Luhmann, 1990: 37). Identity here 
refers to the unity of a manifold of various possible experiences, so that a 
single concept can refer at once to all the potential experiences. If for 
instance, we identify someone batting an eyelid as ‘winking’, our experience of 
someone batting an eyelid, by virtue of identifying it as a wink, includes all 
possible experiences of this wink, e.g. that that person is flirting and will 
welcome me flirting back, etc. Similarly, our experience of everything else in 
the moment can be identified as a “something”. Based on this identification, a 
selection can be made and the experience is made meaningful, e.g. because 
we have identified the batting eyelid as a wink, and perhaps further interpreted 
it as a flirtatious act, it becomes the focus of our attention and the rest of the 
experience is bracketed away as being part of the background, as being the 
context of the wink.  
 
Bearing in mind that meaning is the ordering of experience, it follows that this 
ordering is not given as such by the environment, but is an achievement of the 
system itself. Hence, the identities used to order experience are constructions 
by the system.  
 
                                                 
21
 We do not discuss the temporal dimension at length here. Luhmann’s discussion of this is 
lengthy and includes theories as to how the construction of time as being a continuum (along 
which the present is always moving forward) is related to a modern world view. What is 
relevant for our discussion is only to consider that the experience of time needs to be 
constructed in such a way that the duration of identity over time is possible, that is, that a 
thing may be regarded as the same thing at two moments in time. 
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The construction of identities takes place within a system of negations (or 
distinctions) and with reference to the possibility of a construction being 
confirmed or disconfirmed by others. Now, because things are not given as 
things by the environment, identification is only possible in a system of 
negations: it is what it is only by reference to what it is not. If one considers 
that the same process is applicable to the things that are thus negated (to be 
negated, it too has to be identified), it is clear that a circular reference is 
present here.  
 
Luhmann does not discuss the implications of this circular reference. 
However, insights from structural and post-structural thought show us that, in 
the context of a system of distinctions, the identity of something can only be 
pinned down by a decision. Such a decision restricts the process of circular 
reference; it stops it at a certain point, which allows us to fix identity. For 
instance, if X is defined as not A, not B, etc. and each of the latter are defined 
similarly, the circular reference is stopped when one of the referents (e.g. A) is 
treated as having a self-evident identity, which allows us to identify other 
things in terms of it. Thus the formed identity has an artificial and constructed 
character.  
 
 At this point we start our departure from Luhmann’s views. While Luhmann 
suggests the idea of identification taking place through a system of 
distinctions, he does not follow through on the idea. Luhmann posits 
‘meanings’ as the elements auto-poietically created by psychic and societal 
systems. This implies that the system is made up of ‘meanings’ as its 
elements and the relations between them. Now, if meanings can only be 
identified within a system of negations (or distinctions), the idea of a system 
with ‘meanings’ as elements adds no explanatory or clarifying power. 
Furthermore, these meanings are more accurately described as the system 
states of a system of distinctions, i.e. as a pattern of activation of a system of 
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distinctions. The logical conclusion is that Luhmann then actually proposes a 
system in which the elements are system states.  
 
This is an unnecessary complication which leads to a number of problems. 
Firstly, if ‘meanings’ are the elements of the system, it leaves the question of 
how these meanings are related. This requires Luhmann to conceptualise the 
meanings realised from one experience to the next as having an impact on 
meaning structures which condition the realisation of the next meaning. The 
implication is that a system of ‘meanings’ (that is, a system where the 
elements are ‘meanings’) in any case requires us to think of a system that 
allows ‘meanings’ to be stored.  We propose that this difficulty can be solved 
by positing psychic systems as systems of distinctions, and discuss the idea 
in more detail below. 
 
A second problem with Luhmann’s conceptualisation of ‘meanings’ as the 
elements of the system, is that it obfuscates the distinction between individual 
psychic systems and societal systems. Luhmann (2003: 66) posits both 
psychic and societal systems as producing meaning, albeit two different types 
of meaning. He distinguishes between them on the basis that societal systems 
have communications as elements, that is, auto-poietically produces 
communication, while psychic systems produce consciousness.  Thus it is the 
psychic system that we would normally refer to as the individual’s mind.  
 
In societal systems, the actions between subjects are interpreted as 
communication. Put differently, the action of one’s interlocutor, whether it be 
an utterance, a facial expression, a gesture, etc., is seen as trying to convey 
meaning. This means that it is not the action itself which becomes part of the 
system, but the communication produced by that action. It only becomes 
communication when the system understands the action as a communication. 
(Luhmann, 2003: 68-69, 73).  
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Now, what Luhmann describes as a societal system is in fact better described 
as a cultural system. ‘Societal system’, in our opinion, is somewhat of a 
misnomer: it connotes the interplay of many other systems, economic, 
political, etc., that pertain to the way humans live together. Where the cultural 
system interprets an action as communication, the economic system 
interprets actions as (economic) transactions, while a political system would 
interpret an action as, for instance, an expression of power. Moreover, it is 
pertinent to this dissertation to point out that a single society may contain 
various different systems of communication, what we would call cultural 
systems. It is precisely this relation between society and its cultures that is 
often at the root of many multicultural conflicts, as we will discuss in Chapter 
5.  
 
As such, we propose that the term ‘societal system’ be replaced with the term 
‘cultural system’. While we can conceive, for instance, of the same event (a 
financial transaction between a government official and a businessman 
tendering for a government contract) as simultaneously 1) a communication 
that has meaning within a cultural frame of reference 2) an economic 
transaction and 3) an action that has political implications, the distinction 
between the different systems allows us to analyse it with more clarity. It 
allows us, for instance, to conceive of a political system interfering or 
benefiting a certain culture over another, or of an economic system exerting a 
certain influence over a political system, or of a cultural system informing 
certain political practices. The ability to conduct analyses such as these is 
pertinent for our discussion (in Chapter 7) of the ways in which other types of 
systems can impact on cultural matters. 
 
However, while these three systems - cultural, political and economic -  
‘interpenetrate’, only the cultural system is concerned with meaning.  The 
other systems are not, strictly speaking, systems of meaning. To retain 
Luhmann’s acuity of analysis that pertains to systems of meaning that 
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produce communications, we would do better to stick to the term culture. In 
section 2.4, we will continue to define our concept of cultural systems. 
Presently, however, we turn to the concept of ‘psychic systems’.  
 
2.3 Psychic systems 
More problematic for Luhmann’s account of systems of meaning is his 
account of psychic systems. Specifically, his account rests on what they 
produce, namely, consciousness. This is a problematic notion.  
 
Firstly, he gives no indication why the psychic systems cannot produce 
meaning unconsciously. It seems to contradict the dual structure of meaning, 
that is, of an increase of potential experience and selection from complexity. 
This would mean that that which is not selected (and presumably becomes 
unconscious) is part and parcel of the structure of the meaning realised by the 
individual. Moreover, there is no reason given why we should be conscious of 
realised meaning for it to serve its adaptive functioning. As a counterexample, 
we can easily think of unconscious material that already serves this function 
without being available to consciousness. Becoming aware of unconscious 
meanings, as one does in, for instance, psychotherapy, certainly enhances 
one’s ability to evaluate that material, thus enhancing one’s adaptive 
regulative ability. However, as part of the unconscious, such material has 
already had meaning, had already played a part in one’s functioning. It is 
exactly its functioning that has to be discovered by consciousness. 
 
Furthermore, repression of certain meanings (i.e. not allowing it to enter 
consciousness) within the psychic system can be regarded as central to its 
functioning. As discussed above, the circular reference between distinctions is 
arrested by decisions that treat certain referents (of those involved in the 
circular reference) as having a self-evident identity. Each decision then has 
the effect of creating hierarchies of distinctions: When one referent is treated 
as more self-evident than another, it gains priority over others. It is hierarchies 
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such as these that post-structural thinkers aim to deconstruct.  As decisions 
are necessary parts of the processing of meaning, it follows that the psychic 
system’s processing of meaning necessarily creates hierarchies. Every 
decision corresponds to a certain way of making sense of an experience and 
every decision is by definition one of many possible decisions that could have 
been made. Therefore, when a decision is made, other possible decisions 
have been precluded and for each decision thus precluded, there is a 
corresponding meaning that was repressed. 
 
A second problem with defining the psychic system in terms of consciousness 
is that we struggle to define it meaningfully. We cannot define consciousness 
in neurological terms, that is, in terms of the firing of neurons; if we do so, we 
are talking about a biological system, not a system of meaning. The problem 
Luhmann’s theory faces is to define consciousness without rendering it 1) 
biological or 2) metaphysical.  
 
These problems can be eliminated when we consider psychic systems as 
those systems that uniquely produce meaning (as system states, not 
elements) by interpreting events as meaning.  They, and not culture, are thus 
the systems that produce meaning. The psychic system as proper system of 
meaning can be distinguished from culture, which we will later define as a 
system of meaning of the second order.  
 
We define the psychic system as that system of distinctions a person has 
access to at the moment of the event. A psychic system is thus specific to a 
person. No psychic system can be separated from its person, because the 
meanings it interprets involve the person’s orientation to his/her world.   
 
There might be similarities between one person and the next which allow us to 
speak of a shared system of distinctions, or a shared conceptual background: 
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a great deal of the construction of a psychic system is owed to meanings 
communicated by other people, for instance the norms and values learnt from 
interaction with parents, peers or the media and as we have seen all realised 
meanings refer to some extent to other subjects for agreement or 
disagreement. However, the person ultimately encounters these 
communications as meaningful to him/herself; the meaning ultimately relates 
to only this one person’s life. The psychic system is thus the system whereby 
a person interprets events as meaning and we consequently define it as 
proper systems of meaning. 
 
When we define the psychic system as a system of distinctions, we re-
introduce the idea that meaning is best thought of as an activation of a system 
of distinctions, all of these distinctions being defined in relation to other 
distinctions.  
 
When a psychic system interprets an event as meaning, the meaning is 
realized when 1) the event activates a system of distinctions. All these 
distinctions are defined in terms of each other and therefore a decision needs 
to be made to restrict the circular reference to allow the identification of things; 
2) a selection is made from the overabundant complexity (both actual and 
potential data), i.e. the system decides what in the experience is foreground 
and background respectively. With every meaning realised, the relations 
between distinctions change, thus meanings become part of the system of 
distinctions by being “stored”, as it were, in relations between distinctions 
(Luhmann, 1995: 71).22  The system of distinctions at any given moment 
therefore reflects all prior meanings and any new experience is constituted 
                                                 
22
 Luhmann does give indications that this is in fact what he had in mind when conceptualizing 
meaning as in relation to other meanings. He suggests, for instance, that the identity of a 
meaning, that is, being able to identify it as a certain meaning as opposed to others, it 
constituted by an intricate system of distinctions (Luhmann, 1990: 43-44). Elsewhere, too, he 
refers to meaning as the processing of differences (Luhmann, 1995: 71). However, he does 
not seem to consider its implications when making his distinction between social and psychic 
systems. 
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only through reference to these prior meanings as they are reflected in the 
system of distinctions.  
 
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that all the phenomena we usually term 
‘psychological’ can be described in terms of meaning. In the rest of this 
dissertation, for instance, reference will often be made to psychological 
phenomena such as thoughts, desires and memories. Each can be described 
as an interpretation of experience. All our thoughts about the world and all our 
renditions of facts and states of affairs, however impersonal, carry with them 
the importance and relevance these facts may have in our lives. Our 
experience of something as a desire already involves us interpreting the 
stimuli or data presented to us by our bodies in a certain way. The same is 
true of our experience of emotions. The fact that bodily data is often 
misinterpreted, for instance in the case of panic attacks, provides a real world 
example of how emotions are always already interpreted emotion. If not, they 
are only instinctive, bodily reactions. Moreover, desires and emotions serve to 
orientate us in the world, they posture and prime us for what we want or need 
to do next. As such, they are answers to the question of meaning. 
Furthermore, memory, specifically episodic memory, can be conceptualised 
as the interpretation of experiences as events that had happened to us. We of 
course also store knowledge about the world in our memories. This is known 
as semantic memory. This storage can be conceptualised as consisting of the 
strengthening of relations between certain distinctions. As such, semantic 
memory is formed, and is at play, with every interpretation of meaning. 
 
Having thus defined the psychic system, we conclude this section with a 
proposal as to how the concept of the ‘psychic system’ relates to the notion of 
‘the person’. Taking into account that each psychic system belongs to a 
person, we propose that the individual be defined as that singular point where 
the biological and psychic systems interpenetrate. This means that, for the 
purposes of our discussion, we view the person to be comprised of both 
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biological and psychic aspects, which are intimately linked to each other. In 
fact, all processing of meaning is also simultaneously a brain process. We can 
thus define a person as an organism that interacts meaningfully with his/her 
environment. This includes his/her interaction with other persons. A person is 
thus an organism that can interpret his/her experiences as meaning, and in so 
doing orientates him/herself in his/her world and finds him/herself in 
communicative relations with others. As such, the psychic system (which is 
the system of meaning interpreting experiences as meaning) cannot be 
thought of as a separate entity from the organism, specifically the body. 
However, the distinction between psychic and biological systems remains 
important as the two refer to different levels of analysis: analysis of the 
biological system would focus on the organism itself, while analysis of the 
psychic system pertains to meanings and therefore to the relationship 
between the organism and its environment. The biological and psychic 
aspects of the individual will be important when we consider how we think 
about the identity of individuals and whether one can think of “cultures” as 
discrete entities. 
 
2.4. Cultural systems 
In the previous sections, we have discussed identity formation as an integral 
part of meaning. We now turn to the social dimension of identity formation, 
which will provide us with a starting point from which we will define cultural 
systems more closely.  
 
For an identity to have an adaptive function, that is, for it to be successful in 
allowing the system to select from an overabundance of possibilities, it has to 
be perceived as being given as an identity by the environment, and not as 
constructed as such by the system. The system needs to be able, for 
instance, to trust its expectations; it needs a measure of objectivity, namely 
that things are as they are, independent of the system. This is because 
identification is risky; it could vary in its adaptive value, e.g. the accuracy of 
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the predictions it allows one to make. This means that we bear the 
consequences when we identify something simply as we like. When we 
identify the batting of an eyelid as a flirtatious wink, and then act on it, we run 
the risk of the embarrassing discovery that it was, in fact, only a nervous 
twitch. Thus the formed identity needs to refer to a world independent of the 
system that gives things as they are. Therefore, constructing identities also 
involves constructing the system as existing in an environment of things that 
are given as things by the environment. 
 
This construction (of the environment as independent), according to Luhmann, 
is accompanied by the construction of other people as experiencing systems, 
that is, as having their own experiences just as I do. Put differently, they 
become constructed as subjects, just as I am, in relation to the world of 
objects. Luhmann discusses this as the construction of the social dimension of 
meaning. According to Luhmann, the construction of the independence of the 
environment is not possible without the construction of the social dimension.  
 
“An essential requirement for this process of the intersubjective 
constitution of a meaningful world of objects is the non-identity of 
the experience of subjects (Luhmann’s italics). Only this makes 
possible the separation of the subject living inextricably within his 
experience from the content of this experience; his objects are also 
those of the other subjects ….” (Luhmann, 1990: 38). 
 
Luhmann does not show, however, exactly why this is necessarily so, only 
that the construction of the co-existence of other experiencing subjects leads 
to adaptive gains,23 that is, that more sophisticated meaningful experience is 
                                                 
23
 The adaptive gains of social instruction and modelling is discussed thoroughly by Van 
Niekerk (1986: 10). He highlights the role others play in our familiarity with and orientation to 
our worlds. “We learn from others how to behave, and therefore how to survive, in the world 
of things. As little as I could survive in and cope with an environment such as a mid-African 
tropical forest, as little, I suspect, could a native of such a forest environment orientate himself 
in a city without inter-subjective contact, example and instruction.” (Van Niekerk, 1986: 10)  
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possible once other subjects have been constructed. He also mentions that it 
is a mark of societal evolution that all people be included as being subjects 
(Luhmann, 1990: 39). It is conceivable, however, that meaningful experience 
is possible without positing others as subjects when we consider pre-linguistic, 
rudimentary meaningful processing. An infant’s attachment to his/her mother 
already serves as an orientation to his/her world, already serves to reduce the 
complexity of his/her environment. This is an example of a social process 
impacting on meaning-processing before the infant can construct his/her 
mother as another subject. Likewise, basic conditioning can occur pre-
linguistically and without regarding positive feedback as emanating from a 
subject.24 Autistic people, for instance, are thought to live in a world of their 
own, not regarding others as subjects (Culbertson, 2001 in Louw & Louw, 
2007: 160). Yet, they interact meaningfully (although pathologically and with 
significant social problems, but still meaningfully in the sense that some of the 
environment’s complexity has been reduced and some orientation achieved) 
with their environment.  
 
We would argue that what is essential and necessary for the system to 
construct an independent environment is the possibility of receiving 
disconfirming feedback from the environment. Most typically, this could be in 
the form of social interaction, e.g. a mother teaching a child that not all four-
legged animals are cows (in fact, in early childhood, most feedback is social 
as most of the child’s environment is in fact its mother). Feedback, however, 
does not need to be social in the strict sense, that is, as coming from another 
subject. It only needs to validate or disconfirm the individual’s views. Studies 
in cognitive psychology in the field of connectionist neural networks, show that 
                                                 
24
 A counter argument to these examples would be that the examples can just as easily apply 
to many types of animals. Many mammals show attachment behaviour and can be 
conditioned to make associations, thus establishing very basic systems of distinctions. If we 
reserve meaning only to humans, rudimentary meaning processing (whereby the complexity 
of the environment is reduced) is not strictly speaking meaning at all. Our position does not 
reserve meaning only to humans, as we see no good reason to do so. However, we would 
also point out that such a potential dispute is largely inconsequential to our argument, as we 
acknowledge the social nature of all but the most rudimentary meanings.  
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concept formation has confirmation and negation from the environment as an 
essential component in learning concepts (Eysenk & Keane, 2001: 9-11).  
 
While identity formation does not necessarily require a social dimension, the 
construction of others as subjects can be regarded as a vast developmental 
gain. Healthy human meaning processing as we know it is inconceivable 
without social interaction. We would hold that most of our knowledge of the 
world derives from our social interaction (cf. Van Niekerk, 1986:10). Even the 
above experiment with connectionist neural networks is a simulation of a 
typical social situation. Moreover, when others are constructed as subjects, 
certain phenomena in the environment of things are constructed as things that 
can provide feedback about the rest of the environment, adding specificity and 
sophistication to the person’s process of identifying things and adding 
information to which the person did not have direct experiential access.25 
Moreover, when another person converses with us, we gain access to his/her 
system of distinctions. Through one’s interaction with this other person one is 
exposed to his/her system of distinctions and this exposure causes one’s own 
system to change and develop. From developmental psychology we know that 
such development is most rapid in childhood. Later in life, one’s system of 
distinctions is less open to change. Yet, even when most experiences confirm 
what we already know, this also changes the system in the sense that the 
existing relations between distinctions are strengthened, thus becoming more 
deeply engrained.   
 
Therefore, while the environment can provide validating or disconfirming 
feedback without reference to another person, we can retain Luhmann’s idea 
that the sophistication and nuance with which views or perspectives are 
validated and/or disconfirmed increase dramatically with the construction of 
                                                 
25
 The concepts of confirmation and disconfirmation may thus be regarded as a zero-point on 
the continuum of the development of the social dimension; confirmation and disconfirmation 
cannot be developed to allow more meaningful processing without the construction of other 
people as experiencing subjects. 
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others as experiencing subjects, and with it, the sophistication of our 
meanings increases. In all but the most primitive meanings, the realisation of 
meaning in the psychic system rests heavily on the communicative 
interactions the psychic system has had with other subjects. Not only does 
meaning refer to a system of distinctions, each meaning in turn also refers to 
someone else’s meanings (and whether they will validate or disagree with our 
meanings). This means that meaning is realised within a network or system of 
communicative relationships we have with other people. 
 
Referring back to Habermas’ objection (see section 2.2.1) to the lack of 
intersubjecitivity in systems approaches to meaning, we note here that the 
requirement of meaning to refer to an independent environment and to other 
subjects that can confirm or disconfirm meaning shows some similarities to 
Habermas’ conceptualization of meaning in the context of communicative 
action. In Postmetaphysical Thinking (1992), Habermas criticizes the 
intentionalist, formal and pragmatic approaches to meaning as one-sided. 
Habermas offers a solution to this one-sidedness by proposing that meaning 
be understood in the context of communicative action. Communicative action 
is action undertaken with the purpose to reach agreement between speakers. 
As such, the expression must retain a link to the world in the form of criteria 
for the validity of the expression.  
 
“Understanding an expression means knowing how one can make 
use of it in order to reach an understanding with someone about 
something…. One would hardly know what it is to understand the 
meaning of an utterance if one did not know that the utterance can 
and should serve to bring about an agreement. ” (Habermas, 1992; 
78)  
 
In a communicative action, the speaker “takes up relations simultaneously to 
something in the objective world, to something in the subjective world (i.e. 
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his/her intentions, my parenthesis - JRN), and to something in the shared 
social world.”  (Habermas, 1992: 76). By showing that reference to an 
independent environment and to validation and disconfirmation is necessary 
for meaningful interpretation of experiences, the theory of meaning proposed 
in this dissertation retains the strengths of Habermas’ proposal.  
 
Furthermore, (although Luhmann does not do so), it is possible to show that 
an idea similar to the ideal speech situation is compatible with a systems 
approach. The system’s ability to establish identity would be greatly enhanced 
if it develops the capacity to introduce a standard like the ideal speech 
situation into its meaning processing: when one psychic system disagrees 
with another, this disagreement needs to be processed. Put differently, the 
psychic system needs to consider whether it should take the other’s 
perspective seriously. The ability to process such disagreements can be 
greatly enhanced if it can consider something like a generalised other, 
subjecting the validity of its decisions and behaviours to the standard that 
others would have to be able to agree with it.  
 
However, Habermas’ theory refers only to meaning in intersubjective, 
linguistic expressions. In this regard, a systemic, functional view such as 
Luhmann’s has an advantage when we consider the case where there is no 
sender: Even in the event of an absent sender (e.g. a man walking in the 
woods sees the rays of sunshine breaking through the trees and attaches a 
certain meaning to it) the receiver still grasps the meaning of the experience. 
However, he still grasps the meaning with the possible consensus of an 
interlocutor in mind. He should, in principle at least, be able to convey his 
received meaning to another person, who would be able to agree with him, 
but he does not need to do so for him to experience it as meaningful. 
 
It is worth noting here that others can agree or disagree with us not only on 
questions of fact, but also on various other questions. Others can validate our 
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meanings with regard to moral/ethical issues, conceptual questions; others 
can sympathise with our feelings, and can reciprocate our feelings of love or 
disgust. Referring back to our initial definition of meaning, all of these forms of 
validation serve to give us more clarity and certainty on the question of what 
to make of things and how one should respond to it. This means that, when a 
psychic system realises a meaning, it is done with reference to other psychic 
systems (systems of distinctions). In our interaction with other people we are 
thus related to each other in a communicative relationship that is aimed at 
finding agreement about meanings. These communicative relationships are 
key to our understanding of cultural systems and how they relate to psychic 
systems. 
  
When one person tries to convey meaning to another person, the relationship 
between the two psychic systems changes. For instance, if one person 
communicates something about which the other agrees, that which the two 
systems have in common is corroborated and engrained further. If one person 
convinces the other of something, he has effected a change in the other 
person’s system of distinctions, and thus their relationship has also changed: 
their systems now have something in common which they previously did not. 
Similarly, if the two people disagree on something it will change the 
relationship between them, the nature of this change depending on how they 
were related prior to the communication. For instance, two people on different 
ends of the political spectrum might have expected to disagree; their 
disagreement might then have the effect of making each more certain of 
his/her position. On the other hand, a disagreement between two people who 
did not expect to disagree, throws old certainties into doubt.  
 
We will now use the idea of communicative relationships to define cultural 
systems. As starting point we use Luhmann’s idea that cultural systems 
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interpret actions as communication.26 However, just as we reject the idea that 
‘meanings’ are the elements of meaning systems, we do not regard 
‘communications’ as the elements of cultural systems. Rather, we propose 
that communication is realised in the activation of a system of communicative 
relationships, an idea we will expand upon below.  
  
Earlier, we proposed that psychic systems uniquely produce meaning (as 
system states) and are thus proper, first order systems of meanings. It follows 
that it is not the cultural system that interprets an event as meaning. Rather, 
the cultural system is constituted by the communicative relationships between 
psychic systems. Thus, if we consider psychic systems as proper, first order 
systems of meaning, then culture can be defined as second order systems of 
meaning, because they are constituted by the relations between first order 
systems. 
 
Now, when a person acts to convey a meaning, meaning is realised in the 
receiver of the message and the relation between them changes. Thus, 
simultaneously, the psychic system interprets this event as meaning, while the 
cultural system interprets the action between the subjects as communication 
of meaning. As the respective psychic systems store the meaning through 
changes to the distinctions that constitute their respective systems, the 
cultural system stores the communication through changes to the 
communicative relations between psychic systems.  
 
Thus, if we consider psychic systems as proper, first order systems of 
meaning, then culture can be defined as second order systems of meaning, 
because they are constituted by the relations between first order systems. 
Seen this way, culture can then be defined as 1) a second order system of 
                                                 
26
 Earlier, on p.80, we proposed that ‘cultural system’ is a more accurate term for what 
Luhmann refers to as societal systems. 
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meaning, 2) that is constituted by the communicative relations between 
psychic systems.  
 
2.5. Advantages of conceptualising culture as a second order system of 
meaning  
Defining culture in terms of meaning (more specifically a second order system 
of meaning) holds certain advantages in clarifying our understanding of 
multicultural situations. Meaning is what so-called multicultural disputes are 
about. This rules out defining it succinctly in terms of people, ethnicity or a 
body of practices, as it is the meaning attached to these about which disputes 
are. The dilemma of so-called multicultural situations lies in the claims certain 
people or groups make for the conservation, respect or sanctity of what is 
meaningful for them and how such claims conflict with what other people find 
meaningful and the claim that such meaning is somehow contained in their 
culture. Furthermore, following Thompson’s (1990) argument, we note that 
when the concept of culture refers to practices or rituals, etc., and not 
specifically to the meaning of the practices, the concept ends up referring to 
everything. As such, it is too vague a concept to be of any use. Where 
practices and rituals can be described, their meaning is to be understood. 
Defining culture in terms of meaning therefore has the key advantage of 
allowing us to posit understanding as the key task of different parties in a 
multicultural conflict. Where explanation tends to reinforce a strict us/them 
dichotomy, a focus on understanding does the opposite.  As Clifford Geertz 
(1975: 14) put it: “Understanding a people’s culture exposes their normalness 
without reducing their particularity….It renders them accessible: setting them 
in the frame of their own banalities, it dissolves their opacity.” 
 
Other approaches to culture, such as analysing culture in terms of class 
interests, psycho-analytical approaches, functional analysis of actions, etc., all 
have the implication that one can explain culture. This means that a person’s 
views in a multicultural conflict can be explained by, for instance, class 
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interests. Such views are essentially reductionist. By focusing on explanation, 
they reduce the meaning of a wink to the batting of an eyelid, (to paraphrase 
Geertz (1973)), and confuse the question of what it means to bat an eyelid 
with why the eyelid batted.  
 
Explanatory theories therefore also ignore the very important fact that the 
issue in multicultural conflict has a meaning to those in the conflict and that it 
is worth fighting for because of its meaning to them. An attempt to explain 
them then comes across as patronizing and disrespectful and merely serves 
to establish whichever explanatory framework one uses (functionalist or 
otherwise) as a superior, more civilized knowledge system to which other 
people should convert. It also serves to obscure the importance of one’s own 
“culture” in such conflict situations. Put differently, if one can say: “they have 
that view because of these factors” or: “you say that because you are (e.g.) a 
Christian (or rich or black or American, or orally sadistic, etc.), and that is the 
typical view a Christian would take”, one firstly does not even attempt to 
understand (as opposed to explain) the other party’s message, and one pays 
no attention whatsoever to the validity of one’s own message. In a 
multicultural conflict situation, it is one’s own culture that has to be studied. 
One has to enter a debate as to the value/meaning of one’s own cultural 
assumptions.  Therefore, the final questions all have to do with the value and 
meaning of one’s culture. Culture as something to be interpreted therefore 
remains central to multicultural issues. 
 
For these reasons, a descriptive, explanatory view of culture contributes little 
to our understanding of culture in multicultural conflict and serves rather to 
highlight how culture interacts with other systems, such as economic or 
political systems. Though this might be illuminating in some respects, these 
theories are not, strictly speaking, about culture, but about how other systems 
interact with culture. 
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By using a systems perspective, a clearer delineation between individuals and 
culture is also possible. By defining culture as a second order system of 
meaning, we avoid the mistake of placing culture wholly in the minds of 
individuals, and make it easier to think of culture as something existing in the 
relations between individuals, yet having an effect on how each individual 
assigns meanings to experiences. 
 
Furthermore, by defining culture in terms of communicative relations between 
psychic systems (that is, proper systems of meaning), it becomes easier to 
understand how ethnicity and geography might relate to culture. More 
specifically, it helps us understand why it is tempting to let notions of 
geography, ethnicity and culture coincide (even Geertz does it when he 
speaks of ‘Balinese culture’): before the advent of modern telecommunication, 
our most important communicative relations would be with those 
geographically closest to us and those we share some form of kinship with. 
While we should not confuse culture with ethnicity or geographical location 
(theories that do so are easily refuted by the amount of diversity we encounter 
in the modern world), seeing culture in terms of communicative relations aids 
us in understanding how people might define ‘their’ culture, that is, to think of 
it as ‘a culture’. However, the notion of ‘a culture’ requires some notion of 
delineation. We develop this idea by analogy with personal delineation and we 
thus attend to the idea of personal delineation the next two chapters.     
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DELINEATION OF PERSONS 
 
What makes it possible for us to ascribe identity to a person, that is, to see 
him/her as an entity with discernible boundaries? In this chapter, we will argue 
that a person, unlike other entities, cannot be delineated simply with reference 
to his/her physical boundaries, but that a person has to be delineated both in 
terms of the boundaries of the (biological) organism and the boundaries of the 
psychic system. Furthermore, we will show that a person’s self-delineation – 
while claiming to give a true account of the person, including the goods s/he 
strives for – does not give a complete and accurate account of his/her own 
psychic system’s boundaries. We subsequently propose a dual structure of 
personal delineability whereby the (biological) organism’s boundary contains27 
the psychic system, whereas the boundaries of the psychic system, as 
asserted in the person’s self-delineation, remain disputable. We develop our 
theory against the backdrop of Stefaan Cuypers’ theory of personal identity. 
While we agree with his theory on most of the important points, our departures 
lead to the development of the dual structure model mentioned above. 
 
3.1 Cuypers’ theory of personal identity 
Before discussing Cuyper’s theory, we first outline two different aspects of 
personal identity and two different perspectives on the question. These will 
serve as background to Cuypers’ theory. They will also serve to foreshadow 
some of the differences we have with his theory.  
 
The question of personal identity has two separate, yet related aspects. The 
first concerns the question of identity over time, i.e. how a person can be 
                                                 
27
 We use the term ‘contains’ here with some hesitation. We do not wish to imply that the 
psychic system is like a ghost in the machine, or that the organism is merely the vessel or 
container of the psychic system. We use the word to show that no meanings are interpreted 
without a corresponding bodily process. As such, no part of the psychic system is 
independent or ‘outside’ of the organism.  
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considered to be the same person at two different points in time. The second 
aspect pertains to the boundaries of a person at any given time, i.e. how a 
person differentiates him/herself from other persons and his/her environment. 
We call this aspect ‘delineability’. Put differently, it pertains to where the 
person ends, and his/her environment begins.  
 
The first aspect has a long tradition of philosophical enquiry devoted to it. As 
we will briefly discuss below, two main schools of thought can be discerned, 
namely the sameness and selfhood traditions. The second aspect is not 
addressed thoroughly by either the ‘sameness’ or ‘selfhood’ traditions. This is 
presumably due to the fact that the everyday use of the concept rarely runs 
into difficulties, much less so than the question of identity over time. While it is 
conceivable to ponder whether a person suffering from Alzheimers is still the 
person he was before the illness, we can still say with great certainty where 
that person ends and where his/her environment begins; we can distinguish 
him from the nurse standing by his bedside and we can know that the 
thoughts and desires the patient reports, can be no-one else’s but his/her 
own.  
 
The certainty with regard to the second aspect of identity, we argue, is 
however also problematical. This is particularly true of our psychological 
identity. While we hold bodily identity to be relatively unproblematic, we argue 
in our discussion of Cuypers’ theory below, that the boundaries of the psychic 
system are not clear.  
 
In addition to these two different aspects (i.e. identity over time and 
delineability), we also distinguish between two distinct perspectives on 
personal identity. We call these the objective and subjective perspectives, 
respectively.  
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The objective perspective regards questions of personal identity as questions 
in the mould of: “who is that?” The subjective perspective pertains to 
questions of personal identity as the question of the identity of the “I”. The “I” 
refers to the ‘experiencer’ of one’s experiences. The subjective perspective 
thus regards personal identity as questions in the mould of: “who am I?”  
 
In most cases in everyday life, the answer to these two types of questions 
need not contradict each other. We can say: ‘That is John,” and John can 
reply: ‘Yes, I am John’, though he could obviously go into much greater 
descriptive detail about his history, his values and his future plans.  
 
The difference between these two types of questions leads to two different 
philosophical traditions on the topic of personal identity, which we will now 
discuss. The sameness- and selfhood-traditions can be distinguished in terms 
of their focus on the objective or subjective questions of personal identity: 
where the selfhood-tradition is predominantly concerned with the subjective 
question, the sameness-tradition attempts to answer both questions. This then 
leads to further questions regarding the relationship between body and mind, 
and thus, bodily and mental identity.  
 
The sameness tradition pertains to “an inquiry into which criteria of 
persistence over time (namely: bodily, brain, physical, memory, psychological, 
etc.) determine whether changes, occurring over a lifetime, undermine the 
identity of a person” (Barazatti & Reichlin, 2011: 399). Derek Parfit’s influential 
theory on personal identity is a prominent example of this tradition. Cuypers’ 
theory involves a critique of Parfit’s argument, and accordingly we will discuss 
some of Parfit’s ideas below.  
 
The selfhood tradition “focuses on the person’s self-conception, self-
evaluation, and self-development throughout a lifetime,” (Barazatti & Reichlin, 
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2011: 399). This view involves viewing the person as being the author of 
his/her own self-narratives (Barazatti & Reichlin, 2011: 399). Some 
approaches within this tradition include theories that focus on character, that 
is, that personal identity is derived from a certain stability and permanence in 
character (Barazatti & Reichlin, 2011:403); and theories that focus on the 
“relationship between persons and their actions” (Barazatti & Reichlin, 
2011:405).  
 
With these two traditions and two different types of identity questions in mind, 
we turn to Cuypers’ argument on personal identity. Cuypers presents a view 
that is broadly consistent with our theory of psychic systems, even though 
some important differences arise (as we will discuss below). His theory 
represents an important step forward in uniting the different traditions. He 
focuses on the so-called ‘standard debate’ (Cuypers, 2001: 15) between 
empiricist bundle theorists and metaphysical ego theorists and demonstrates 
the inadequacy of both.  
 
Ego-theorists require the existence of a soul-substance as the essence of 
personal identity. In this regard, Cuypers points out that “there is nothing in 
the nature of self-consciousness that rules out the possibility that a person 
would be constituted at a certain moment by a group of egos or by a series of 
egos over time….Metaphysicians, in response to this problem, must appeal to 
the supra-ego in order to guarantee the unity of the spiritual ego; and in turn, 
they must appeal to the super-ego  to guarantee the unity of the supra-ego, 
and so on ad infinitum”  (Cuypers, 2001: 32-33). The metaphysical position 
thus leads to an infinite regression. Moreover, the soul-substance has no 
empirical support (Cuypers, 2001: 33). Introducing it as an explanation for our 
experiences of identity therefore does little to clarify or explain those 
experiences, it merely replaces one mystery (that of personal identity) with 
another (that of the nature of soul-substance).  
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On this matter we are in agreement with Cuypers, as we see little use for an 
explanatory metaphysics such as proposed by ego-theorists. As such, 
Cuypers’ critique of the empiricist theories is of more interest to us. In this 
regard, Cuypers focuses mainly on the arguments of Derek Parfit. Parfit’s 
theory, as presented in Reasons and Persons (1984), holds that “(o)ur identity 
over time just involves (a) Relation R – psychological connectedness and/or 
psychological continuity, …provided (b) that there is no different person who is 
R-related to us as we once were.” (Parfit, 1984: 216).  This definition requires 
some explanation. Parfit does very little to explain the nature of connections, 
and discusses the concept mainly with reference to examples. It is not clear 
what these examples have in common, other than a common-sense notion 
that they are, in fact, psychological phenomena. Nevertheless, Parfit uses the 
example of memory as an example of a ‘memory connection’ (Parfit, 1984: 
205) between Person X at one point in time and Person Y at a later point, if Y 
can remember having some of the experiences X had at the earlier point in 
time. Likewise, he uses the examples of beliefs or desires: X and Y are 
connected if X had the belief or desire at an earlier point, and Y still has that 
desire at a later point.  Parfit then defines psychological continuity as ‘the 
holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness’ (Parfit, 1984: 206), 
where strong connectedness refers to a sufficient number of connections, 
specifically ‘we can claim that there is enough connectedness (between a 
person at two different points in time) if the number of connections, over any 
day, is at least half the number of direct connections that hold, over every day, 
in the lives of nearly every actual living person.” (Parfit, 1984: 206). Besides 
our doubts over the nature of connections, Parfit’s use of the number of 
connections also seems quite arbitrary. What exactly is special about a half? 
Why not make it more than that, or less?  
 
Our objections aside, Parfit’s theory has some promising elements. For one, it 
avoids the metaphysician’s problems. Secondly, we see the idea of continuity, 
even if developed inadequately by Parfit, as a possible basis for our own 
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views on identity. Cuypers’ approach, however, improves on Parfit’s in that it 
also employs some ideas related to continuity, yet arrives at these from vastly 
different premises, which also form the basis of his critique of Parfit’s 
approach.   
 
Cuypers criticizes Parfit and other empiricists for holding an atomistic position 
(Cuypers, 2001: 57-62). According to such a position,  
‘(t)he inner space of the ‘I’ is the object of indubitable and direct 
knowledge, whereas the outer space is only the object of doubtful 
and indirect knowledge….Thus all knowledge is grounded in the 
special and privileged access of the first person to his inner life” 
(2001: 59).  
Cuypers’ use of the term ‘atomism’ refers here to the idea that mental and 
physical particulars can be separated from each other, and that they exist 
independently. The whole that we experience as a person can thus be divided 
into its parts, or ‘atoms’. Therefore, in a subtle way, the empiricists employ a 
concept similar to a Cartesian dualism. This much is clear if we consider the 
thought experiments Parfit employs (Parfit, 1984: 199-201). In one, a person 
is ‘transported’ from Earth by reproducing his body on Mars. This is done in 
such a manner that all his memories are also inscribed in the neuronal 
structure of his brain. His body on Earth is then killed off, ceases to exist. In 
another variation, his body on Earth remains living, so that, allegedly, two 
versions of him exist. Even though Parfit connects the mind to the body (there 
is no transfer of ‘essence’ or a ghost in the machine, so to speak, only an 
elaborate biological reproduction exercise), his thought experiments reveal the 
implicit notion that the body and mind can be separated.  
 
Cuypers fundamentally disagrees with this notion. Following Peter Strawson’s 
(Strawson, 1958) analysis of the concept of a person, Cuypers holds that the 
person is a so-called primitive concept that cannot be reduced or divided into 
physical or mental ‘parts’. “(T)he concept of a person is neither reducible to 
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the concept of mind nor to the concept of a body” (Cuypers, 2001: 72). 
Following this line of thinking, Parfit’s thought experiments are therefore not 
only far-fetched, they also represent a logical impossibility, like squaring a 
circle.  
 
In this regard, we agree with Cuypers’ thinking. To see how Cuypers and 
Strawson’s views are consistent with our approach, as well as where we 
differ, let us briefly consider Strawson’s basic argument, as well as Cuypers’ 
expansions on Strawson’s ideas.  
 
Strawson argues that experiences themselves imply ‘the unique position or 
role of a single body’ (Strawson, 1958, 98). Experiences suggest that they are 
perceived by a single body (of which the functioning allows the experience to 
be had, and whose malfunctioning, i.e. blindness, rules out the possibility of 
experience), that perceives from a definite location and with a definite special 
and temporal orientation (i.e. “I was there at that time and I was looking in that 
direction”28) (Strawson, 1958: 92). Furthermore, Strawson argues that “it is a 
necessary condition of one’s ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, 
to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be 
prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself” (Strawson, 1958: 
99).29 As such, it follows that a person is always a person amongst other 
persons. Furthermore, if we can ascribe experiences to others, it will be based 
on their behaviour. As such, the concept of person implies a certain degree of 
dynamism, that is, a person is a person who acts and interacts with other and 
his/her environment.  
                                                 
28
 This is my own quote from a hypothetical person, not Strawson’s words. 
29
 While Strawson grounds this assertion in the everyday use of words referring to 
experiences (e.g. the expression ‘in love’ means the same whether one uses it in the 
sentence ‘I am in love’ as when one uses it in the sentence “He is in love”), he could also 
have pointed out the absurdity that would result if his assertion were denied: If I cannot say 
that these experiences, that are perceived by a unique body, can be ascribed to someone 
else, then who can I ascribe them to? If I cannot ascribe them to someone else, then I can 
ascribe them to nobody – literally no body – thus violating our initial assumption of a unique 
perceiving body. 
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Cuypers uses Strawson’s concept of the person to construct personal identity 
as comprising of ‘bodily identity, agential identity and narrative identity’ 
(Cuypers, 2001: 75). Following Strawson’s concept of person, whereby the 
body cannot be thought of as somehow separate from a person, Cuypers 
argues that bodily identity is a necessary aspect of personal identity. As such, 
personal identity must always also refer to a physical entity (like a body), and 
accordingly, discerning personal identity is a relatively easy task:   
“(T)he subject of experiences requires to be or possess an entity, 
the identification of which should cause no problem within our 
spatio-temporal framework…” and as such “…there is no problem 
of identification at all because their material bodies can readily be 
individuated and (re)identified by ordinary physical criteria” 
(Cuypers, 2001: 71). 
 
It is tempting to stop the question of personal identity right there. If bodily 
identity is relatively easy to establish, one possible suggestion is to simply 
define psychological identity also with reference (once again) to the organism: 
since all psychological phenomena (thoughts, emotions, etc.) are always also 
patterns of firing neurons, a person’s psychological identity can, in fact, 
coincide with the brain. 
 
Yet personal identity does not only reside in bodily identity. Strawson’s 
concept of person implies an acting person. Accordingly, Cuypers develops 
the idea of agential identity. He argues that what differentiates persons from 
other objects, is that persons demonstrate “intentional agency” (Cuypers, 
2001: 77). This is not to be misconstrued as another expression of a 
Cartesian dualism. The concept of action, according to Cuypers (2001:72) 
“involves both an intention to act and a bodily movement”. Thus the person’s 
intentional agency neither lies in a metaphysical ego, nor can it be separated 
from the personal body, nor can it be reduced to being only the body.  
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Cuypers’ notion of agential identity also allows him to formulate a notion of 
continuity. He holds that intentions and actions “cannot be identified 
atomistically, i.e. on their own, isolated and cut off from other attitudes and 
actions,” (Cuypers, 2001: 78). Intentions and actions are only intelligible as 
part of a wider “network of other intentions,” including the person’s past 
intentions (Cuypers, 2001:79). A person’s intentions at any given moment are 
therefore intrinsically connected to each other. As such, Cuypers’ theory 
provides for psychological continuity over time.  
 
Cuypers then expands the idea of agential identity with the related concept of 
narrative identity. The latter refers to the unification of a person’s actions “into 
a single coherent story” (Cuypers, 2001: 80). This coherent story or narrative 
“involves rendering one’s deeds and omissions intelligible not only to oneself 
but also to others with whom one entertains multifarious relations in a public 
common world”. One’s narrative identity thus refers to the person’s life, the 
coherent whole of his/her actions and interactions with others.  
 
3.2 A dual structure approach to personal delineation 
In many respects, our view of a person (and a person’s psychic system) is in 
agreement with Cuypers and Strawson’s theories. In Chapter 2, after our 
exposition of the psychic system, we defined the person as an organism that 
interacts meaningfully with his environment, including other persons. A person 
is thus an organism that can interpret his experiences as meaning, and in so 
doing orientates him/herself in his/her world and finds him/herself in 
communicative relations with others. As such, the psychic system (which is 
the system of meaning interpreting experiences as meaning) cannot be 
thought of as a separate entity from the organism, specifically the body. Our 
concept of person therefore retains the inseparable unity between body and 
psychic system that Strawson and Cuypers hold.  
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Furthermore, we agree with the description of the person as a public entity. 
Because the psychic system is inseparable from the body, indicating and 
identifying a person is as simple as pointing to his/her body and giving him/her 
a name. This gives an indication of the person’s spatio-temporal position. A 
person can be identified as that person who was born on that date in that 
town and who was subsequently named by his/her parents or the relevant 
authorities.  
 
In terms of our systems approach, we regard the organism as providing us 
with boundaries about which consensus is possible. The person’s skin, for 
instance, represents a discernible boundary between organism and 
environment, so that there can be no disagreement between observers about 
where the person ends and the environment begins, so to speak. At any given 
moment, the skin allows us to regard the person as a discrete entity. Even 
though the organism changes through time (we do not consist of the same 
cells as we did 10 years ago) we are able to reach consensus about which 
organism we are talking about because we have a clear idea where the 
environment begins and the organism ends.30 
 
The person, however, is not simply to be equated with the organism, for if this 
were so, we would lose the distinction between the person and other material 
bodies, where persons can act with intention, thus interacting with their 
environment in a meaningful manner, while other material objects do not. 
When we take into account the definition of the person as the interpenetration 
of the biological and cultural system, we must also be able to define the 
boundaries of the psychic system. 
 
                                                 
30
 Our ability to see an organism as the same organism through time can be ascribed 1) to the 
psychic system’s construction of an identity that has duration over time, as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and 2) the well-established fact of gestalt-tendencies in human perception, by 
which continuities are emphasised over discontinuities (Eysenk & Keane, 2001: 28). 
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Therefore, a person’s bodily identity is not the whole account of that person. 
For that we require a narrative identity, which in turn requires reference to 
actions and intentions. Intentions, in turn, refer to interpreted meanings, 
because meanings are defined as the answers to questions about ‘what to do 
next’ (see Chapter 2, section 2.1).  
 
By relating narrative identity with agential and bodily identity, Cuypers 
manages a synthesis between the sameness and selfhood traditions. This 
synthesis, however, is not perfect. We disagree with Cuypers on the perfect 
unity of a person’s self-conception and the public conception of that person. 
Cuypers holds that “it is absurd to speculate that, even in a hazy state of 
mind, I could wrongly identify my neighbour’s self as my self; no such 
possibility of introspective misidentification of the self seems to exist” 
(2001:64). He also alleges that “a person is continuously and immediately 
present to himself” (Cuypers, 2001: 79).  
 
While we agree with Cuypers about misidentifying one’s neighbour’s thoughts 
as one’s own, some opposite examples do not hold. It is, we argue, quite 
possible to incorrectly deny that one has a certain thought or desire, because 
that thought or desire has been repressed. Following our exposition of the 
psychic system, it is essential to the functioning of the psychic system that it 
represses certain meanings (otherwise it would lose its adaptive and world-
orientating value). Moreover, these repressed meanings are part of one’s 
psychic system: just because they are not allowed into the “I” does not make 
something other than meanings. Put differently, repressed meanings are 
expelled from consciousness, but not from the psyche. Repressed meanings 
can however, be detected by other means (see our example of an implicit 
racism test below). The problem then is that, in some cases, a third person 
perspective of a person and a first person perspective do not always agree, 
nor is there always a conclusive way of determining whether a person has a 
certain thought or desire (or in general a certain meaning). If there were a way 
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of deciding such matters conclusively, we would have to privilege a certain 
perspective over another (e.g. regarding the first person perspective as more 
important than the third person perspective). But this would violate a 
Strawsonian view of a public person. Strawson, in fact, makes a similar point: 
 “(I)n order for there to be such a concept as that of (person) X’s 
depression, (that is) the depression which X has, the concept must 
cover both what is felt, but not observed, by X, and what may be 
observed, but not felt by others than X.” (Strawson, 1958: 109).  
 
Contrary to Cuypers’ view, we hold that self-identification can only give an 
accurate representation of the boundaries of the “I”. The boundaries of the “I” 
can simply be defined as the boundary between those psychic phenomena 
(thoughts, emotions, desires, memories, etc.) that “belong” to the “I”, that is, 
that can be described as “mine” and those that do not. Moreover, these 
phenomena, being part of the psychic system, also express meaning. Recall 
from Chapter 2 that all psychological phenomena can also be conceptualised 
in terms of meaning. As such, they not only indicate where the boundaries of 
the “I” lie, but also orientate the “I” and give it an indication of its place in the 
world. In so doing, the boundary between subjective (the observer) and 
objective world (the observed) is also constituted. Take for instance, the case 
of a person perceiving someone else’s anxiety, or perceiving that person’s 
thought communicated to him verbally. The boundary of the “I” is established 
by virtue of the person being able to ascribe the emotion or thought to the 
other person and therefore being an object of observation, while appropriating 
his perception or observation of it as “his”/”hers”, thereby affirming him/herself 
as observer. In so doing, s/he has delineated the boundary of his/her psychic 
system. 
 
As long as we assume the boundaries of the “I” to coincide perfectly with the 
boundaries of the organism, person identity remains relatively simple. We can 
then link the great changes in identity we undergo through our developmental 
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history with the continuous development of the organism. Just as we 
accentuate continuities over discontinuities in the latter, we can do it with our 
psychic identity as well.  
 
However, the boundaries of the “I” do not coincide perfectly with the 
boundaries of the organism and as such, our perception of ourselves as 
unitary is a flawed construction. As such, personal identity becomes more 
complicated. Recent studies in neurology suggest that our unitary experience 
of ourselves as “I” is the result of periodic binding waves in the brain. These 
bursts of activity occur so frequently that we experience it as being 
continuous, though in reality it is not. The implication is that the “I” exists only 
periodically (Zilmer & Spiers, 2001: 182).  
 
Furthermore, large parts of brain processing are unconscious. A large 
proportion of our learning is implicit and procedural, which is associated with 
the more primitive, subcortical areas in our brain. These processes are all 
unconscious (Zilmer & Spiers 2001: 181). Interestingly, this provides some 
support for the classical Freudian view that the unconscious draws on the 
more primitive areas of our psyche. 
 
Moreover, the psychic system’s conscious and unconscious meaning 
processing can be in conflict with each other. Research in cognitive 
psychology suggests that self-reported non-racist persons can demonstrate 
racism in tasks that access implicit learning processes. The research does not 
suggest that they were lying about their own racism. Rather, that they were 
employing a certain amount of cognitive control and self-censorship, which 
was bypassed in tests of implicit associations (Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwender, Le & Schmitt, 2005: 1369; Ottoway, Hayden & Oakes, 2001: 97; 
Phelps, O’Connor, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, Gore & Banaji, 2000; 
729).   
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Their racism is therefore not given access to consciousness. If the person, in 
his/her self-reflective experience of the unitary “I” could be 100% certain 
where the boundaries of his/her psychic system lie, s/he would not be able to 
deny his/her racial prejudice as s/he does.  
 
What such studies show is that we cannot be sure where the boundaries of 
our own psychic systems lie. More specifically, we cannot conclusively deny 
that we have ascribed a certain meaning to our experience. The example of 
the declared non-racist, mentioned above, is an example of this. S/he had in 
fact processed his/her environment in a certain way, resulting in him/her 
thinking a certain (racist) thought (e.g. ‘blacks are dangerous’), yet would deny 
that s/he had thought it and express an opposite thought (e.g. ‘I do not think 
blacks are dangerous’). Both these thoughts are meanings a person can 
ascribe to his/her experience.      
 
The psycho-analytical school of thinking still provides us with the best 
vocabulary to describe such intra-psychic conflicts. Whether or not a certain 
psychic element may be appropriated as “mine” can at times be very 
controversial and cause intra-psychic conflict. A person might, for instance, 
repress anxiety provoking desires or emotions, or dissociate from traumatic 
memories. In so doing, the person essentially does not appropriate certain 
memories, desires or emotions as ‘his/hers’. Such repression has been the 
subject of the well-established tradition of psychoanalysis, originating with 
Sigmund Freud and has received considerable empirical support (Shedler, 
2010: 100-102). In this school of thought, intra-psychic conflict and the 
accompanying repression is expressed in neurotic anxiety. Moreover, the 
phenomenon is not restricted to the clinical population. In the psycho-analytic 
school of thought, it is regarded to be present in all people to a certain degree.  
 
In this regard, psychoanalytical thought is in agreement with a systems 
perspective. Luhmann (1990), as discussed in Chapter 2, regards the 
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boundary between observer and observed (in this case between the psychic 
system and its environment) as a construction by the psychic system itself.  
 
We need not go as far as to say that the world stops existing when we close 
our eyes. The point here is that when we observe things, we observe them as 
things, yet they do not exist naturally as things, free and independent of 
observation: it is the psychic system/observer that constructs them as such. In 
so doing, the psychic system represses the work it has done in such a 
construction. It does not recognise how the system of meaning it employs has 
constructed the thing as thing, how its own thoughts are present in the thing it 
perceives to be naturally given, free and independent of its observation. 
Studies in cognitive science, for instance, recognise the significant impact 
emotions have on how we perceive things, how we direct our attention and 
how we remember things, yet in our perception we do not recognise the 
contribution we make (Eysenk & Keane, 2001: 505). We therefore do not 
appropriate our own thoughts, but project them onto the thing, so that the 
thing is regarded as being naturally there.   
 
Furthermore, repression of certain meanings (i.e. not allowing it to enter 
consciousness) within the psychic system can be regarded as central to its 
functioning. As discussed above, the circular reference between distinctions is 
arrested by decisions that treat certain referents (of those involved in the 
circular reference) as having a self-evident identity. Each decision then has 
the effect of creating hierarchies of distinctions: When one referent is treated 
as more self-evident than another, it gains priority over others. It is hierarchies 
such as these that post-structural thinkers aim to deconstruct.  As decisions 
are necessary parts of the processing of meaning, it follows that the psychic 
system’s processing of meaning necessarily creates hierarchies. Every 
decision corresponds to a certain way of making sense of an experience and 
every decision is by definition one of many possible decisions that could have 
been made. Therefore, when a decision is made other possible decisions 
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have been precluded and for each decision thus precluded, there is a 
corresponding meaning that was repressed. 
 
The hierarchical organisation of the psychic system is necessary for 
simplifying the complexity the environment presents to the organism. Put 
differently, without hierarchies, there is no interpretation of meaning, because 
meaning involves simplifying the environment’s complexity in order for the 
person to orientate him/herself in his/her environment. If the system does not 
make this simplification, it runs the risk of deteriorating, ceasing to exist as a 
system. However, it does open the door for controversy and conflict: where 
the person claims the boundaries lie, can be disputed. We have already 
mentioned the intra-psychic examples found in psychoanalysis. Intra-psychic 
conflict is caused when the person places the boundaries so that some 
psychic elements (thoughts, desires, fears, motives, etc.) are not appropriated 
as belonging to him/her. Where the repression is too strong, such conflict is 
expressed in anxiety.  
 
Such misappropriations can also be disputed interpersonally. The therapeutic 
setting is but one example and is by no means the most likely place to find 
such disputes. Rationalizations, for instance, are examples of such 
misappropriations. In cases of rationalization, the person offers a reason for 
his/her behaviour (or his/her judgement, attitude towards some issue, etc.) 
which is not the real reason for his behaviour. In proper rationalisation, the 
person does not consciously advance a hidden agenda and actually believes 
the reason s/he offers. What therefore happens in rationalization is that the 
real motive is not appropriated by the person as a psychic element belonging 
to him/her. In interaction with other people, such rationalizations may then be 
identified by others. However, though the person might sometimes agree with 
his/her interlocutors when made aware of his motives, consensus is not 
always possible. Either the person did not have the hidden motive others 
claimed s/he did (in which case one might suggest that they might be the ones 
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rationalizing) or the person may simply continue to repress the motive. There 
are no objective measures to definitely determine which motives belong to the 
person and which do not.  
 
Another pertinent phenomenon is racial discrimination and the incitement of 
racial violence. Studies have shown that a key element in the incitement of 
racial violence is the de-humanization of the particular racial group (Hagan, 
Rymon-Richmond, 2008: 875). This makes it possible for people, who would 
ordinarily be well-adjusted pro-social persons, to commit terrible violence or 
participate in discriminatory practices based on their perceptions of the 
particular racial group. These perceptions are then characterised by the 
following: 1) the ‘race’ in question is not a constructed concept but a natural 
category, 2) the group is therefore homogenous in that all members have the 
qualities that distinguish this group from others and 3) all the persons in this 
group are therefore, by virtue of these qualities, subhuman and deserve the 
treatment they receive. Participation in discourses such as these has the 
effect of repressing any feelings of empathy, humanity and pro-social 
behaviour in the perpetrators. Those persons participating in it thereby do not 
appropriate their pro-social feelings as theirs. As in the case of 
rationalisations, there is no way of objectively determining whether they are in 
fact repressing those feelings, or whether they never had them in the first 
place. 
 
The boundaries of the single, unitary “I” are such that they invite controversy 
and dispute and, in such disputes, objective consensus about them is often 
not possible.  This would suggest that we should think about person identity in 
a different way, not that we discard the idea of person identity completely.  
 
In this regard we have to note that disputes about psychic boundaries always 
take place within parameters provided by the objective, organic boundaries. 
When we dispute whether a psychic element (e.g. a motive) belongs to a 
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person or not, the organic boundaries gives us an idea as to what the different 
parties in the dispute are claiming. When someone represses something, for 
instance, and the issue of this repression is raised by an interlocutor, we know 
which organism is being referred to, but we do not know where its psychic 
boundaries lie. The organic boundaries therefore serve as a basis from which 
the dispute may continue. 
 
The only possible conclusion from such an insoluble disagreement within 
objective parameters is what we would call a dual structure of personal 
delineation. The person can easily be delineated with regard to his body. This 
is what we will call the person’s trivial delineation. We call it trivial, because it 
comprises merely a nominal identification, i.e. ‘he is that person, named X’. 
With only such a trivial boundary, nothing of much importance is said about 
the person. We know, for instance, nothing about his/her thoughts or desires, 
we know nothing of his/her intentions. The more significant boundary is that of 
the psychic system: to delineate the psychic system is to say that a thought, 
desire, or generally, a meaning belongs to person X. Yet this is not always 
clear. In fact, because of the functioning of the psychic system, repression is 
an integral part of the system’s functioning, and because there is repression, 
there is in some cases no definite way to declare whether a person does, in 
fact, have a certain thought or desire, and whether s/he does not.  
 
We would therefore propose that person identity is structured as follows: 
objective boundaries which serve as parameters within which psychic 
boundaries may be disputed. It is by virtue of these parameters that disputes 
about psychic boundaries do not translate into a sense of complete confusion 
of a person’s identity. Put differently, we may disagree over which psychic 
elements belong to a person, but we do not start calling him by another name 
or claim he is someone else. We depict this dual structure in Figure 1, below. 
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Figure 1 
 
3.3 Continuity as unity in conflict 
One challenge facing our dual structure is to explain psychological continuity. 
When intentions can be at odds with one another within a person, that is, 
when the person can experience intra-psychic conflict to such an extent that 
the “I”-account is dubitable, then how is continuity provided for? 
 
We suggest that the faculty of memory in the psychic system, specifically the 
ability to retain repressed elements allows us further insight into how we may 
be able to think of the person’s psychological continuity.  
 
Repressed psychic meanings, though repressed, are retained in memory. 
This means that at any moment in time, the psychic system’s perception of 
itself as a single, unitary “I” has to take into account 1) previously and 2) 
currently repressed memories, as well as 3) conscious memories and 4) 
current unrepressed psychic elements. In so doing, it is continuously 
confronted with the demand to choose between continuing to repress certain 
psychic elements or to recover them from consciousness, or perhaps to 
repress something that was once conscious.  
 
Thus the retention of the repressed in memory provides what we will call a 
‘unity of conflict’. This term refers to the fact that the results of each intra-
Repressed thoughts 
Unitary “I”-
account 
Organism boundary 
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psychic conflict are retained, are available to be recovered and are 
continuously laying claim to be included in the unitary experience of the “I”. All 
previous conflicts must be accounted for continually. This provides us with a 
sense of identity over time, so that, despite fragmentation and conflict in the 
psyche at any given moment in time, it does not make sense to think of the 
person at two different points in time as two different persons.  
 
3.4 Autonomy and delineability 
We will argue (in Chapter 4) that the abovementioned unity of conflict is a 
definitive feature of what we understand by autonomy in persons. Put 
differently, we will argue that where the unity of conflict (between repressed 
and non-repressed psychic elements) is guided by the self-referential 
decisions of the “I” (we will develop the concept of self-referential decision in 
Chapter 4), we will argue that the person can be considered autonomous. 
Moreover, we will show (cf. Chapter 4) that the continuous retention and re-
consideration of repressed materials is central to person autonomy.  
 
Now, with regard to his/her trivial boundary, a person need not be 
autonomous to be delineable. However, when the potential dispute of the 
psychic system’s boundaries is taken into account, the notion of autonomy 
comes into play. Because the “I”-account is not necessarily an accurate 
account, a third-person perspective of the person needs to be able to 
ascertain whether certain meanings ‘belong’ to that person, or not. Yet a 
person may have repressed one meaning, and present a diametrically 
opposite meaning in his “I”-account. Because the “I”-account is not 
necessarily the true account of the psychic system, the problem of delineating 
the psychic system is also a problem of ‘representivity’, i.e. which meanings 
are truly representative of the person. To entertain the notion that a person is 
identical with two diametrically opposite intentions is counterintuitive, unless 
we can conceive of an underlying unity relating such opposite intentions.  
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Such unity is provided for by the unity of conflict, discussed in the previous 
section. We will now show that the idea of unity of conflict presupposes 
personal autonomy. In the previous section, we argued that unity of conflict is 
made possible by the retention of repressed meanings and their continued 
claims to be included and re-appropriated in the unitary experience of the “I”. 
Now, even though repressed meanings are unconscious, the re-appropriation 
of these meanings is necessarily a conscious process, and thus forms part of 
the “I”. This is so, because re-appropriation involves the “I” being confronted 
with data (e.g. the results of an implicit racism test) that forces it to become 
aware of the fact that some meanings have been repressed. Without 
becoming aware of this, no re-appropriation is possible. Being thus confronted 
also causes the “I” to pay attention to its own processes, its own interpretation 
of meanings: Where particular meanings were certain and self-evident, they 
are now no longer so. This requires the “I” to interrogate its own meanings, in 
order once more to find meaning and obtain some certainty about its 
orientation in the world.  
 
Re-appropriation of repressed meanings therefore requires (1) a reflective or 
self-referential quality of the “I” in order to re-appropriate a previously 
repressed meaning; and (2) having become aware of a previously repressed 
meaning, the ability to choose between two opposing meanings. In Chapter 4, 
we will argue that personal autonomy is defined by these above two points.  
 
Furthermore, where representivity is a problem for personal delineation, it is 
even more so with cultures. Therefore, with an eye toward our eventual 
analogy between persons and cultures the problem of representivity in 
cultures suggests that, if we were to attempt an analogy with person 
delineation, we would have to show that cultures can exhibit representivity in a 
way analogous to how persons exhibit autonomy. For instance, we will show 
(cf. Chapter 5) that an analogy is possible between, on the one hand, the 
dominant and oppressed views in a culture, and on the other, the unitary 
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experience of the ‘I’ and repressed psychic meanings. Furthermore, where the 
character associated with a certain culture is typically at the centre of a 
multicultural conflict, one needs a certain notion whereby one can discern 
whether the alleged leaders or spokesmen of that culture actually legitimately 
represent the culture, or whether they have just successfully hijacked the 
culture for their own causes.  
 
With regard to representivity in cultures, we suggest that a solution to the 
problem of representivity is possible where the dominant account continually 
maintains an openness to - and engages in dialogue with - marginal accounts. 
Therefore we must aim to find a unity of conflict in cultures that is analogous 
to personal autonomy. Accordingly, we will argue, in Chapter 6, that an 
analogous interplay between dominant and marginalised accounts can be 
present in cultures, whereby they achieve, not autonomy (because this 
concept is still reserved for persons) but cultural representivity. To this end, 
we first discuss the concept of person autonomy in Chapter 4, whereupon we 
discuss its analogy in cultures in Chapter 5 and 6.   
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CHAPTER 4 
AUTONOMY, MEANING AND SELF-REFERENCE 
 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the importance of personal autonomy 
for the problem of representivity. We also suggested that, in order to delineate 
cultures in a manner analogous to personal delineation, we would have to find 
an analogy for personal autonomy in cultures. Accordingly, we first focus our 
attention on what we understand personal autonomy to be. In this chapter, we 
will set out to define the concept of autonomy. We first offer a basic definition 
of autonomy as self-legislation and then proceed to investigate its relationship 
with meaning and self-reference.  
 
In the weakest, most basic sense, autonomy can be defined in terms of self-
regulation. In this sense, something can be said to be autonomous when it 
regulates its own functioning. This means that it can, automatically and 
without further input or intervention, change its functioning (to some or other 
extent) to adapt to differences in its environment. This most basic definition 
includes many entities we are quite familiar with. A stove, refrigerator or air 
conditioning system can react to changes in the environment (e.g. someone 
opening the fridge or stove’s door) by making changes to its functioning (i.e. 
increase or decrease its output). 
  
This, however, is a rather weak form of autonomy. In the context of this 
dissertation, concerning itself with respect for persons and the politics of so-
called multicultural situations, we prefer to focus on a stronger definition. We 
can think of many systems that manage to regulate their own functioning, but 
which are not responsible for those laws, rules and principles by which they 
are governed. It is the latter capacity of self-legislation, i.e. the ability to 
determine one’s own principles, rules and/or values that constitutes the 
starting point of our definition of autonomy. Thus, it is a concept that could 
typically be applied to people and governments. Accordingly, it would seem 
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inappropriate to apply the term ‘autonomy’ to stoves, pool cleaners and air 
conditioners. The ability to determine one’s own principles, rules and/or values 
therefore constitutes our basic definition of autonomy, which we will attempt to 
define more closely with reference to the concepts of ‘self-reference’ and 
‘meaning’.  
 
4.1 Self-reference 
In the context of this dissertation, self-reference does not simply denote 
something referring to itself, like we would refer to ourselves with pronouns 
such as ‘we’, ‘our’, and ‘ourselves’, etc. We refer to it specifically in the 
following sense: an entity can be called self-referential when it performs on 
itself the same operation it performs on other objects. One typical, simple 
example would be a sentence that has itself as either the subject or object, 
e.g. “This sentence is true” or “I am writing this sentence”. Usually, a sentence 
would use something other than itself as subject or object (e.g. “I am writing a 
letter”) but in self-referential sentences the sentence itself fulfils the function of 
subject or object.  
 
As it is found in normal language, so too it is found in formal languages such 
as mathematical formulas or the type of coding one would find in computer 
programmes. However, it is not restricted to languages. People, for instance, 
also exhibit some self-reference. As we will discuss in more detail in the 
following section, people can have desires about their desires (e.g. not 
wishing to have certain desires), perceptions about their perceptions (e.g. as 
in cognitive-behavioural therapy, where the patient perceives his perceptions 
as healthy/functional or not), etc. In such cases, self-reference is 
characterised by a division of operations into first-order and second-order 
operations. In the example just mentioned, the person’s desire to eat a fatty 
breakfast would be the first order desire, while, cognisant of his/her diet, 
his/her desire not to desire such a breakfast would be a second-order desire. 
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Another example would be a computer that has programmes to evaluate the 
other programmes it is running.  
 
Self-reference permeates our discussion of meaning and autonomy in the 
next section, and the role it plays in this regard will become clearer as we go 
along. As an initial remark, it suffices to note that autonomy as we have 
tentatively defined it (i.e. as self-legislation) would already exhibit the structure 
of self-reference. For instance, if a person restrains him/herself from doing 
something, e.g. hitting someone, s/he has performed an action on one of 
his/her actions. His/her restraint is a second-order operation performed on the 
first-order action (of hitting someone, which was consequently not enacted). 
The self-legislation involved in autonomy would in every case have the 
structure of a second-order function, be it a desire, an action, a thought or 
otherwise, allowing or disallowing other first-order desires, actions, thoughts, 
and the like.  
 
4.2 Meaning, reason and community 
We now turn our attention to the relationship between meaning and 
autonomy. The relationship between meaning and autonomy is best 
understood in the context of two distinct philosophical traditions that attempt to 
ground personal autonomy in, respectively, 1) Reason or 2) people’s 
participation in the knowledge and values of their community.  
 
The first tradition, attempting to ground autonomy in Reason, can be traced 
back at least as far as Grotius (Darwall, 2004) and spans a wide variety of 
thinkers, including, and perhaps most notably, Immanuel Kant. In this 
tradition, the question of autonomy is framed as the problem of authority, that 
is, the questions of whose authority one falls under (O’Neill, 2004). Autonomy 
then refers to the person being his own authority, or to phrase it in terms of 
the introduction of this chapter, someone who legislates for himself. 
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Furthermore, in this tradition, the concepts of autonomy, rationality and 
morality are thought to be closely related to one another.  
 
John Locke - whom Stepehn Darwall (2004) includes in this tradition - for 
instance, sees autonomy in the capacity to command oneself. Though Locke 
sees humans as essentially motivated by their own pleasure, he sees our 
ability to command ourselves as an important capacity. It is this capacity that 
allows us to take a step back from our own pleasure when it is required, in 
Locke’s philosophy specifically when the satisfaction of our desires causes 
harm to others. Moreover, this capacity is a rational capacity. Our motivation 
towards the satisfaction of our desires is inhibited by laws. In turn, our 
adherence to these laws is a “rational apprehension of what is right” (Darwall, 
2004: 122). Thus our accountability to moral laws is intimately linked to the 
rational ability to step away from our own desires. Herein too lies the person’s 
autonomy. The person’s freedom from being under someone else’s authority, 
i.e. being solely his own authority, cannot simply be equated to him following 
his desires blindly. This would merely substitute being ruled by someone else 
with being ruled by the natural forces. Autonomy lies in being able to step 
away from these desires when rationally apprehended laws dictate it.  
 
What this rational capacity entails is perhaps most clearly defined in Kant’s 
idea of the Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative, to “act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should 
become a universal law”, (Kant, 1785/1998: 27) represents the same basic 
relations between autonomy, rationality and morality that is typical of this 
philosophical tradition. In Michael Sandel’s discussion of Kant’s philosophy 
(Sandel, 2009: 103-139), he points out the close connection in Kant’s 
philosophy between people’s capacity to reason and their autonomy. Without 
the capacity to reason, we would be mere slaves to our desires and appetites. 
“Our capacity for reason is bound up with our capacity for freedom. Taken 
together, these capacities make us distinctive, and set us apart from mere 
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animal existence. They make us more than mere creatures of appetite.” 
(Sandel, 2009: 108).   
 
“To act autonomously is to act according to a law I give myself.” (Sandel, 
2009: 109). This law, in turn, cannot be an expression merely of my desire at 
that moment. The laws that an autonomous person gives him/herself must be 
derived from reason (Sandel, 2009: 118). As such, the laws must stand the 
test of universalization, as formulated in the Categorical Imperative.  
 
According to Onora O’Neill (2004: 187-191) the rationality of the Categorical 
Imperative lies in one’s ability to generalize it universally, that is, to all 
humans. We find the same idea of universalization in Habermas and Cuypers, 
who we will discuss in more detail below. In this view, autonomy lies in the 
ability to have tested the contents of one’s will against the requirement of 
universalization. If one’s will or desire passes the test of universalization, then 
it has been ‘rationalised’ – meant here not in the psycho-analytic sense of 
having been furnished with a plausible excuse, but more literally, ‘to have 
made it rational’. If one’s acts could conceivably be agreed to by all, then one 
has acted on no-one’s authority but one’s own and, at the same time, one has 
done so in a manner that was accountable to reason (and thus by implication 
also accountable to other people) and without simply succumbing to one’s 
natural desires (i.e. not simply being ruled by natural forces). 31 
 
Interestingly, in both cases we see autonomy being described as a special 
type of heteronomy. The autonomous person achieves his/her autonomy 
precisely by adhering to something outside of him/herself, specifically 
                                                 
31
 Naturally, such an attitude bears some traces of the Cartesian view which wishes to 
separate the “I”/cogito from the body, so that the person is only free if his decisions were not 
unduly influenced by bodily demands. However, simply rejecting the body/mind dualism is not 
a short-cut out of the problem of autonomy. One is still left with the task to explain how we 
should think about autonomy and must still account for the opposition between 
deciding/choosing a course of action as opposed to simply reacting instinctively like an animal 
or plant would. 
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universal, rational laws. These laws are not laws of his/her choosing, s/he is 
not their author. And yet, adhering to them is somehow different to following 
one’s base instincts or simply obeying another person. What is it that makes 
the dictates of rational laws different from other dictates?  
 
One possible answer lies hidden in Locke’s idea of ‘self-command’, that is, the 
ability to step away from one’s desires and command oneself to do something 
(according to universal, moral, rational laws). According to this line of thinking, 
acting according to rational laws is something that one willingly (without force) 
imposes on oneself. The binding force of reason is not an authority by force, 
but something one adheres to simply because it makes sense to do so, just 
like building an airplane with natural laws in mind makes more sense than 
ignoring them. The binding force of rational laws lies in the fact that they were 
arrived at by generalization, i.e. that all could agree to them and confirm them 
(cf. O’ Neill, 2004: 187-191). Implicitly, this presupposes a fundamental 
similarity between moral and physical laws; both are there to be discovered, 
not invented, by our rational capacity.  
 
It is this line of thinking that has come increasingly under pressure from the 
second tradition we mentioned earlier, that is, the tradition that attempts to 
ground personal autonomy in the person’s participation in the values and 
knowledge of his community. This tradition perhaps spans an even wider 
array of thinkers who do not have much in common but for the 
abovementioned position.  
 
One such thinker is Richard Rorty. Rorty is very sceptical, to say the least, of 
the idea that Reason would be able to ground personal autonomy. 
Specifically, he denies the idea that there are such things as objective moral 
laws and that we have access to them only through rational, logical 
investigation. Rorty sees our knowledge of moral laws as something strongly 
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rooted in our community. Our philosophical insights are, according to him, 
only “abbreviations” of a community’s way of life (Rorty, 2004: 212).  
 
Rorty, however, runs into the same problems as the rational tradition. If the 
maxims we live by have no special status, how does one account for personal 
autonomy? How is living under someone else’ rule then different from simply 
following the norms of one’s community? 
 
Stefaan Cuypers - himself also part of this second tradition, though he shows 
some similarity to the first tradition as well – develops a model of personal 
autonomy that goes some way in addressing the abovementioned questions.   
He does so with reference to self-reference and what he calls ‘caring’. How he 
employs the concept of self-reference will become clear in our discussion of 
the ‘caring’ in the next section. However, he falls short on certain aspects, 
which leads us to suggest (in section 4.4.) a meaning-based approach to 
autonomy that modifies his model with perspectives that draw on the 
existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard.  
  
4.3 Cuypers on ‘caring’ and ‘moderate heteronomy’ 
Cuypers takes Harry Frankfurt’s and Gerald Dworkin’s hierarchical models of 
autonomy as his starting point. A hierarchical model of autonomy sees the 
autonomous person as “a reflexive32 system of belief and desires” (Cuypers, 
2001: 88). Accordingly, the person’ autonomy is seen to reside in the 
relationship between desires (henceforth ‘first-order desires’) and the self-
evaluations of these desires (henceforth ‘second-order desires’). Put 
differently: “Persons typically not only have desires of the first order, X desires 
that p, but also desires of the second order, X desires or does not desire that 
X desires p.” (2001: 89). Autonomy is then defined by the correspondence of 
the first- and second-order desires: 
                                                 
32
 In the sense Frankfurt, Dworking and Cuypers use the term ‘self-reflexive’, it is synonymous 
with the term ‘self-referential’ as defined in section 4.1. 
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“In terms of Frankfurt’s model, then, a person exercises freedom of 
will33 when he acts upon the will of the first-order desires he wants 
to have. If there is a conformity of his first-order desires to his 
second order desires, then he enjoys freedom of will.” (Cuypers, 
2001:90).  
 
If, on the contrary, he has acted on a first-order desire without the ‘consent’, 
so to speak, of his second-order desire, then he has not acted autonomously, 
because either 1) someone else has forced him to act or 2) he was 
overwhelmed by his natural, base instincts. 
   
Dworkin then expands on this idea by including the criterion of ‘procedural 
independence’, that is, that a person can be considered to act autonomously if 
1) s/he identifies with his/her desires (as in Frankfurt’s model) and 2) - and 
this is how procedural independence is defined - has not been influenced in 
an undue way to make this identification, that is, s/he has not been influenced 
either by other people or simply his/her animal instincts (Cuypers, 2001: 91). 
 
While he retains the basic hierarchical view of the Frankfurt/Dworkin model, 
Cuypers does have certain reservations about it. He focuses specifically on 
the risk of an infinite regress inherent in a hierarchical model. As discussed 
above, Frankfurt’s hierarchical model posits that a person acts autonomously 
when he acts 1) in accordance with a first order desire which 2) his second 
order desire ‘approves’ of, or identifies with. This problem of infinite regress 
refers to the question of how the conformity between second order and first 
order desires manage to ensure autonomous action. If acting autonomously is 
ensured by the second-order desire’s ‘consent’, what guarantee is there that 
                                                 
33
 Cuypers uses the term autonomy and “freedom of will” interchangeably. In the way he uses 
‘freedom of will’, it is consistent with our idea of autonomy as self-legislation, that is, as 
referring to the quality of not being ruled or governed by anything or anyone external to 
oneself. 
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the latter is not also (like the first-order desire), tainted by external influences 
such as base instincts? Would this then require a ‘third-order’ desire to 
supervise the second-order desire, and so forth, ad infinitum?  
 
Frankfurt’s proposed way out of this dilemma is the introduction of the concept 
of ‘decision’. He argues that the second-order desire involves a decision, a 
decisive commitment, and that the act of decision is necessarily internal and 
not susceptible to external forces. While this idea has an intuitive validity to it 
– when we think of a decision we implicitly also think of someone having 
actively made it – the concept of ‘decision’, if left unpacked, remains 
somewhat ‘obscure’ (Cuypers, 2001: 93) and not very successful in solving 
the problem of infinite regress.  
 
Specifically, it is not clear how the self-evaluation of desires necessarily 
involves a decision. In fact, as Cuypers points out, most often self-evaluations 
‘elude consciousness’ (Cuypers, 2001: 93), that is, the consent second-order 
desires give to first-order desires, are not subject to a ‘decision’.  
 
He argues that the most important decisions people make, and which they 
experience as autonomous decisions, are often due to a commitment to things 
they care about (Cuypers, 2001: 93).  
 
“When we care about something, it’s about us, our own personal 
projects and ideals or certain individuals and groups to which we 
are particularly attached. These objects of care are of a more 
personal kind in the sense that they give some sort of guidance to a 
caring person in what he does with his own life. How a caring 
person leads his own life is to a great extent guided by such objects 
of care as, for example, a professional career, a family tradition, a 
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dear friendship, a political party or a religious community.” 
(Cuypers, 2001: 94) 
 
Being thus attached to an object of care is characterised by being under the 
influence of that object. The person is intimately tied to that object of care, so 
much so that he cannot choose against it lest he loses himself, that is, stops 
being who he is.  
 
“He feels that he cannot help caring so much about this or that as 
he does. He feels he cannot bring himself to will otherwise than he 
does….This person not so much lacks the power to act otherwise 
than the will to alter the will he has.” (Cuypers, 2001: 95)  
 
If he is under the influence of a force over which he has no control, then, in a 
certain sense, he is ruled by something other than himself – hence Cuypers 
describes his theory as one of heteronomy. On the other hand, he sees this 
heteronomy as the basis of a person’s autonomy. As quoted above, these 
objects of care are about the person him/herself. They are the things that 
guide his/her life and give meaning to it, as opposed to him/her simply being a 
slave to his/her desires. Relatedly, – and in this regard Cuypers has an 
argument similar to Franfurt’s – s/he actively identifies34 with this force. It is 
thus also his/her decision, something s/he constitutes his/her autonomy by.  
 
What places Cuypers in the second tradition – which looks toward 
participation in the community as the cornerstone of personal autonomy – is 
his contention that those objects of care are firmly rooted in the person’s 
participation in a community. In this regard, he relies on a certain reading of 
the later Wittgenstein and on the work of Charles Taylor on the importance of 
                                                 
34
 In this context, identity refers specifically to the idea that one will cease to be oneself if one 
ceases to care about a certain thing. What one cares for and one’s identity are thus intimately 
intertwined. When we use the term identity or the verb ‘identify’ in this chapter, we intend this 
meaning. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 128
social recognition (Cuypers, 2001: 138-150). In this view, the meaning we 
attach to things, i.e. how much we care about them, is developed through 
recognition by significant others (Cuypers, 2001: 141). Our views of what is 
meaningful and what deserves our care (and thus also our views on what type 
of people we are) are thus determined in our interaction with these significant 
others. Moreover, Cuypers follows Taylor’s argument that one can only 
determine what is important/meaningful/to be cared for against a background 
or framework of values, norms, and principles that have developed in a 
community. If one has the freedom of simply choosing what is important 
without regard or reference to such a framework – so the argument goes – 
then “…free choice is … just a wanton movement of the mind without any 
special authority” (Cuypers, 2001: 144) and such choices are thus 
“insignificant or trivial” (Cuypers, 2001: 144).  
 
Cuypers borrows the term ‘horizons of significance’ from Taylor, when he 
refers to these frameworks. A horizon of significance, for Cuypers, “refers to 
the inherited traditions and customs of valuing to which both the person who 
asks the recognition and the other people who give or deny it are 
subordinated.” (Cuypers, 2001:145). As such, they are more generalized than 
the views/opinions of specific people (i.e. the significant others the person has 
interaction with) (Cuypers, 2001:145); they thus transcend both the self and 
other specific people (Cuypers, 2001:146). Yet, they are not universal. A 
horizon of significance is always a “valuation system of a historically grown 
community” (Cuypers, 2001:145), firmly rooted in the history and development 
of that specific community.  
 
Naturally, such ideas are open to charges of conformism. Is what the 
autonomous person cares for simply dictated by the norms of his community? 
Wherein, then, does his autonomy lie?  
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One possible answer to such questions is that interaction with the community 
does not necessarily mean agreement. One could just as easily disagree with 
the community framework of norms/values/principles, but this also requires 
some sort of reference to that framework. Cuypers gives an indication of this 
when he refers to traditions of critique within communities, which allow 
persons to differ from the current norms (Cuypers, 2001:147). Yet this 
argument cannot carry much weight before one can explain how interaction 
between a person and his/her horizon is possible and can clarify the nature of 
the relationship between the person and his/her horizon.  
 
This is the weakness of Cuypers’ model. In avoiding the risk of infinite regress 
by de-emphasizing ‘decisions’ (as used in the Frankfurt/Dworkin-model) and 
focusing more on objects of care, Cuypers’ model runs into difficulties when it 
has to account for the moments where the person stands as individual in 
relation to (sometimes in opposition to) his/her horizon. To overcome these 
difficulties, the focus on ‘caring’ needs to be balanced with a greater emphasis 
on ‘decisions’.   
 
To this end, we believe that a reinterpretation of the term ‘decision’ from what 
we will call the meaning-based approach will be fruitful. This approach draws 
significantly on an existentialist, specifically Kierkegaardian, perspective. We 
will set out to show that a meaning-based approach can, with the term 
‘decision’ suitably defined, reinterpret Cuypers’ model in terms of the concepts 
of meaning, psychic systems and cultural systems and that such a re-
interpretation will make it possible to avoid the pitfalls of both the traditional 
rational and community-centred approaches to autonomy.  
 
4.4 The Meaning-based approach to Autonomy 
As mentioned above, we will set out to show that a meaning-based approach 
to autonomy can avoid some of the problems Cuypers’ model faces. Our 
approach borrows significantly from Kierkegaard’s philosophy. However, using 
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the concept of meaning developed in Chapter 2 also leads us to be critical of 
certain aspects. The meaning-based approach will also show considerable 
similarities to Cuypers’ model. This is because, as we will now show, 
Kierkegaard’s account of what he called ‘the self’ shows definite similarities 
with Cuypers’ model of the autonomous person. 35 
 
In the first place, there is a similarity between Kierkegaard’s self and Cuypers’ 
autonomous person in the sense that the Kierkegaardian self is very much an 
autonomous self.36 The ideas of freedom and choice are integral parts of 
Kierkegaard’s account of the self. In both Either/Or (1843/1946) and 
Repetition (1843/1941), Kierkegaard argues against the so-called aesthetic 
way of life, a way of life that occurs in the moment and is lived for the moment. 
The aesthete lives from one moment to the next without making any choices. 
As opposed to this, he argues for a so-called ethical way of life. This does not 
necessarily mean abandoning the hedonism that such a moment-to-moment 
life is often associated with. Rather, the point Kierkegaard tries to make is that 
an individual, in order to be truly a self, needs to choose, that is, lead a life of 
responsibility and freedom.  In this regard, we have to take into account that 
Kierkegaard’s writings are widely regarded as a reaction to the Hegelian idea 
of a universal spirit; that he was a vocal opponent of the so-called 
‘Christendom’ (as opposed to ‘Christianity’, which denotes a true religious 
relationship between the individual and God) and that he was engaged in a 
long polemic against the Danish National Church. The main point of 
Kierkegaard’s opposition to Hegel, Christendom and the Danish National 
Church was that they were denying individual existence, subsuming it into 
collective processes and, with regard to the Church and Christendom, 
                                                 
35
 Of course, in other respects, the two differ diametrically. Most notably, perhaps, is 1) 
Kierkegaard emphasizes decisions and decisive acts, while Cuypers de-emphasizes 
decisions; and 2) the fact that, at least according to a conventional reading of Kierkegaard, his 
philosophy has a decidedly individualist stance, perhaps even radically so, while Cuypers’ 
model actively rejects such an individualism. 
36
 Cuypers defines personhood in third-person terms, i.e. as a public actor and expressly 
avoids any internal, subject-centred definitions. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, is an 
exponent of the latter, and so this is another point of difference between the two. 
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relinquishing the relationship between the individual and God. This was 
essentially a non-conformist stance, a position against simply being obedient 
to the Church, adhering to the norms of the day rather than doing so out of an 
authentic, individual relationship with God.37 As such, his view of the self has 
the structure of autonomy: his idea of responsibility and freedom is an 
argument for self-command as opposed to simple obedience to other people 
or rule by one’s base instincts.  
 
The second similarity between Kierkegaard and Cuypers lies in the self-
reference they ascribe to respectively the self and the autonomous person. 
Cuypers follows the Frankfurt/Dworking hierarchical model, of which self-
reference is an integral part.  
 
“The reflexivity31… is formally modelled by the distinction between 
first order and second order desires. Persons typically not only 
have desires of the first order, X desires that p, but also desires of 
the second order, X desires or does not desire that X desires p.” 
(Cuypers, 2001: 89).  
 
A similar type of self-reference is seen in Kierkegaard’s work. The self, 
according to Kierkegaard (1849/1989), refers to the relationship between 
the temporal and the eternal, the relationship between facticity and 
potentiality, (see also Shmueli, 1971) that relates to itself. It is a relation 
relating to itself (Kierkegaard, 1849/1989). Its self-reference lies in its ability 
to relate to itself. The same type of division between first-order and second-
order functions are thus evident here: the self would be concerned with e.g. 
either its temporal or eternal concerns – these would be its first order 
                                                 
37
 See, for instance, Kierkegaard (1849/1989: 117): “And now Christianity! Christianity teaches 
that this single human being, and so every single human being, whether husband, wife, 
servant girl, cabinet minister, merchant, barber, student, etc., this single human being is 
before God ….this human being has an invitation to live on the most intimate footing with 
God!” 
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functions – while the concern about maintaining a coherent self amidst 
these differing concerns is the second order function.  
 
The third similarity between Kierkegaard and Cuypers lies in the self or the 
autonomous person’s relationship to something outside of him/herself. This 
relationship is a crucial aspect of autonomy in both Cuypers’ and 
Kierkegaard’s models. In Cuypers’ model, as discussed above, (see 
section 4.3). it is the individual’s interaction with his/her community that 
constitutes the objects of his/her care and, according to Cuypers, a 
person’s autonomy is constituted by the decisions s/he makes out of care 
for these things.  
 
We find a similar idea in Kierkegaard’s writings, as expressed most 
concisely in the formulation:  “…a relation relating to itself, and in relating to 
itself relates to something else” (Kierkegaard, 1849/1989: 43). In 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, the self is characterised by two poles, a tension 
described as either the relationship between, facticity and potentiality or the 
temporal and the eternal (Schmueli, 1971). 
 
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard (1849/1989) embarks on an in 
depth analysis of all the possible pitfalls of such a tension. The main thrust 
of his argument is that the tension between the two poles cannot be 
maintained (meaning that the self cannot continue to exist as a self) unless 
it is grounded in the relation between the self and the Other (that is, God). 
As will be evident below, there is a certain relation in how Kierkegaard 
treats God and how Cuypers treats objects of care which will allow us to 
relate both of them to the concept of meaning as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
From the start it is important to note that Kierkegaard’s treatment of God 
does not consist of a formal proof of God’s existence. In fact, he rejects the 
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project of attaining a conceptual grasp of God and maintains that He can 
only be apprehended through faith (Kierkegaard, 1844/1974: 49-55). What 
is more pertinent to our current discussion is the function or role that God 
plays in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, particularly with reference to how a 
relationship with God constitutes the true self.  
 
In Fear and Trembling (1843/1985), Kierkegaard’s line of thought on this 
matter is perhaps most clear. As in ‘Sickness unto Death’, the idea is that 
true selfhood is only possible in a relationship of faith with God. In ‘Fear 
and Trembling’, Kierkegaard expands on this idea with reference to the Old 
Testament account of Abraham and Isaac38. Abraham, as a ‘Knight of 
Faith’ (Kierkegaard, 1843/1985: 99), is willing to give up everything  - one 
can’t help but think that, had he been given the choice, he would have 
sacrificed himself rather than his son Isaac -  and resigns himself to this 
sacrifice, and yet, paradoxically, has the expectation that what he is about 
to sacrifice will be restored to him. His obedience to God thus has the 
double movement of not only 1) giving himself up but also 2) expecting that 
he will get his sacrifice back. Through doing this, Abraham is able to 
maintain the tension between the temporal and the eternal, “living in the 
world while keeping (his) distance from it … free to receive what God is 
constantly revealing” (Schmueli, 1971: 101). 
 
Naturally, Kierkegaard’s writings have a strong Christian colouring. 
However, if one temporarily suspends the theological references, we 
believe it is possible to ‘translate’ his position using the concept of 
‘meaning’ as set out in Chapter 2. One has to note, too, that this leap of 
faith is not only required in relation to Divine commands. In Fragments of 
Philosophy, for instance, Kierkegaard (1844/1974: 101) argues that 
everything that exists is apprehended only through faith. This does not 
                                                 
38
 Abraham was commanded by God to sacrifice his son. Abraham obeyed, but was delivered 
from doing the deed when God provided him with a sheep as substitute. (Genesis 22, verse 
1-19) 
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mean that we cannot trust our senses or disregard observations as we see 
fit, depending on our beliefs: “Faith … does not believe that the star is 
there, for that it sees, but it believes the star has come into existence. The 
same holds true of any event.” (Kierkegaard, 1844/1974: 101). This is to be 
understood against the background of Kierkegaard’s view regarding 
existence and essence. He opposes the two concepts: Conceptual 
knowledge can only grasp essences and has to concern itself with the 
necessary. Existence, on the other hand, is dynamic and cannot be 
grasped concepts. Existence relates to the change from potential being into 
actual being (1844/1974: 92) and neither the potential nor the actual are 
necessary. Now, Kierkegaard designates faith as the method of grasping 
existence. Accordingly, existence is not grasped by conceptual knowledge 
but by faith.  
 
To see why he uses the term faith, we have to consider that he regards all 
coming into existence as pointing back to “a freely effecting cause” 
(Kierkegaard, 1844/1974: 93), which is God. We do not see this as some 
form of cosmological proof or argument for intelligent design. Kierkegaard 
does not, for instance, deny such things as natural laws or that one could 
have knowledge about natural laws. Rather, by opposing essence to 
existence and knowledge to faith, Kierkegaard is saying something about 
the difference between the knowledge of facts and the apprehension of the 
meaning of those facts. Our reading of Kierkegaard suggests that God is 
Kierkegaard’s answer to the question about the meaning of it all and that 
living in faith is living meaningfully, that is, interpreting the existence we 
encounter to discern the meaning of it on a day to day basis.39   
 
At this point, we can start to reinterpret Kierkegaard’s writings in terms of 
meaning. Recall from Chapter 2 that the psychic system interprets 
                                                 
39
 In Existential psychology, notably those theories of Victor Frankl, Rollo May and Irvin 
Yalom, the Kierkegaardian self striving to be a self is consistently re-interpreted as the self 
striving to attain meaning. 
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experience as meaning through a system of distinctions. This creates a 
circular reference, e.g. X is defined as not A, not B, etc., while A and B are 
defined, amongst others as being not X. This circular reference is stopped 
by a decision, that is, when one of the referents (e.g. A) is treated as 
having a self-evident identity, which allows us to identify other things in 
terms of it. It is important to emphasize that the decisions in meaning are 
made without there being sufficient grounds from which to calculate the 
best decision.40 If there were any grounds for the decision, then one of the 
referents would already have had a self-evident identity, while this is 
exactly what the decisions aim to accomplish. Decisions are per se 
groundless.  
 
Without this decision, the circular reference continues ad infinitum; the 
psychic system is paralyzed, unable to make sense of its experience. In 
Kierkegaardian terms, this would be the self trapped in the eternal. 
Likewise, the psychic system that does not make use of a system of 
distinctions (apart from per definition not being a psychic system – see our 
definition in Chapter 2) is forced to reduce the complexity of its environment 
through other means, such as animal instincts. This is the Kierkegaardian 
aesthetic self, trapped in a moment-to-moment existence.  
 
We thus see that the decisions we described in Chapter 2 have the same 
structure as Kierkegaard’s leaps of faith. Just like Kierkegaard’s leap of 
faith, there are no grounds for decisions. A decision, like faith, is a leap 
over an abyss. Furthermore, decisions are also characterised by the same 
double movement, the inherent contradiction of expecting back what one 
has already sacrificed.  Recall from Chapter 2 that for meaning to have an 
adaptive function, that is, for it to be successful in allowing the system to 
select from an overabundance of possibilities, it has to be perceived as 
being given as an identity by the environment, and not as constructed as 
                                                 
40
 This is what Derrida (1988) refers to as an ethical decision. 
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such by the system. In constructing meaning, the psychic system has 
already given up the given-ness of meaning, and yet has to treat it as a 
given meaning after it has been constructed.  
 
Furthermore, we know that when a psychic system interprets experiences, 
it does not do so in a disinterested manner. In a very real sense, it risks 
itself. It puts itself on the line, hoping, trusting that it will not be lost.  
 
Now, although there are structural similarities between Kierkegaard’s faith 
and these decisions, this does not mean that they are one and the same. 
We certainly do not risk our whole life in every meaning we attach to every 
experience. However, these ‘small’ meanings all contribute to the way we 
view the big questions of life, death and our existence. Our decisions in 
these matters are very much, in Kierkegaardian terms, leaps of faith.  
 
Bearing this in mind, a further distinction between different types of 
decisions is necessary. In particular, we distinguish between automatic and 
self-referential decisions. In this distinction between automatic and self-
referential decisions, the meaning-based approach starts to depart slightly 
from a purely Kierkegaardian perspective. The decisions made by the 
psychic system from one moment to the next do not need to be self-
referential or concern questions of core meaning. The psychic system need 
not even be aware of making them. Decisions can be made automatically 
and still maintain their function in the processing of meaning. Furthermore, 
it is important to note that some of our decisions have to be automatic. 
Some of our ways of making sense of things can be called into doubt some 
of the time, but not all of them all of the time. If this were not so, our 
meaning processing would quickly become so complex that it stops 
functioning as a way to orient the psychic system in its environment. A 
meaning-based approach thus needs to make a distinction between 
automatic decisions and self-referential decisions. The former are decisions 
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the psychic system makes automatically, while the latter are so-called 
leaps of faith. They are self-referential because it involves the psychic 
system’s view on its own decision:  it is aware of the groundlessness of the 
decision and must make the leap despite being aware of it. Furthermore, 
self-referential decisions are concerned with the answer to questions of 
core meaning. Core meanings are those meanings that are fundamental to 
all other meanings, and from which other meanings are derived. The 
meaning-based approach thus regards any value or principle that functions 
as an answer to questions of core meaning as fulfilling an equivalent role 
as God does in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, in the sense that the psychic 
system’s relationship with it is one of faith: Just like God, any answer to 
questions of core meaning needs to have authority. Even if the psychic 
system constructed these answers, it cannot function as answers if the 
psychic system does not believe it to hold some authority that is binding 
and not just a function of the whims of the psychic system. If it does not, 
these answers cannot fulfil their function of providing guidance on issues of 
core meaning. Moreover, just as Cuypers’ model, although this is an 
authority residing outside the individual – or psychic system in our model - 
and thus a moderate heteronomy, the authority of a core meaning can still 
be regarded as an expression of the psychic system’s autonomy, because 
it actively accepts this authority and identifies with it.   
 
The meaning-based approach has certain advantages over Cuypers’ 
model. Where Cuypers de-emphasises decisions in autonomy, a meaning-
based approach shows us that the act of caring necessarily has a decisive 
character. When Cuypers describes our caring about something, it is caring 
about values or principles or anything that serves as an answer to 
questions of core meaning. What a meaning-based approach shows us is 
that our relationship to these objects of care are characterised by faith, or 
self-referential decisions, as we argued above. As such it adds a very 
important dimension to Cuypers’ model of autonomy. It clarifies the process 
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of how we are to validate whether someone’s actions were autonomous. 
Where Cuypers’ model does not allow us to distinguish between the person 
who arrived at his/her guiding values through conformity and the person 
who arrived at it by being true to him/herself, a meaning-based approach 
perspective allows us to deal decisively with the scenario where an 
individual uncritically and automatically follows the values of his/her 
community. Accordingly, a person acted autonomously when s/he was in a 
relation of faith with his/her object of care, and not simply conforming to 
what his/her community had taught him/her. This also has the implication – 
one that fits rather well, in our opinion, with some common sense intuitions 
about personal autonomy  - that people are not autonomous all the time. 
We do not always actively make decisions, we sometimes act automatically 
and conventionally; when we do so, we are not autonomous, but we still 
have the capacity to be autonomous.  
 
The meaning-based approach can also act as a corrective of the 
Kierkegaardian perspective. Traditionally, Kierkegaard has been read as a 
champion of individuality, as someone who rejects any sort of conformity to 
others. In this regard, Kierkegaard’s writings suggest a sharp distinction 
between our unique, individual relationship with God on the one hand, and 
our relationship to our community as well as conceptual and abstract 
knowledge on the other. Specifically, one must not let the latter intrude on 
the former. This sharp distinction can now be deconstructed with reference 
to our concept of meaning. As discussed earlier, a meaning-based 
approach requires us to make a distinction between automatic and self-
referential decisions. There we argued that not all decisions can be self-
referential leaps of faith, as this would work against the function of meaning 
to reduce complexity.  
 
Now, automatic decisions and self-referential decisions condition one 
another. On the one hand, our self-referential decisions result in meanings 
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that are truly central to our lives and accordingly form the core of our 
meaning processing and thus condition a great deal of our automatic 
decisions. For example, the person who has undergone a religious 
conversion, might, as a result, do things differently from now on, develop 
certain habits more in keeping with his/her newly found deep truth.  
 
On the other hand - and this is perhaps the more significant of our 
departures from a Kierkegaardian perspective – automatic decisions 
necessarily condition our self-referential decisions. Our self-reference does 
not allow us to actually take up a position outside of ourselves, only to 
imagine how we would look if seen as an object. This imagination has to 
make use of the very same system of meaning that we are reflecting on, 
the very same system that has developed over years and owing the 
greatest part of its early development to automatically accepting what its 
parents claimed as the truth. No real position outside the psychic system 
(which is a system of meaning) is possible and thus our self-referential 
leaps are conditioned by it. Self-referential decisions are made against the 
background of already existing meaning. Even when it contradicts these 
meanings, it has to speak in the already existing ‘language’ of these 
meanings.  
 
Nevertheless, despite being conditioned, self-reference gives decisions a 
different character. Self-referential decisions are by definition guided by 
what the psychic system believes to be the answer to certain questions of 
core meaning. These answers are always accompanied by some form of 
authority (other than the psychic system itself) to which it is accountable. If 
the answer is in the form of God, then God Himself is the authority. If the 
answer is in the form of something like a value or principle, the psychic 
system still needs to invoke some form of authority other than itself. If the 
value is only valuable because the psychic system chose it, it loses its 
function in orientating its life. The psychic system needs the value or 
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principle to be important regardless of whether it was chosen. In cases 
where the answers to questions of core meaning do not take the form of 
God, the psychic system needs to invoke a standard whereby he believes 
all people in his position would agree to it. This idea bears some 
resemblance to Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1986: 260), 
in that the validity of a statement is defined by whether others in an 
atmosphere free of power would agree to it. One subtle difference is that 
we regard it more as a function of one’s ability to bestow cognitive empathy 
and imagination than as the ability to reason. This subtle difference helps 
us consider instances where people cannot agree, regardless of their ability 
and willingness to reason, because the respective axioms they employ are 
just too different and specific to the different lives they have experienced.  
The psychic system projects the standard of the generalised other into its 
interaction with other people. It is a construct of the psychic systems itself; 
it does not exist objectively. However, if the psychic system constructs the 
standard so that it only serves to perpetually justify its own desires, it 
essentially closes itself off from communicative relationships and loses the 
adaptive gains of being in communicative relationships. In extreme cases, 
such psychic systems would be considered disabled and/or pathological, 
unable to handle their own affairs and thus not autonomous. 
 
The meaning-based approach’s conceptualization of communicative 
relationships between psychic systems allows us to clarify the interaction 
between the autonomous person and his community. Firstly, as set out in 
section 2.3, we regard a person as being constituted by the interpenetration 
of the psychic and biological systems. Of the two, only the psychic system 
is related to meaning. The biological system by definition does not make 
self-referential decisions. When we thus refer to personal autonomy, we 
are referring in particular to the autonomy of the psychic system.   
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Recall from Chapter 2 that the establishment of communicative 
relationships (which constitute the cultural system) between psychic 
systems represents an adaptive gain, adding specificity and sophistication 
to the person’s process of identifying things and adding information to 
which the person did not have direct experiential access. We also argued 
that this adaptive gain lies mainly in the possibility of others to provide 
disconfirming feedback. If this possibility were not present, the validating 
feedback we receive would be meaningless. Thus these communicative 
relationships between psychic systems would lose their adaptive function if 
disagreement were not possible. Implicit in the psychic system’s 
communicative relationship with others is the fact that they have lived 
different lives. When considering what to make of disagreement, the 
system has to take into account how relevant the difference is. For 
instance: are the values the other person has experienced applicable to my 
life? Has he seen things I could not? Am I seeing something he has 
missed? The psychic system’s ability to process these differences is 
necessary to gain any advantage at all from communicative relationships. 
The ability to process differences is greatly enhanced if it can consider 
something like a generalised other, subjecting the validity of its decisions 
and behaviours to the standard that others would have to be able to agree 
with it.  
 
In conclusion, the meaning-based approach can define autonomy as 
follows: a person may be regarded as acting autonomously when his/her 
actions are the result of self-referential decisions. These decisions involve 
the person being in a relationship of faith with answers to questions of core 
meaning, the authority of which s/he accepts and identifies with.  
 
The meaning-based approach can therefore be seen to solve the most 
pertinent problems of both the rational and community based traditions on 
autonomy.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 142
 
Because the possibility of disagreement is inherently part of interpreting 
experiences as meaningful, the problem of conformity is avoided. If 
disagreement is not practised often enough by people, it is due to factors 
like oppression or traditions of conservatism, or personality factors, or the 
like. In such cases, we can rightly contend that people in these cases are 
not being allowed their autonomy.   
 
The meaning-based approach avoids the metaphysics of the rational 
tradition. In this view, we can regard self-commands to be issued by the 
authority of the meaning it has for the person. At the same time, it is issued 
as a self-referential decision. Because such decisions involve answers to 
questions of core meaning, they invoke some authority other than the 
person him/herself. The meaning-based approach thus avoids the problem 
of the person simply acting on his/her own desires. At the same time, it 
does so without having to posit the objective existence of universal laws of 
reason or morality. The authority invoked is necessarily a construction of 
the individual him/herself, but the authority cannot simply be a slave to 
his/her passion, lest it loses its function as guiding force in his/her life. 
 
Given our formulation of autonomy as residing in self-referential decisions, we 
will have to demonstrate how such decisions are possible in cultures. 
Specifically, we will have to demonstrate how cultures can exhibit self-
reference, and how cultures can be thought of as exhibiting something 
analogous to the person’s reaching out to core meaning.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CULTURES AS DISCERNIBLE ENTITIES 
 
In the previous two chapters we have focused on personal delineation and 
personal autonomy. We now turn to the concept of cultures and investigate 
how cultures can be delineated in the same way. In Chapter 2 we developed 
the idea of cultural systems as second order meaning systems. However, the 
idea of a cultural system may just as easily apply to all humanity, as in when 
culture is opposed to e.g. nature. The auto-poietic nature of systems of 
meaning merely separates culture from that which is not culture. It therefore 
does not capture the regional (sometimes ethnic) connotation of “cultural” that 
refers to differences in background. It is therefore, not yet clear how such a 
conceptualization helps us to think of cultures as discrete entities that have 
identities in much the same way as individuals. An analogy between cultures 
and persons with regard to delineation will have to be proven for three 
different aspects: We will need to show that cultures have 1) the trivial 
boundaries (in persons this coincides with the organism’s boundary), 2) 
structures analogous to the “I” and repressed meanings and 3) representivity 
analogous to personal autonomy. It can be shown however, that 
conceptualising cultures as systems of meaning makes it possible for us to 
complete such an analogy and think of cultures as identifiable, discrete 
entities within the greater cultural system. This will be done by examining so 
called multicultural conflicts. In so doing it will be shown how multicultural 
conflicts can give rise to, and are in fact key to the development of cultures.  
 
5.1 Multicultural conflicts 
Our point of departure in defining multicultural conflicts involves the manner in 
which individuals categorise themselves. According to Henri Tajfel’s (1970) 
Social Identity Theory, any individual has an array of possible categories 
within which to categorise him/herself. S/he may, for instance, use tags such 
as ‘friendly’, ‘intelligent’, ‘tall’, but also employ, from time to time, categories 
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such as, e.g. ‘South African’, ‘Afrikaans’, ‘Capetonian’, etc. Crucially, 
according to Tajfel’s theory, these self-categorisations vary from one situation 
to the next, so that the situation determines which is the most salient. We thus 
define multicultural conflicts as situations that elicit individuals’ self-
categorisation into groups that refer to their cultures.41  
 
Note also that multicultural conflict situations are thus divisive in nature as 
they self-categorise results into an ‘us vs. them’ situation which, according to 
Tajfel’s theory is accomplished merely by the categorisation itself. This theory 
has since been corroborated with empirical, experimental evidence (Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971: 149; Diehl, 1990: 263, 292; Tajfel, 1982: 39).  
 
Furthermore, multicultural conflicts have as essential features 1) a difference 
between two individuals or parties, a difference on an issue that 2) appears to 
be fundamental or insurmountable and 3) this difference refers to the cultural 
difference between the two parties. Furthermore, such conflicts involve 4) a 
conflict between collective and individual rights, where the encroachment on 
individual rights is justified with reference to culture, and or 5) a conflict 
between public and private representation of a culture.42 Furthermore, it is 
important to note that multicultural conflicts often (though not always) occur 
against the backdrop of the nation state, or more specifically, they occur as a 
problem for the idea of the nation state, challenging the correspondence 
between a certain territory, its government and its way of life.  
 
                                                 
41
 We will argue on p.149 that people’s reference to their cultures involve what we will call 
‘inclusion theories’. While inclusion theories represent a specific person’s definition of his/her 
culture, it cannot serve as a true delineation of the whole culture.   
42
 While it is conceivable that there are conflicts involving different cultures that do not share 
these common features, the examples listed below account for the most prominent and 
difficult issues. Moreover, we would argue that conflicts that do not involve the encroachment 
of individual rights for the sake of collective rights are easily conceptualized within existing 
frameworks and without the necessity for reference to culture and should, in our opinion, not 
be called “multicultural” or “inter-cultural”. 
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Note that it is not necessary that these differences actually are fundamental, 
only that at least one of the parties perceive them to be so. An examination of 
most of the issues usually referred to as multicultural conflicts share these 
features. To illustrate this, let us consider for instance the following issues: the 
African concept of dignity as opposed to freedom of artistic expression43; the 
practice of polygamy and ukuthwala44; the ritual practice of clitoridectomy;  the 
conflict between freedom of speech and respect for religion (specifically 
pertaining to the issue of blasphemy); the prohibition of Muslim headwear in 
some European states; representation and powers afforded to traditional 
leaders in (for instance) South Africa and various conflicts where the 
conservation of the ‘character’ of a public sphere is at stake (for instance 
Quebecois language policies or the recent Swiss referendum against the 
building of minarets).  
 
The first few cases are all instances where certain cultural practices, abhorred 
and attacked by some as inhumane, are defended on the basis of being 
“cultural”. The implication in this regard is clear: those who attack it allegedly 
do not do so only on the merit of the case but based on a misunderstanding of 
the other party’s culture, that is, they argue from the wrong assumptions. This 
fits well with the abovementioned characterization of multicultural conflicts, 
except that it does not appear to involve any particular nation state.  
 
The powers afforded to traditional leaders tend to evoke similar problems, 
because traditional leaders could conceivably allow or condone some of these 
controversial practices. Furthermore, they would represent, as in the South 
African case, pockets of monarchic (and hence undemocratic rule) that 
                                                 
43
 Recall from our Introduction that ‘The Spear’ debacle is an example of such a tension 
between dignity and artistic expression. ‘The Spear’, a satirical painting depicting President 
Zuma in a pose similar to a painting of Lenin, only with exposed genitals, was exhibited in the 
Goodman Gallery in Johannesburg in May 2012. The furore caused by this saw Zuma taking 
legal action (Subramy, 2012) to prohibit the gallery and City Press to display the painting (the 
latter on its website).  
44
 Ukuthwala is a cultural practice whereby ‘the intending bridegroom, together with one or two 
friends, would waylay the intended bride … and they would forcibly take her to the young 
man’s home’ (Ntlokwana, 2009: 4) 
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deprive their people (who are also South African citizens) of their freedom to 
self-rule through a democratic state. Moreover, their treatment of women, 
based on cultural tradition, would also be problematic. 
 
With regard to freedom of speech and religion, the outrage at a Danish 
cartoon depicting Mohammed, published in Jyllands Posten in September 
2005 (Rose, 2006). Those outraged call for censorship (if not something more 
drastic). This would encroach on the (Danish) individual’s freedom of speech 
and belief, but would be justified on “cultural” grounds. The cartoonist should 
obey the laws they (i.e. the ones who are outraged) are committed to, even if 
he is not, and should therefore refrain from what is considered blasphemy. It 
is something that in their view needs to be obeyed by all; otherwise it loses its 
value. It is with regard to this assumption (about universal observance of their 
laws) that the opposing parties differ. Moreover, the different assumptions of 
the opposing parties make clear reference to different cultural backgrounds, 
hence the conflict is typified as a conflict between e.g. Islam and “the 
West”/”secularism” (Beukes, 2006, Rose, 2006).   
 
In cases where the character of the public sphere is at stake, the conflict is 
typically between those who want to preserve a certain character or “heritage” 
and those who are for a greater inclusivity, (for instance those who are 
marginalised by this public character). The Swiss referendum on minarets and 
the language conflict in Quebec are examples of these. In these cases, the 
preservation of a certain level of homogeneity of the public space (which is 
preserved in order to preserve the culture represented by that public space) 
has to proceed at the expense of other’s marginalisation. In the Swiss case, 
the outcome of the referendum is cited to be an expression of Swiss voters’ 
wish to defend against an Islamic character that would threaten the 
Swiss/European character of the public sphere. Similar arguments are heard 
in the French and Dutch public sphere, where the Islamic headwear is seen to 
erode the secular nature of the French and Dutch societies respectively 
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(Pillay, 2007). In the case of Quebec, proponents of pro-French laws argue 
that pro-French laws are needed to prevent Quebec from losing its French 
character. In these cases, at least one of the parties value the preservation of 
their culture as a good, and at least part of the conflict is about whether and to 
what extent such preservation is justifiable in the light of the exclusion and 
marginalisation it causes. Furthermore, in these cases, there is no way to 
accommodate every culture; to make the public space as neutral as possible 
is already to erode the current character, and to maintain the current character 
is to exclude others from having a public space that is also “theirs”. 
Necessarily, such conflicts have to include a discussion on and reference to 
those cultures that are to be protected.  
 
A further key aspect in all these cases is a tension between collective rights 
and individual rights. The cultural practices that are under attack invariably 
involve an encroachment on individual rights (sometimes extended to animals 
as well, as in the case of the bull-slaughter ritual); the conflict between respect 
for religion and freedom of speech essentially involves religious demands for 
the encroachment of the right to freedom of speech; and conflicts about the 
character of the public sphere rest on the demand for the preservation of a 
collective good (the survival of a culture) which leads to the marginalisation 
and misrecognition of individuals of those not excluded from the public 
sphere. Furthermore, the justification of encroachment on individual rights 
proceeds by way of reference to culture. 
  
Essential to multicultural conflicts is that at least one of the parties involved 
introduces reference to his/her culture to the debate. This can be done in a 
variety of ways and, depending on the context, by a wide variety of people. In 
all cases, however, such references are made in the public sphere. It can be 
made, for instance, by a journalist writing an opinion piece in a daily 
newspaper (such as Prof. Simphiwe Sesanti regarding African values in 
response to the ‘Spear of the Nation’ debacle) (Sesanti, 2012), or someone 
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claiming to be a representative of a culture may make a public statement or 
initiate a public debate (as we have seen in the cases of religion in the public 
sphere in Switzerland and France).  
 
How representative these people are is a topic that will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. It is interesting to note, however, that the media plays an ever 
larger role in disseminating these messages that refer to culture and that with 
the advent of the internet and practices such as blogging, an ever wider 
variety of people are potential initiators of public debate and an ever greater 
interaction between individuals is possible. In this regard, John Thompson, in 
his analysis of media and ideology (long before the advent of blogging), 
already indicated a trend away from one-way media communication and 
towards greater interactivity (Thompson, 1990: 214).  Thompson’s analysis 
also shows the connection between the development of mass media and the 
nation state: 
 
‘The emergence and development of (media) industries was a 
specific historical process that accompanied the rise of modern 
societies. The origins of mass communication can be traced back 
to the late fifteenth century, when the techniques associated with 
the Gutenberg press were taken up by a variety of institutions …. 
This was the beginning of a series of developments which, from the 
sixteenth century to the present day, was to transform radically the 
ways in which symbolic forms were produced, transmitted and 
received by individuals in the course of their everyday lives. It is 
this series of developments which underlie what I call the 
mediazation of modern culture. This is a process which has gone 
hand-in-hand with the expansion of industrial capitalism and with 
the formation of the modern nation-state system.” (Thompson, 
1990: 163-4) 
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When a person publicly introduces a reference to his/her culture, s/he offers a 
delineation of that culture. Of course, this delineation may be highly 
controversial; we will address that question below. For now, let us examine 
the implication that this delineation by an individual has.  
 
The delineation takes the form of what we will call an “inclusion theory”. An 
inclusion theory simply refers to the conceptualisation that makes it possible 
for an individual to determine (for him/herself if for no one else) who is a 
member of that culture and who is not. To do so, an inclusion theory 
necessarily needs to rely on criteria or essential features, which makes it 
inherently flawed. The interactionist nature of culture would imply a 
continuous, not discrete, variation in culture: a neighbouring tradesman might 
adopt some of a tribe’s meanings, but not all, and he might impart some of 
those meanings to his kinsmen. It is even conceivable that some neighbours 
end up having more in common with each other than with their own kin. As 
such, an inclusion theory that attempts to draw a border whereby those on the 
inside share a certain set of meanings, and those outside of the border do not, 
inevitably results in simplistic generalisations that are not accurate. 
Furthermore, as a product of interaction, culture is not simply metaphysically 
given and does therefore not by some sort of divine decree apply in equal 
validity to a certain group of people within a discrete geographic location. 
Even in a highly isolated tribe such as the tribes anthropologists have tended 
to study in the past, there is no way of generalising the findings observed in 
some interactions to the whole. If an anthropologist were to check his/her 
interpretations with some of a tribe’s members, s/he would get a wide variety 
of different responses. Put differently, what is regarded by some as a valid 
interpretation now, is always up for negotiation and “under construction”, so to 
speak. No meaning can claim general and permanent validity. Diversity and 
the interplay of agreement and disagreement therefore lie at the core of the 
development of culture. This means that defining a culture simply by an 
agreement on certain values is problematic. This also rules out the possibility 
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of defining a culture by a list of essential features and makes any inclusion 
theory fundamentally flawed.  
 
From the definition of multicultural conflict offered above, it is clear that a 
certain amount of public involvement is necessarily present in a multicultural 
conflict: a conflict that can be contained to two individuals that refer to their 
different backgrounds does not need to be considered a proper multicultural 
conflict. Without reference to the public sphere, the conflict can, in the worst 
case, reach an agreement to disagree. The essential conflict between 
collective goods as against individual liberties is therefore not at play when the 
debate can be contained completely to two individuals.  
 
Earlier we indicated the importance of the media in initiating and maintaining 
public debates. Also, we have indicated that multicultural conflicts are 
necessarily public matters. Now, in as much as the debate between two 
parties become public, the party that ventured the initial inclusion theory, that 
is, made the initial delineation of culture, risks being contradicted by those 
very people s/he included in the culture. Moreover, those who can potentially 
agree or disagree need not be participants in dialogue with each other. Due to 
the effect of mass media, people can appropriate a broadcasted message and 
discuss it amongst themselves and still hold an opinion on the inclusion theory 
at stake, without ever having to engage personally the original interlocutors of 
the public debate (cf. Thompson, 1990: 317). 
 
All those involved in this way can agree or disagree on a) the original issue 
disputed and/or b) his/her inclusion theory, that is, whether they should be 
grouped with that culture at all, much less in support of his/her position. This 
results in the individual being able to group people into four camps:  
1) those s/he expected to agree (based on his/her inclusion theory and their 
perceived membership of his/her culture) who do;  
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2) those s/he expected to agree who don't;  
3) those s/he expected to disagree who do and  
4) those s/he expected to disagree who don’t.   
 
Similarly, as the debate becomes public, each participant of the debate needs 
to offer an inclusion theory and divide people into the same four categories. 
The only participants who do not offer an inclusion theory are those who reject 
inclusion theories (rightly) for their flawed character; they contribute to the 
debate by disagreeing in principle with all inclusion theories offered.  
 
Let us consider the range of possibilities with regard to agreement and 
disagreement on inclusion theories. On the one extreme, it is possible that, 
initially, there are as many different conceptualizations of that culture as there 
are participants, that is, there is no agreement whatsoever. On the other 
extreme, there is complete agreement. In between these two extremes lies a 
spectrum of agreement and disagreement.  
 
Where complete agreement is highly unlikely, complete disagreement is also 
precluded by the social phenomenon called the metacontrast principle (Mogg 
& Vaughan, 2008: 126). The metacontrast principle dictates that individuals 
tend to exaggerate similarities with those people they categorise themselves 
with, as well as exaggerating differences with those who form part of their out-
group. Accordingly, an individual will minimize differences within his/her in-
group and maximize his/her difference with the out-group.  
 
On the one hand, the multicultural conflict itself has created an ‘us vs. them’-
situation, resulting in the individual exaggerating similarities with whomever 
s/he includes in his/her culture (regardless of how flawed his/her inclusion 
theory is), while exaggerating differences with whomever s/he regards as 
members of the out-group.  On the other hand, it follows from Tajfel’s social 
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identiy theory that the public debate elicits internal differences, which 
necessarily repeats the ‘us vs. them’ situation internally. In addition to this 
process, people’s proneness to conformity in opinion is a phenomenon well 
established in social psychology (cf. Asch, 1956: 1-70). The result is that, from 
the potentially vast variety of inclusion theories, a much smaller number 
survives the public debate, as individuals support those theories they feel 
closest to, minimizing the nuances they may differ on, while maximizing their 
differences with opposing theories. Furthermore, each of these remaining 
theories then necessarily has those who agree with it, and those who disagree 
with it.   
 
In this regard, we define the concept of a ‘dominant account’ as that theory 
which is agreed upon by the most people, that is, the inclusion theory that 
most people would agree upon if a poll were to be taken amongst all those 
involved (including those discussing the issues amongst themselves after 
receiving the message via mass media). Granted, such a poll would be quite 
impractical and difficult to implement. Yet, it is not impossible (we see it, for 
instance, when referenda are conducted) and in principle, such a dominant 
account is empirically verifiable.     
 
However, when (as the debate goes on) a dominant conceptualization 
emerges, it becomes possible to ascribe identity to that culture, that is, to see 
it as a discrete entity. Important to note here is that identity (that is, the 
culture’s status as discernible entity) should not simply be equated with the 
dominant account. The dominant account is not the correct account of the 
culture’s identity. It retains the flaws of a simple inclusion theory and is simply 
dominant because it is enjoying the most support. This could be because of 
rational agreement or due to various other measures, such as simple 
repetition, conformity, censorship or control over media production. For the 
moment, it is not important from where the dominancy stems and how 
legitimate such dominancy is; we will address such issues in Chapter 6. The 
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point of interest here is that, once a dominant account has been established, it 
provides us with the basis from which the identity of a culture can be 
conceptualized in comparison with personal identity. This is the focus of the 
following section (5.2).  
 
One possible objection at this point, however, would be that, of the examples 
we used as multicultural conflicts, it is not always clear that the antagonists 
would in fact represent the dominant account. It is rather conceivable that 
some of them represent quite marginal views. Those supporting the practice 
of ukuthwala, for instance, may be a minority of Xhosas. We accept this point. 
We point out, however, that it is still possible in principle to establish 
empirically what the dominant account is, and if those demanding cultural 
rights are in fact the marginal group, it certainly has negative implications for 
the legitimacy of their claims to represent the group. Moreover, as we will 
demonstrate in Chapter 6, the quality of interaction between the dominant and 
marginal account will be crucial for determining the legitimacy of all claims for 
cultural rights.  
 
A further question would concern the possibility of not having a dominant 
account at all. In such cases, following our argument, it would not be possible 
to delineate a distinct culture. We would point out, however, that this is not the 
case in the examples discussed so far.  Because the multicultural conflict 
situation creates an ‘us vs. them’-situation, it focuses the issues to be agreed 
or disagreed upon. In the examples discussed so far, we thus find one of the 
following structures: a) heavily polarised, but more or less equally supported 
accounts, b) a clear dominant account with marginal accounts, with the 
dominant account being a vocal antagonist in the conflict, or c) a clear 
dominant account that is relatively silent, while the marginal account is the 
vocal antagonist. Moreover, the absence of a dominant account would 
indicate, in essence, the absence of a multicultural conflict that would elicit 
people’s self-categorization.  
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5.2 Discernible boundaries in cultures 
At first glance, ascribing identity to cultures, that is, seeing them as discernible 
entities, appears to be an untenable position. However, close examination of 
how we apply the concept “identity” to persons reveals that a comparison is 
possible. In Chapter 3, we proposed a dual structure model of personal 
identity. According to this model a person 1) can be delineated with regard to 
his body. This is what we will call the person’s trivial delineation. However, 2) 
the more significant boundary is that of the psychic system. The boundary of 
the psychic system is not clear and – crucially – does not coincide with the “I”. 
Thus personal identity is delineated by objective boundaries – the organism’s 
boundaries - which serve as parameters within which psychic boundaries may 
be disputed. Moreover, we argued that continuity in personal identity is 
established by a unity of conflict between the “I” and repressed meanings and 
that this unity of conflict is characterised by autonomy, as developed in 
Chapter 4: a relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings whereby 
the “I” can self-referentially re-appropriate repressed meanings and doubt the 
certainty of core meanings. We summarize this dual structure in Table 1, 
below: 
 
Table 1 
 Personal identity 
Trivial boundary Organism’s boundaries 
Continuity Unity of conflict: a relationship between the “I” and repressed 
meanings, characterised by: 
o Self-reference 
o Doubt of core meanings 
 
 
 
Personal autonomy 
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We now turn to the concept of cultures to investigate whether it may be 
possible to think of it as discrete entities in the same way as we think of 
persons. In this section, we will pay particular attention to completing the 
analogy with regard to trivial boundaries, as well as finding corollaries for the 
“I” and repressed meanings. Questions surrounding self-reference and core 
meanings will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
  
Does a culture have objective boundaries that are comparable to the person’s 
organismic boundaries? We suggest that it does. In this section, we will 
propose a definition of cultural boundaries whereby the communicative 
relations between people from the same culture is qualitatively different from 
the relations between people from different cultures.  
 
In this regard, we must take into account the definition of culture as system of 
relations between psychic systems. This allows us to propose a definition of 
boundaries in cultures in terms of the relations between psychic systems. Put 
differently, we can define the boundaries of a culture if we can show that the 
relations between psychic systems (which are the elements of the culture) 
inside the culture are qualitatively different from the relations outside.  
 
We propose that this is possible if one uses the self-categorisation elicited by 
a multicultural conflict situation. The multicultural conflict situation gives rise to 
inclusion theories. When an individual offers an inclusion theory, s/he 
categorises him/herself and identifies with a certain group. Notwithstanding 
the fact that his/her inclusion theory is flawed, this self-categorisation 
nonetheless results in a claim that s/he is to be included in group X. All those 
individuals laying claim to be included in group X are now related to each 
other on account of this claim: their relationships are now characterised by the 
claim that they “belong together”. Put differently, if person A claims to be a 
member of group X and person B makes the same claim, both have to agree 
on the fact that the other party’s inclusion theory is voiced by an alleged 
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insider of that culture, i.e. they agree that they consider themselves to be 
insiders.  
 
The examples of groups involved in multicultural conflicts we have mentioned 
thus far, all also refer to either nationality (e.g. Swiss culture), regionality (e.g. 
European culture), ethnicity (e.g. Zulu), language (e.g. Francophone) or 
religion (e.g. Christian).45 This does not mean that cultures are to be equated 
simply with nationalities or religious groups. The reader would recall from 
Chapter 2 that we have distinguished between cultural, political and 
economical systems as different types of societal systems. Moreover, a group 
may be, at once, an economic, political and cultural system. A Dutchman 
would, for instance, participate in his country’s politics and be part of its 
economy, yet still be able to communicate certain meanings to his countrymen 
on matters unrelated to politics and economy. In this example, the same 
group (i.e. Dutch people) can be said to constitute a cultural, political and 
economical system. In other cases, the political, economical and cultural do 
not coincide. One society, (i.e. one societal system), could have one 
economic system and yet contain a variety of political and cultural groups. 
This would be the case in a multicultural society such as Canada or South 
Africa.  
 
Multicultural conflicts thus have further important characteristics. Firstly, they 
pertain to the meanings members of the particular groups hold. Note that the 
members of a certain group need not agree on these meanings. We wish only 
to point out that certain inter-group conflicts are not about meanings, but 
about other matters such as resources, or simply political power. Furthermore, 
                                                 
45
 One could arguably add sexual orientation to the list of groups that can also be cultures. In 
particular, Kymlicka (1998) investigates the issue of gay culture with regard to certain gays’ 
claims to exclusive gay clubs, i.e. clubs that heterosexual may not enter. We are not yet 
convinced that matters such as these require protection of a certain culture, or whether they 
are not still better thought of as simple equality arguments, i.e. that gays want to have certain 
spaces where they can assume other club-goers have the same sexual orientation as they 
do, just as, they would argue, straights can assume others are straight in most other spaces. 
Naturally, this is a complex argument, and one that we intuitively find problematic. At present, 
we do not regard it as a proper cultural issue. 
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the meanings pertinent to multicultural conflicts are meanings about group 
membership: the arguments, agreements and disagreements evoked by 
multicultural conflicts not only cause people to be divided into groups, they 
also evoke meanings by group members about the importance of belonging to 
that group. Moreover, while these meanings about group membership may be 
disputed amongst group members, multicultural conflicts require that 
agreement is striven for, not for any instrumental reason (e.g. for strength in 
numbers, or for creating a united front against the opposing group) but for the 
validation a person is granted when his fellow group member agrees with him 
on the importance of their group membership. Recall from Chapter 2 that 
communicative relationships between people are defined by their pattern of 
validation and disconfirmation. While two people have an agreement such as 
a contract or a commitment to collaborate, collaborations and contracts serve 
the function of achieving ends. They are thus means to ends. Agreements that 
provide validation, on the other hand, provide some certainty about the 
meaning of the ends themselves, i.e. whether the ends are worth pursuing. As 
such, they reduce the uncertainty and complexity that the environment 
presents to the person.  
 
Cultures can thus be defined by the particular character of their 
communicative relationships. The communicative relationships in cultures are 
characterised by  
 
a) group members’ shared claim that they belong to Group X. For 
example, two Zulu’s both asserting that they are Zulu’s. Person A may 
disagree with Person B about whether s/he (B) is a Zulu, but they 
nevertheless share this claim. This claim is therefore one characteristic 
of their communicative relationship. 
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b) The dominant account46 of the group asserts that membership of that 
group is important to the extent that group membership is a core 
meaning for those members sharing the dominant account, i.e. it is a 
fundamental value to them that they are part of that group. For 
example, hypothetically, the view held most often amongst Zulu’s (i.e. 
the dominant account) would be that it is important for them to regard 
themselves as Zulu, that it is a central part of who they are, how they 
view themselves and how they orientate themselves in the world.  
c) Members who hold the dominant view assert a certain inclusion theory, 
e.g. ‘the practice of polygamy is central to Zulu culture’ (i.e. if you want 
to regard yourself as a Zulu, you should be pro-ritual slaughter) and 
want all members to share this view. 
d) The aforementioned desire for agreement amongst all members is not 
just instrumental, i.e. they do not strive for such agreement because of 
the political benefits of solidarity (e.g. a united front against liberal-
minded activists against ritual bull-slaughter), but because of the 
interpersonal validation such agreement provides. For example, Person 
A (a Zulu) would want Person B’s  (also a Zulu) agreement on his view 
of ritual bull slaughter, not just because he wants strength in numbers, 
but because Person A believes he (A) is right and requires B to 
recognize the value of his (A’s) view. 
 
The communicative relation between the hypothetical persons A and B is thus 
characterised by the types of assertions made in criteria (a)-(d). While they 
may agree or disagree on these matters, their communicative relationship is 
characterised by these matters. All people sharing this type of communicative 
relationship can then be said to be part of the cultural group X. The common 
character of members’ communicative relations with each other therefore 
                                                 
46
 Recall from p.152 that the dominant account refers to that inclusion theory which is agreed 
upon by the most people, that is, the inclusion theory that most people would agree upon if a 
poll were to be taken amongst all those involved. However, we must stress again that the 
dominant account remains a flawed account of the culture and is by no means to be 
considered as the only true account. 
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constitutes the superficial boundary of that culture. However, it is important to 
note that the delineation does not end there. To be thought of as a culture, 
certain other criteria pertaining to the character of the culture’s institutions still 
need to be met. We will attend to these in Chapter 6. 
 
In the example above, we have used the Zulu culture, that is, a culture 
associated with an ethnic group, as an example. We can also show that the 
same applies to cultures associated with (i) nations, (ii) linguistic groups, and 
(iii) religions.  
 
(i) Person A and B would share the claim that they are Swiss, for instance 
(criterion A). Person A who holds the dominant account, would 
hypothetically assert that ‘in order to consider yourself Swiss, you have 
to value the Christian heritage reflected in our public sphere, and 
oppose the presence of Islam in our public sphere (criterion (c)). If 
there is a dominant account47 and this dominant account asserts that 
being Swiss should be a core meaning to all who consider themselves 
Swiss (criterion (b)) and wishes to convince all those who do not agree, 
to agree with them, not for the political benefit it holds, but for the 
validation it brings (criterion (d)), then all those calling themselves 
Swiss share a communicative relationship characterised by the 
dilemma about the presence of Islam in the public sphere. 
(ii) Likewise, Person A and B would share the claim that they are French-
speaking Canadians, or Francophone (criterion (a)). Person A, who 
holds the dominant account, would hypothetically assert that ‘in order 
to consider yourself Francophone, you have to value the presence of 
French in our public sphere, and be opposed to measures that threaten 
this presence’ (criterion (c)). If there is a dominant account and this 
dominant account asserts that being Francophone should be a core 
                                                 
47
 Recall from p.152-153 that it would not be possible to delineate a distinct culture if no 
dominant account is present.  
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meaning to all who consider themselves Francophone (criterion (b)) 
and wishes to convince all those who do not agree, to agree with them, 
not for the political benefit it holds, but for the validation it brings 
(criterion (d)), then all those calling themselves Francophone share a 
communicative relationship characterised by the dilemma about the 
presence of French in the Canadian public sphere. 
(iii) Furthermore, Person A and B would share the claim that they are 
Muslim (criterion (a)). Person A, who holds the dominant account, 
would hypothetically assert that ‘in order to consider yourself Muslim, 
you have to support the punishment of those who blaspheme, even if 
they are not believers (criterion (c)). If there is a dominant account and 
this dominant account asserts that being Muslim should be a core 
meaning to all who consider themselves Muslim (criterion (b)) and 
wishes to convince all those who do not agree, to agree with them, not 
for the political benefit it holds, but because it would be the right belief 
to hold (criterion (d)), then all those calling themselves Muslim share a 
communicative relationship characterised by the dilemma about 
blasphemy by non-believers (and by implication, the question of free 
speech).  
 
Now, there may be varying degrees of consensus about inclusion theories: 
some may object to one’s self-identification, others may accept it, etc. Despite 
this variance, however, there now exists a qualitative difference between the 
relationship between those on the inside of the culture and those on the 
outside, respectively: on the inside, the individuals have a claim to inclusion 
which may be agreed or disagreed upon by the others laying a similar claim; 
on the outside, there is no such claim.  
 
Furthermore, if two group members share a communicative relationship that 
does not meet the above criteria, those members are not members of a 
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culture, but of another group. With some examples, it will hopefully become 
clear how such criteria can help distinguish cultures from other groups.  
 
A group of investors, or shareholders, may meet criteria (a)-(c), but cannot 
meet criterion (d). The shareholders may identify themselves as such - 
criterion (a) – and the dominant view amongst them may be that it is important 
to do be members of that group. The dominant view might even be (though 
this sounds somewhat unlikely to us) that members should hold a certain view 
on a matter (e.g. appointing a new CEO) in order to consider themselves 
shareholders: (criterion (c)). However, if agreement is sought in the case of 
shareholders, it is for a purely instrumental reason: they need agreement to 
make a decision, and they need the decision to be the right one in order to 
protect their capital investment. Thus criterion (d) is not met.  
 
Likewise, we consider the case of groups with a common cause. As with 
shareholders, groups organised around a common cause may meet criterion 
(a)-(c). Members of Green Peace may, for instance, identify themselves as 
such, indicate the importance of belonging to the group and assert that 
members, in order to be considered part of the group, should be opposed to 
nuclear testing. However, as with shareholders, the drive behind agreement is 
instrumental, that is, to create a united front and exercise political pressure on 
the powers that be. Thus criterion (d) is not met.    
 
The example of clubs, e.g. an amateur drama-club, is more difficult to 
exclude. A club may meet criteria (a), (c) and (d). The members of the group 
may e.g. identify themselves as Shakespearians, and the dominant view in 
the group may be that one needs to have a keen interest in Shakespeare in 
order to be part of the group. Moreover, it is conceivable that members may 
value this agreement amongst them because it validates their particular 
passion for Shakespeare (critertion (d)). However, it is difficult to conceive of 
them meeting criterion (b). In order to meet (b) the dominant view amongst 
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them must be that it is a core meaning, not just to be passionate about 
Shakespeare, but that this passion needs to be shared, i.e. that there needs 
to be a group organised around this passion. While it is conceivable that an 
individual may feel strongly about Shakespeare and identify himself as e.g. a 
‘Shakespearian’, it is more difficult to conceive of an individual finding core 
meaning in identifying himself as ‘Member of the Durbanville Shakespeare 
club’. However, while it is difficult to conceive, it is not impossible.  
   
The example of clubs shows that our definition of cultures provides some 
scope for cultures of varying size and complexity. Following the criteria above, 
groups as small as families and as large as whole societies may both be 
regarded as cultures. However, we hasten to note the following: Firstly, the 
above definition of criteria only pertains to the superficial, trivial boundaries of 
cultures. Further criteria pertaining to the representivity of the institutions of 
cultures thus still need to be met. Cultures would, for instance, need to show 
the necessary complexity and sophistication to include institutions that satisfy 
the power vs. consensus criterion (which we develop in Chapter 6). When this 
is taken into account, smaller groups, such as families and clubs, would be 
excluded, limiting the diversity of different types of cultures.  
 
Secondly, some diversity with regard to the different types of cultures is not 
necessarily a problem. If they all share a common basic structure (as set out 
by the criteria above, as well as the character of institutions we discuss in 
Chapter 6), the different ‘species’ of cultures can be classified. We could then, 
for instance, classify the different examples of cultures mentioned thus far into 
‘national’, ‘regional’, ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’ cultures, yet all of them 
can be regarded as cultures if they meet the pertinent criteria. They differ, 
however, with regard to the content that an individual group member can 
appropriate for himself as meaningful (i.e. as pertinent to the question of who 
he is, and how he should orientate himself to the world). Put differently, the 
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different types of cultures can be distinguished on the basis of the content of 
the inclusion theories group members assert in criterion (b).  
 
In this regard, it is important to clarify the relationship between, for instance, 
nations and cultures, religions and cultures, languages and cultures or ethnic 
groups and cultures, etc. In all of the cases mentioned above, a culture is not 
to be simply equated with, respectively, a country, a religion, a language or an 
ethnic group. The culture associated with the group pertains to the meaning 
group membership has for the group members. The culture then bears the 
name of that nation, religion, language or ethnic group, when the inclusion 
theory offered as per criterion (b) refers to, for example, a nation.  
 
A person participating in a national culture would, for instance, be provided 
with a wide variety of potential inclusion theories, which he can appropriate as 
an essential feature of his/her group identity. A country’s political history, 
current politics, various laws and policies, its literature, art and sport can all 
potentially be referred to in a member’s inclusion theory offered in criterion (b). 
Ethnic cultures would per definition introduce race and racial heritage as a 
potential basis of inclusion theories. Similarly, religious and linguistic cultures 
would respectively introduce religious beliefs and linguistic heritage as 
potential bases for inclusion theories.48  
 
The differences between these different types of cultures only become 
important when they impact on matters of viability and fairness (specifically, 
fair intercultural competition).49 As we will discuss more extensively in Chapter 
                                                 
48
 Distinctions such as these, however, also run into some difficulties. Many linguistic groups 
and religions, for instance, also have political histories. Conversely, a national culture can 
also have strong ties with religious beliefs. We would point out, however, that a clear-cut 
distinction between types of cultures is not necessary for our argument. Our argument is 
concerned with the structure all examples of cultures share. Furthermore, we introduce other 
concepts in Chapter 6, such as viability, that provide clearer ways of distinguishing between 
cultures. 
49
 In Chapter 6 and 7 we will show that, when we can conceive of cultures as delineable, we 
can also define concepts such as viability and intercultural fairness. Unfair intercultural 
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6 and 7, the reference to viability and fairness determines whether a culture’s 
survival can be protected or not. Thus we would argue that the diversity in 
types of cultures does not lead to less clarity in deciding on multicultural 
matters, nor does it result in a blank cheque, so to speak, whereby everyone 
and anyone can lay claim to protection of his/her ‘culture’. We will expand on 
this idea in Chapter 7, where the implications of our model of culture are 
applied to real world multicultural issues. 
 
One objection to such a delineation of cultures may be that this is a trivial 
solution to the problem of delineation. The culture is simply defined as all 
those who consider themselves to be part of it and all the problems of 
disputes about inclusion theories are merely avoided without any real 
resolution. It is important to note, however, that in terms of our analogy with 
personal identity, this delineation of cultures can be as superficial as the skin 
is to personal identity. The real definition of a culture, pertaining to its 
character and, ultimately, to the legitimacy of its claims to protection, pertain 
to the way in which disputes about inclusion theories are handled. We will 
attend to this problem in Chapter 6. 
 
Our proposed delineation of cultures in terms of self-categorisation and the 
resultant difference in communicative relations, means that the culture 
indicates (but is not defined by) the set of all persons who could possibly 
consider themselves part of that culture, whether considered so by others, or 
not. Put differently, a person who considers him/herself as part of the culture, 
but is not regarded as such by others, is still indicated in the culture.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
competition, for instance, would occur when a culture would have been marginalised via acts 
of power (such as, for instance, conquest or colonisation) by other cultures, as opposed to 
losing representation in the public sphere through dissent amongst its members and a lack of 
relevance to its members. Viability refers to the culture’s ability to thrive and continue to 
attract and retain its members, without violating the demands of fairness. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 165
In this regard, it is important to note that 1) the boundaries are defined by the 
qualities of the relations between people, and not by the inclusion or exclusion 
of people as such, and 2) that the boundaries are not defined by, and do not 
require, consensus over whether their inclusion is justified. Rather, it is 
defined by consensus about the objectively verifiable fact whether or not there 
was a claim that they should be included or not.  
 
Note that such a boundary includes more than just the dominant account. The 
dominant account merely represents a single inclusion theory. It also includes 
far less than the sum total of the human race. The divisive nature of the 
multicultural conflict situation serves to restrict the variance in inclusion 
theories: the conflict situation highlights the pertinent point of contention, 
forcing those participating in the debate to make pertinent reference to it in 
their inclusion theories. This serves to relate all the different inclusion theories 
to each other, restricting the total set of individuals who may be included in the 
objective boundaries of the culture, so that not everyone can possibly be 
considered part of a certain culture.  
 
We can see how the conflict situation restricts the scope of inclusion theories 
if we refer back to the examples discussed above. An English speaking 
Canadian of English heritage, for instance, will not consider himself French 
Canadian, nor will others consider him to be; nor can he be considered to be a 
Zulu, nor can he be considered Muslim if he does not regard himself as such.  
A Muslim who is not a Swiss, French or Dutch civilian, or staying there, would 
not be considered by anyone to be part of those particular cultures; a 
Caucasian atheist Danish national would not be considered by anyone to be a 
Muslim, nor would he be considered a Zulu. There may be people included on 
both sides of a conflict situation. A Swiss person of Muslim heritage who is for 
a secular public sphere can conceivably be included in more than one culture 
in the same conflict situation. Such a person then represents a shared 
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boundary, so to speak, between for instance the “Muslim” and “Swiss” 
cultures. This does not make the boundary any less discernible. 
 
Another factor restricting the total number of individuals included is the cultural 
nature of inclusion theories. Inclusion theories are of course themselves 
cultural in nature and thus have their origins in the interaction between people 
and retain a regional connotation: whom I consider to be one of my own is 
necessarily strongly linked with whom I talk to, which is traditionally strongly 
linked with the person’s local region.50 We would therefore not expect the total 
set of people included in the culture to be significantly greater than the 
inclusion theory (of one of the participants in the debate) that includes the 
most people. The different sets of criteria employed in the different inclusion 
theories would be related to one another, almost bearing a ‘family 
resemblance’ in the Wittgensteinian sense.  
 
These relations can vary in their closeness. If, however, these relationships 
become so tenuous that there is no one who is not included by at least one 
theory, we cannot speak of a culture any longer. In the examples of 
multicultural conflicts mentioned thus far, this is not the case and we can see 
that the total of inclusion theories cannot include the whole of humanity and 
that a broad consensus that a certain set of people can definitely not be 
indicated in the culture is possible. From the examples mentioned above, we 
can note, for instance, that all serious inclusion theories relating to the Muslim 
faith would share criteria that at least connect a person to the faith, either as 
someone practising the faith or born in it, and that those who do not meet 
those criteria would not be considered Muslim. A similar logic can be applied 
to other cases: for someone to consider him/herself to be part of the French, 
                                                 
50
 It is only with the advent of modern technology that regular contact with people from vastly 
distant regions has become possible. Even in such cases, residues of previous ‘regionality’ 
may be present in the communication, such as difference in language, so that we are aware 
of the fact that we are communicating with someone ‘from somewhere else’. 
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Dutch or Swiss cultures, there has to be some sort of connection to those 
cultures, whether it be by being a citizen, or of that heritage, etc.  
 
It is important to recall here that although it is obviously easy to think of 
difficult cases or individuals who might or might not be indicated, that is not 
the issue here. Those difficult cases would, by the present definition, be 
included in that culture. The point is that a broad consensus about the non-
indication of certain people is possible and that the objective boundaries of a 
culture cannot conceivably be expanded to indicate all of humanity. Put 
differently, there is therefore a set of people who cannot be included in the 
culture by any stretch of the imagination.  
 
One potential objection against such a proposal to define a culture’s objective 
boundaries in terms of people is that it contradicts the culture as system of 
meaning and returns to a type of ethnic definition. This need not be the case.  
 
The reference to sets of people merely serves as an indicator. We can define 
the same set also in terms of relations between psychic systems. This is 
similar to the case of the individual, where the objective boundaries of the 
psychic system could be considered to coincide with the brain. Just as there 
are no thoughts that are not neurological, there is no cultural activity that does 
not involve people.  
 
If cultural systems may be defined as the system of relations between all 
psychic systems, then ‘a culture’ as delineated entity may be defined as the 
system of relations between a certain set of psychic systems, the set defined 
so that the relations between those psychic systems are all characterised by 
the claims that meet criteria (a)-(d) above. Moreover, just as a psychic system 
is always embodied, i.e. cannot be separated from the body, so any culture is 
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always ‘enmembered’, that is, cannot be thought of as existing separately 
from its group members.   
 
The level of consensus about claims (that meet criteria (a)-(d)) may vary: the 
dominant centre of the culture will be characterised by more consensus, while 
in the marginal, oppressed views in the culture there will be little consensus as 
to whether those views belong to the culture or not. There remains, however, 
a qualitative difference between those outside the objective boundaries of the 
culture and those inside: on the inside, there are claims that one “belongs” to 
the culture, though these claims may be disputed. On the outside, however, 
there are no such claims.  
 
Within the objective boundaries of the culture, we find dominant and 
repressed accounts, as discussed above. From our definition of the objective 
boundaries as the sum of all people included by at least one inclusion theory 
(or put in purely cultural terms, the total of all relations between psychic 
systems that are characterised by the claim that the psychic system belongs 
to the same culture), it follows that dominance or repression can now also be 
defined in terms of the consensus about inclusion: repressed perspectives are 
those about which there is considerable dispute whether they belong to that 
“culture” or not, while the dominant perspectives enjoy a great deal of 
consensus about whether they belong to that culture or not.    
 
A comparison is possible between, on the one hand, the dominant and 
oppressed accounts, and on the other, the unitary experience of the ‘I’ and 
repressed psychic elements on the other. Just as the “I”, in interaction with its 
environment and other people, claims to be representative of the person, the 
dominant view claims to be a pure representative of the identity of the culture. 
In both cases, this causes controversy and dispute. While in the psychic 
system, such conflict is expressed in anxiety, disputes in multicultural conflicts 
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may be expressed in public debate, political struggles, outrage and even 
violence. This is summarised in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the idea of a ‘unity of conflict’ can also be applied to cultural 
identity, as it is to personal identity. Just as personal identity is given a sense 
of continuity by the continued demand to deal with repressed psychic 
elements, so too the culture has to continually deal with people demanding to 
be acknowledged in the dominant view and be recalled from the margins. In 
the individual psychic system, this is made possible by the faculty of memory. 
In cultures a similar process is present. Firstly, the marginal accounts are not 
deleted by marginalisation, because the psychic systems that hold those 
views are not deleted, except in the extreme cases of witch hunts and 
persecution (and even in such cases, their views tend to be handed down to 
other people). As such, they remain there, ready to be heard as soon as they 
are allowed to. Secondly, each inclusion theory offered at a time of 
multicultural conflict has its origin in an earlier moment in time, where there 
was also a need for self-description. As such, the link with the past, and 
accordingly with both dominant and repressed views, is retained.  
 
From the discussion above we can see that cultures correspond to individuals 
in some key aspects with regard to how we are able to view them as discrete 
entities: 1) both have objective boundaries 2) within which their identities are 
disputed and 3) both are characterised by a ‘unity of conflict’. We would 
Marginalised/oppressed 
accounts 
Repressed thoughts 
Dominant 
accounts 
Unitary “I” 
Objective boundary Organism boundary 
Figure 2. Comparison in structure between “cultural” and individual 
identity. 
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therefore argue that one can regard cultures as discrete entities in much the 
same way as we do individuals.  
 
The implications of this, however, remain problematic: if we regard cultures as 
things, despite all the internal disputes, etc, do we not leave the door open for 
extreme abuse and marginalisation, the phenomenon of a smaller group 
speaking for people it does not really represent? This is a valid objection, but 
not an objection, strictly speaking, about the status of a culture as an entity. 
Rather, it speaks to the problem of whether a culture can justify the 
encroachment of the autonomy of its members for the sake of its continued 
existence. It is this question we will address in the next two chapters when we 
discuss how certain types of institutions in a culture serve to maintain the 
continuity of a culture’s character, while also protecting personal autonomy.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SELF-REFERENTIAL CULTURES 
 
In Chapter 5 we set out to arrive at a conceptualization of cultures that would 
make it possible to delineate them, at the same time allowing for 
disagreement within the culture and without reducing the culture to a false 
essence. The problem of how the identity of a culture would relate to its 
character, the ‘way of life’ that presumably holds its members together 
(although members may disagree on this as well) and how this character can 
change without the culture losing its identity, has been deferred until now. 
Along the way, problems of how the dominant account of a culture relates to 
its marginal account (and what the implications are for dissident or 
marginalised voices in a particular culture) have been highlighted. These will 
be addressed in this chapter.  
 
In Chapter 1, we suggested that the abovementioned problems require us to 
conceptualise a culture as being able to restructure or reorganise itself and, 
more importantly, do so in a manner that does not encroach on individual 
rights. Moreover, it will have to reorganise itself and still maintain the claim to 
be authentically itself. If this were to be successful, so it was argued, cultures 
would have to be conceived of in a way similar to how we view personal 
autonomy – which we developed in Chapter 4 - and how individuals deal with 
their repressed meaning in a healthy manner. We now focus our attention on 
investigating whether it is possible to conceive of the reorganisation of a 
culture in a way similar to how we view personal autonomy. This will lead us 
to develop certain criteria by which to judge the way a culture treats its 
marginal accounts as well as the legitimacy of its claim to be authentically 
itself. 
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In Chapter 2 we defined psychic systems as systems of meaning, that is, 
systems that process experiences as meaning. Similarly, we defined culture 
as a second order system of meaning, constituted by the communicative 
relationships between psychic systems. Recall from Chapter 2 that 
communicative relationships between people may simply be defined as the 
pattern of validation and disconfirmation between them, or put differently, 
which meanings they share and which they do not. These communicative 
relationships shape the way people process meanings (and are in turn shaped 
by the meanings people continually process).  
 
Where psychic systems process experience as meaning, culture processes 
actions as communication; in psychic systems the processing of meaning is 
accomplished by the activation of a pattern of distinctions, whereas in culture 
communication is accomplished by the activation of a pattern of 
communicative relationships. Put differently, communications can be 
conceptualised in terms of changes in patterns of communicative 
relationships. When one person tries to convey meaning to another person, 
the relationship between the two psychic systems changes. For instance, if 
one person communicates something (e.g. a religious view) about which the 
other agrees, that which the two systems have in common is corroborated and 
entrenched further. If one person convinces the other of something (e.g. 
effects a change of opinion on a certain religious matter), he has effected a 
change in the other person’s system of distinctions, and thus their relationship 
has also changed: their systems now have something in common which they 
previously did not. Similarly, if the two people disagree on something it will 
change the relationship between them, the nature of this change depending 
on how they were related prior to the communication. For instance, two 
people on different ends of the political spectrum might have expected to 
disagree; their disagreement might then have the effect of making each more 
certain of his/her position. On the other hand, a disagreement between two 
people who did not expect to disagree, throws old certainties into doubt. 
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In Chapter 5 we discussed how discernible entities called cultures can be 
formed in situations of multicultural conflict. In this regard, the boundary of a 
culture was defined by the character of its communicative relationships: a 
specific culture is constituted by communicative relationships where those 
relationships are characterised by identification with that culture.  
 
In Chapter 4, we provided a formulation of personal autonomy as residing in 
self-referential decisions, where such decisions involve answers to questions 
of core meaning. Personal autonomy was shown to refer to a particular 
relationship between the “I” and repressed accounts, whereby repressed 
meanings are continuously re-evaluated and core meanings doubted, before 
a decision is made. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, this structure of 
self-reference and doubt was shown to provide for unity in conflict between 
the “I” and repressed meanings.  
  
Now, in this Chapter, we set out to demonstrate how cultures can have a 
similar structure, which can similarly provide for unity in conflict between 
dominant and marginal accounts.  
 
6.1 Self-reference in cultures 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the autonomous psychic system as displaying self-
reference. The autonomy of a psychic system lies in the system’s ability to 
interpret its own interpretations and evaluate its own evaluations. When put 
before a question of core meaning, the system is required to make sense of 
(or ascribe meaning to) its own processing of meaning. The psychic system, 
when faced with a question of ultimate meaning, is faced with a dilemma that 
requires him to call his most valued meanings into question, to test them, that 
is, to decide what they mean to him. In this regard, the autonomous psychic 
system is exemplary of a self-referential system.  
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If a cultural system functions to interpret actions as communication, then self-
reference is achieved when the cultural system communicates about its own 
communication. In Chapter 5, we discussed how discernible entities called 
cultures can be formed in situations of multicultural conflict. These situations 
call forth inclusion theories. Recall from Chapter 5 that inclusion theories are 
(flawed) accounts of who belongs to a certain culture and who does not. As 
such, they satisfy the requirements of self-reference. When an inclusion 
theory is offered, a communication is effected and this communication is 
about the communicative relationships between people, e.g.: “We (from this 
culture) share x, y and z, while you (not from our ‘culture’) do not”. Likewise, 
the very act of identification with a culture is based on an inclusion theory and 
constitutes a communication about a person’s communicative relationships 
with others. This means that self-reference is already present in the elements 
of cultures: a culture is constituted by communicative relationships that are 
self-referential in the sense that they communicate assertions about those 
very same communicative relationships.    
 
This however, does not yet constitute a system that is self-referential in a 
manner analogous to psychic systems. The analogy is not complete because 
in cultures, the elements are self-referential, while in a psychic system, the 
system as a whole is self-referential. If we bear in mind that a psychic system 
is a system of distinctions and that meaning is an activation of a pattern of 
these distinctions, then in psychic systems, reflecting on one’s meanings 
requires one to investigate one’s own (system of) distinctions. Furthermore, 
such an investigation would require the system to call its own distinctions into 
question. To have the same type of self-reference in cultures, we would have 
to have what we call second-order communication: communication that 
investigates and problematizes the current communicative relationships and 
likewise investigates and problematizes the inclusion theories and 
identifications that characterise those communicative relationships. We 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 175
therefore argue that a culture needs to satisfy this criterion of second-order 
communication before we can call it self-referential.  
 
Now, such second-order communication is possible, but not necessarily 
present in all cultures in a multicultural situation and we therefore suggest that 
not all cultures with discernible boundaries are necessarily self-referential. 
However, second-order communication does take place in certain cases. 
Problematizing accounts of a certain culture can be found in the media, in 
academic institutions (particularly in disciplines such as cultural anthropology, 
sociology and the like) and in politics. Where such accounts are present, they 
are offered in response to and stimulated by the public debate between 
different inclusion theories.  
 
The debate around the practice of ukuthwala can be used as an example. 
When the issue was raised in the media51, the initial positions on the custom 
involved describing it as a cultural practice, hence involving a definition of that 
culture. It drew responses from a number of institutions and people. These 
responses would typically take issue with the definition of the culture by either 
a) pointing out that the custom as practiced by certain individuals is not as it 
was understood traditionally; they thus offer a definition of the culture by 
delineating which practice may be considered cultural and which may not52; or 
b) by pointing out that the custom itself needs some revision, indicating that 
the essence of the culture would be untouched by changes made to the 
custom. Ntlokwana (2009), for instance, argues that ‘(w)ith Westernisation 
and education, the traditional custom died a natural death as it had become 
old fashioned and outdated.’ Others ask for the practice itself to be 
reconsidered, and adapted to the requirements of individual rights, so that, for 
                                                 
51
 The media’s initial position on the practice was decidedly critical. The Daily Sun (Banjac, 
2010), and the television news programme ‘Third Degree’ (Media Flaws, 2010) are examples 
of these. 
52
 Some examples of these are the position taken in by the Commission for Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (cf. Mapumulo, 
2011) and, to a certain extent the ‘Submission made to the SA Law Commission on 
Ukuthwala Custom’ compiled by Ntlokwana (2009) of the Centre for Constitutional Rights.  
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instance, the practice may be allowed if the (adult) woman would give her 
consent (Mwambene & Sloth-Nielsen, 2011: 22).  
 
These responses to the debate represent second-order communications, as 
they investigate and put into perspective the inclusion theories raised by the 
debate. We thus note again how the multicultural conflict situation provides 
the conditions for firstly, the delineation of a culture and subsequently, the 
possibility for that culture to be self-referential.  
 
6.2 Institutions 
One would object that the self-reference constituted by inclusion theories is 
merely the self-reference of an individual, that it is simply an individual 
reflecting on his group membership. How would one instance of this constitute 
the self-reference of the whole system? We suggest that it does not. Rather, 
self-reference in cultures needs to be a characteristic of its institutions. We 
now continue to further define the term ‘institution’ in terms of a cultural 
system.  
 
As an initial definition, we regard institutions as referring to agreed upon 
practises. Although this might seem a very broad definition of the term 
institution, we can demonstrate that it fits the colloquial use of the term. For 
instance, a society that has institutionalised freedom of the press, for 
example, has agreed upon the practice of a free press. Likewise, a society 
may have entrenched another practice, e.g. marriage.  
 
With reference to the term society, we note that society is not to be 
understood as synonymous with the term ‘culture’. As noted in Chapter 2, we 
prefer to use society as a term that encompasses the interplay of various 
systems, such as culture, the economy and politics. The actions of and 
interactions between people in a society can be communicative (and thus 
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cultural, because culture consists of communicative relationships), economical 
and/or political, amongst others. As such, agreed upon practices are, strictly 
speaking, not part of culture. However, the meaning attached to these 
practices is thoroughly cultural. By virtue of being agreed upon, they are 
shared between people and thus impact communicative relationships, and 
then consequently be put into practice by the members of that culture. We will 
return to the question of how agreed upon practices relate to communicative 
relationships, and thus culture.  
 
Now, naturally, there may be disagreement about certain values or practices. 
Not all people in a democracy value democracy and not all people believe in 
marriage. Just because something is an institution does not make it 
uncontroversial. However, when the members of a society claiming to adhere 
to an institution (e.g. a value or a practice) decrease to the extent that they 
become the minority, the exception rather than the rule, then one can certainly 
no longer call that value or practice an institution.  
 
This definition of institutions can also be defined in terms of communicative 
relationships and thus we will demonstrate how it relates to cultures. 
 
With psychic systems, the processing of meaning leads to strengthening or 
weakening the relations between distinctions. When the relations between 
distinctions are strengthened with each meaningful processing of an event, 
the distinctions involved attain a more and more self-evident, rather than 
constructed character.  
 
Analogously, the cultural system (note: not “a culture” yet, we will attend to 
this below), processes actions as communication leading to changes in 
communicative relations. Just as the distinctions constituting a psychic system 
can gain a self-evident character, so too can communicative relations become 
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entrenched and self-evident. They are thus no longer treated as constructed, 
i.e. as a product of the communicative interaction between psyches, but are 
treated as givens. Recall from Chapter 2 that communicative relations are 
defined by agreement and disagreement between psychic systems and that 
these agreements and disagreements pertain to issues around ideas, values 
and ways of relating to each other. Put differently, the issues we agree or 
disagree about pertain to the questions such as ‘what is the truth?’, ‘how 
should we live?’ and/or ‘how should we treat each other?’ It then follows that, 
when communicative relations become entrenched and attain an 
unconstructed character, those issues that are agreed upon also attain a 
certain self-evident validity.  
 
Now, in a culture, the communicative relationships are characterised by 
reference to an inclusion theory. In turn, inclusion theories refer to those 
characteristics that characterise the essence of that culture, so that inclusion 
theories claim: “it is x, y and z that makes this culture what it is, it ceases to be 
that culture without x, y and z”. When inclusion theories make such claims, it 
aims to show that the culture is defined by agreement on certain issues, e.g. 
“all true Zulu’s believe in these particular ideas, we all value these particular 
things, we all value this particular way of life,” etc.  
 
Now, inclusion theories, and the communicative relationships that contain 
them, become entrenched in the same process that forms the dominant 
account. The entrenchment of certain inclusion theories and the formation of 
the dominant account around these inclusion theories are flipsides of the 
same coin. Recall from Chapter 5 that the dominant account is defined by the 
inclusion theory that the majority of members of the culture support. It is thus 
an inclusion theory that characterises the communicative relationships 
between these majority members. Where these entrenched inclusion theories 
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are put into practice, they become institutions of that culture.53 We thus define 
institutions in cultures as the practices that reflect the entrenched inclusion 
theories of the dominant account.  
 
For instance, in a culture where democracy is an institution, it means that the 
dominant account of that culture has designated democracy as an essential 
characteristic of that culture and that the dominant account claims that 
members of the culture are in agreement about the value of democracy. 
Likewise, in a culture where polygamy is an institution, the same logic follows. 
This does not mean that all members of the culture actually do agree about its 
value. However, those in disagreement have been relegated to the 
marginalised accounts of the culture, that is, they are regarded as die 
dissident view.  
 
Thus we can answer the objection that the self-reference constituted by 
inclusion theories is merely the self-reference of an individual person. We 
argue that an individual reflecting on his/her group membership and 
communicating it to others is simultaneously a) engaging in self-reflection, 
thereby making sense of his experiences and b) impacting his communicative 
relationship with another individual. Importantly, change in a communicative 
relationship is something that happens between individuals. As such, the self-
reference of a culture does not so much lie in a person’s capacity to reflect on 
his/her own background as it does in how the culture disseminates such 
reflections. This focus on dissemination rather than on the individual mind 
further shows that the locality or membership of the original producer of 
communication about a culture is not important in determining whether self-
reference has occurred: a so-called outsider or foreigner could have written 
something about one’s own culture, but if it were published in a local 
newspaper it becomes something the members of a culture can understand 
                                                 
53
 In some cases, one can conceive of members of the dominant account wanting to put into 
practice certain institutions, yet not being allowed to do so by the larger society that they 
inhabit.  
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and debate, something they can agree with or disagree with, that is, 
something about their communicative relations that becomes part of their 
communicative relations with each other. Lastly, there is strictly speaking no 
law stating that self-reference should permeate the whole system. In fact, this 
would be impossible in psychic systems too, overburdening the system to the 
point where it cannot function anymore.   
 
What we therefore suggest is that self-reference, when applied to psychic and 
cultural systems, is not an all-or-nothing concept. No system is 100% self-
referential (it would be impossible to function); self-reference is always to be 
placed on a continuum. We can therefore say that some systems are more 
self-referential than others. A culture where a lone individual can only speak 
his/her insights to a friend of course displays very little self-reference, so little 
that the system’s self-reference approaches zero. In such a case, we can 
hardly call the system self-referential.  
 
Compare this to a situation where self-reference through second-order 
communication is part of the fabric of a culture, where second-order 
communication is not just the lone armchair philosopher pondering privately, 
but a pursuit many partake in, as part of a tradition of reflecting on such issues 
and where such a tradition has the support of institutions like the media and 
academia. In such a situation, second-order communication would effect a 
widespread activation of communicative relationships and we would be 
justified to describe it as the system’s self-reference.  
 
Let us consider a hypothetical situation where, in response to a multicultural 
conflict, a prominent political analyst writes an investigative, critical piece on a 
certain culture and its self-perceptions. Whether s/he is a member of that 
culture or not is not that important. More important is that this piece is 
communicated by publishing it in a prominent daily newspaper, the readership 
of which is comprised mostly of members of that culture. At once, his/her 
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communication becomes something the readers who are members of that 
culture can respond to, something they can agree with or disagree with, that 
is, something about their communicative relations that becomes part of their 
communicative relations with each other. Provided, that is, that they 
understood it. If for any reason, whether it is the author’s jargon or the 
readers’ obstinate refusal to deal with any reflection, the message is not 
understood, the message that could have constituted a culture’s self-
reference is merely the first salvo in a superficial polemic. This is because a 
culture’s self-reference lies in how a communication is received and 
disseminated, not in the mind of the sender. It lies not only in the members’ 
capacity to generate and understand such reflections, but also in the 
willingness to engage in it and the frequency with which they do it. Seen in 
this way, it is clear that self-reference lies on a continuum.  
 
When we see cultural self-reference in terms of the process of dissemination, 
it draws attention to various factors that could facilitate or impede self-
reference. These include, as mentioned above, a tradition of engaging in such 
matters (or not); the extent to which mass media publish such views and the 
extent to which it is capable to sustain lengthy, nuanced views as opposed to 
40-word opinions; the effect that political and financial forces have on decision 
about which views are aired and to what extent certain views are repressed. 
From the above list it is clear that institutions like the media, academia and 
government play an important part in the self-reference of cultures and we 
suggest that a culture’s self-reference depends largely on how its institutions 
function.    
 
6.3 Self-reference and unity of conflict in cultures 
In Chapter 4 we described autonomous psychic systems as exhibiting self-
referential decisions where such decisions involve answers to questions of 
core meaning. Now, before we attempt to show how cultures are sometimes 
analogous to psychic systems in this regard, we need to attend to the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 182
question of decisions in psychic systems. Specifically, we need to investigate 
how the psychic system’s self-referential decisions relate to the opposition of 
a single unitary “I” with repressed meanings and how this influences the way 
we think about agency in psychic systems.   
 
We should avoid thinking of these decisions as being made solely and 
uncontrovertially by a single, unitary “I”. Rather, such a unitary “I” is already a 
construction of the psychic system and is but one part of the decision. 
Moreover, we can show that the construction of the “I” in fact takes place 
through such self-referential decisions.    
 
In Chapter 5 we discussed the analogy between, on the one hand, the 
dominant and oppressed accounts in cultures and, on the other, the “I” and 
repressed psychic meanings. We now turn to the question of how the “I” and 
repressed psychic elements relate to self-referential decisions about 
questions of ultimate meaning, that is, to the autonomous functioning of the 
psychic system. As mentioned above, the psychic system is faced with a 
dilemma when dealing with questions of core meaning. The dilemma requires 
it to call its most valued meanings into question, to decide what they mean.  
 
Our model of psychic systems (see Chapter 2) describes the psychic system 
as processing meaning through a system of distinctions. Any system of 
distinctions creates a circular reference, e.g. X is defined as not A, not B, etc., 
while A and B are defined, amongst others as being not X. This circular 
reference is then stopped by a decision, where one of the referents (e.g. A) is 
treated as having a self-evident identity, which allows us to identify other 
things in terms of it (i.e. B is defined in terms of A). We use the term ‘decision’ 
on purpose: it is not a calculation. Rather, the term ‘decision’ recognises the 
fact that the outcome could have been different, e.g. another referent (B 
instead of A) could have been treated as self-evident (i.e. A is defined in terms 
of B). Each decision then has the effect of creating hierarchies of distinctions: 
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By treating one referent as more self-evident than another, it gains priority 
over others. It is hierarchies such as these that post-structural thinkers aim to 
deconstruct.    
 
As decisions are necessary parts of the processing of meaning, it follows that 
the psychic system’s processing of meaning necessarily creates hierarchies. 
Every decision corresponds to a certain way of making sense of an 
experience and every decision is by definition one of many possible decisions 
that could have been made. Therefore, when a decision is made other 
possible decisions have been precluded and for each decision thus 
precluded, there is a corresponding meaning that was repressed. Those 
meanings that are prioritised constitute the psychic system’s dominant 
account of itself and its place in the world (which we defined in Chapter 3 as 
the “I”), while the rest are repressed.    
 
The construction of hierarchies also has bearing on questions of core 
meaning. The psychic system’s core meaning occupies the most central 
space in his/her processing of meaning. It forms the core of its meaning 
processing and therefore corresponds to the topmost position in a hierarchy of 
distinctions. As such, it occupies a central place in the psychic system’s 
dominant account of itself, the “I”.  The “I” is, as it were, moulded around 
answers to questions of core meaning.  
 
When the psychic system is faced with a dilemma, a core meaning is called 
up, but with a problem. The dilemma does not allow the system to simply 
apply the meaning it usually does. Rather, the dilemma posits a cost to 
applying the core meaning as usual. Applying the meaning as usual would, for 
instance, result in much pain or anguish or simply have a detrimental effect on 
its adaptation to its environment. As an illustration, consider an individual 
faced with a situation where he is asked to compromise his/her deepest moral 
code, or else endure his/her or his/her family’s suffering. A situation such as 
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this requires the psychic system to be self-referential; it needs to make sense 
of its own core meanings. As such, it also needs to call into question its own 
dominant account of itself. Put differently, as the “I” is moulded around 
answers to questions of ultimate meaning, such dilemmas also call the “I” into 
question. 
 
Note that this second-order (self-referential) meaning processing is carried out 
by the very same system of distinctions that is under investigation. 
Nevertheless, self-reference gives decisions a different character by arriving 
at a decision after having problematized an ultimate meaning. Put differently, 
the difference self-reference makes is that it allows the system to consider the 
groundlessness of its ultimate meaning, so that the eventual decision is not 
merely an automatic calculation, but an act of autonomy, a leap of faith.  Self-
reference in the system can only serve this function when it is able to access 
previously repressed meanings, that is, other possible meanings to be 
attached to an experience.  
 
Apart from repressing alternative meanings, the processing of meaning also 
hides a realised meaning’s constructed nature, i.e. it represses the fact that 
the meaning was constructed by the system, treating the meaning as if it was 
instead given as such by the environment.  The processing of meaning at 
once hides its own functioning and other possible meanings from view. Both 
its own function and other possible meanings therefore constitute repressed 
material that is to be re-discovered by self-reference when the system faces 
issues of core meaning.  
 
If we consider that self-reference in autonomous psychic systems needs 
access to previously repressed meanings, it follows that self-reference is 
determined by the relationship between the “I” and the repressed meanings in 
the psychic system. In the language of psychoanalysis, this relationship would 
be expressed in terms of defence mechanisms. Accessing repressed material 
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invariably calls old certainties into question, and with the reduction in certainty 
a certain measure of anxiety is unavoidable. The psychic system would 
understandably wish to avoid the experience of anxiety, yet to continue to 
repress certain elements carries its own risk: if repressed material is avoided it 
renders decisions merely automatic. For a psychic system to be autonomous, 
repressed meanings need to be recalled from it banishment and the 
concomitant anxiety endured as the price of autonomy. Existential 
psychologists such as Rollo May (1950) refer to this as existential anxiety as 
opposed to neurotic anxiety that results from avoiding existential anxiety.  
 
Self-referential decisions in psychic systems therefore involve a recall, a call-
up of repressed meanings and therefore concern the willingness of the ‘I’ not 
to avoid these repressed meanings. Put differently, self-referential decisions 
require the ‘I’ to let go of its defences against alternative, repressed accounts 
of the psychic systems and its place in the world.  
 
If cultures are to make something analogous to self-referential decisions, they 
have to exhibit the same type of recall or re-appropriation of alternative, 
repressed accounts. Earlier in this chapter, we argued that self-reference in 
cultures would be achieved by what we call second-order communication: 
communication that investigates and problematizes the current 
communicative relationships and likewise investigates and problematizes the 
inclusion theories and identifications that characterise those communicative 
relationships. Expanding our analogy with psychic systems, we now propose 
that problematization of inclusion theories involves a recall, re-evaluation or 
re-appropriation of marginalised inclusion theories. Put differently, a culture 
can only have unity of conflict between dominant and marginal accounts when 
it seriously considers dissident inclusion theories. Once again, we stress that 
self-reference would not be determined by the mind of the individual 
embarking on such a problematizing investigation. Rather, self-reference 
would be exhibited by the functioning of that culture’s institutions in 
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disseminating such insights. If these institutions promote an openness to 
alternative insights concerning inclusion theories, then that culture can be 
described as self-referential.  
 
6.4 The correlate of core meaning in cultures 
In our analogy of cultures with psychic systems, what in cultures would 
correspond to core meanings? Forming the core around which the “I” is 
moulded, core meanings are the psychic system’s most fundamental 
understanding of itself in relation to its world. As such, it not only offers a 
perspective on the psychic system itself, it also offers a particular perspective 
about the world.  
 
On our way to such an answer, let us once again consider how core meaning 
is conceptualized in terms of a pattern of distinctions.  
 
Earlier in this chapter, we conceptualised core meaning as occupying the 
topmost tier in the psychic system’s hierarchy of distinctions. Accordingly, it 
occupies a central place in the psychic system’s dominant account of itself 
and its place in the world, that is, the “I”. When an autonomous (self-
referential) decision is made, the boundaries between the “I” and repressed 
meanings are temporarily lifted. This is done so that the psychic system can 
be aware that alternative meanings are possible. These alternative meanings 
also represent possible ways of relating to the world. There is no calculation 
that excluded them from the “I” in the first place. Rather, they were repressed 
by way of decision. When the boundaries that separate the “I” from repressed 
meanings is lifted temporarily, it serves to make the psychic system aware of 
this decision, as well as making it aware of the fact that it must choose again 
between possible ways of making sense of the situation at hand.  
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Furthermore, the temporary lifting of boundaries between the “I” and 
repressed meanings reminds the psychic system that its core meaning is a 
construction, not a given. Thus, when the boundaries are lifted, it has the 
effect of simultaneously highlighting the constructed nature of a core meaning 
and putting the value of that meaning (that is, how functional it is in lighting the 
way, of orienting the psychic system in its world) into question again. 
Likewise, previously repressed meanings are open to review again: while their 
constructed nature is also highlighted, their value and functionality can once 
again be considered.  
 
With the boundaries lifted, the psychic system is thus once again forced to 
make a leap of faith. It must choose between possible meanings and at the 
same time, believe that its choice is not just correct because of choosing it, 
but because it is somehow independently valid. Put differently, the psychic 
system has to believe that its meaning is not just a construction, that it has 
some independent validity. If the value is only valuable because the psychic 
system chose it, it loses its function in orientating its life. It therefore has to 
introduce some form of authority. This authority could be phrased in religious 
terms or in terms of a certain standard whereby he believes all people in his 
position would agree to it. Either way it is a construct of the psychic system 
itself; it does not exist objectively. Knowing that its decision is groundless, the 
psychic system can only believe that others, if they had seen what it has seen, 
had experienced what it has, would have made the same decision.  
 
In this regard, it is important to note that the validity of a core meaning cannot 
be verified or disconfirmed with absolute certainty. The psychic system can 
gain some confidence in its meanings when it has the consensus of others on 
the matter, but ultimately can only believe that its meaning is not just valid 
because of consensus but that the consensus is there because the meaning 
has independent validity. Likewise, if the psychic system encounters 
disagreement with others about a particular meaning, it does not automatically 
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follow that the meaning is invalid. Whether the psychic system abandons its 
meaning in the face of disagreement would depend on its belief about 
whether others might be mistaken and whether they might have thought 
differently if they had had the experiences the psychic system has had.  
 
The fact that consensus does not guarantee validity means that one cannot 
judge a person to be autonomous or not based on the content of his/her core 
meanings. However, the person can be judged based on the process s/he 
followed to arrive at that core meaning. Thus, as we argued in Chapter 4, a 
person may be regarded as acting autonomously when his/her actions are the 
result of self-referential decisions. If the person needed to prove his/her 
autonomy to others, s/he would have to show that s/he did not simply employ 
his/her core meaning automatically, but rather arrived at it after temporarily 
lifting the boundaries between the “I” and repressed meanings. This is what 
we term the process of authentication. Furthermore, s/he would have to show 
that s/he could claim in good faith to have adhered to the standard of authority 
that s/he introduced. To do so, s/he would have to show that, where there are 
disagreements, these disagreements are instances where people cannot 
agree, regardless of their ability and willingness to reason, because the 
respective axioms they employ are just too different and specific to the 
different lives they have experienced. This is what we term the process of 
authentication in psychic systems.  
 
Where a psychic system is a system of distinctions, a cultural system is a 
system of communicative relationships. Furthermore, a culture is constituted 
by communicative relationships that are self-referential in the sense that they 
communicate assertions about those very same communicative relationships. 
More specifically, these assertions about the communicative relationships 
take the form of inclusion theories. As we discussed in Chapter 5, inclusion 
theories attempt to offer an essential definition of what it means to belong to a 
certain culture. The implication of any inclusion theory is that the purported 
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essential characteristics are a sine qua non of that culture; without them, the 
culture as one knows it ceases to exist.  
 
One should avoid using the idea of a ‘continued existence of the culture’ 
implied in an inclusion theory as a way of completing an analogy with psychic 
systems. This would be problematic, because the meaning a psychic system 
produces also refers to continued existence in as much as meaning points a 
way to the future54, it processes this as a pattern of activation of its elements 
(i.e. distinctions). A culture per se does not process its own continued 
existence, the question of continued existence is merely a concern of (some 
of) the individual members of that culture. Furthermore, the moment we start 
to conceptualise a culture itself being concerned with its own existence, we 
turn it into a meaning-processing system, and treats it like it is some type of 
super-organism with a mind of its own. This is an idea we have already 
excluded earlier (in Chapter 2).  
 
To avoid this problem, we suggest another approach. When we look for a 
correlate of meaning in the analogy between psychic systems and cultures, 
our answer has to be in terms of communication, or more specifically, in terms 
of patterns of activation of communicative relationships.  We have already 
posited an analogy between psychic systems and culture (as opposed to 
cultures) whereby psychic systems interpret events as meaningful while 
culture interprets actions as communication. We suggest that a similar logic 
can be applied to the concept of cultures.  
 
Where communicative relationships are the constituting elements of culture, 
cultures are comprised of communicative relationships characterised by 
inclusion theories. Recall from Chapter 5 that inclusion theories are members’ 
                                                 
54
 In Chapter 2 we developed the connection between meaning and future behaviour:  
meaning is understood when we receive an ‘answer’ as to how to go forward, what to do next 
or how to react to something. 
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conceptualisation of who has membership of a culture and who has not. 
Fellow members of a culture are thus related by virtue of each’s claim that 
s/he belongs to that culture. As they can agree or disagree with each other on 
these claims, their communicative relations are thus characterised by these 
claims. 
  
Moreover, as we have discussed above (in section 6.2, on institutions), 
inclusion theories posit certain practices as central and essential to a culture’s 
existence. Thereby, cultures process practices in terms of whether it is an 
institution of that culture or not. Thus, where psychic systems interpret 
process experiences as meaningful, the broader cultural system (that includes 
all humanity) processes actions as communication and distinct, delineated 
cultures process practices as institutions.  
 
 We suggest that the analogy of culture with the autonomy exhibited by 
psychic systems can be completed when we turn our attention to the process 
of authentication. Specifically, we will argue that the distinction that a psychic 
system makes between a meaning a) being valid due to consensus vs b) it 
being valid independent of whether people agree upon it or not, has its 
corollary in cultures in the form of the distinction between a) inclusion theories 
that are dominant due to power relations and oppression vs b) inclusion 
theories that are dominant due to consensus in a milieu free of power. This 
consideration then acts as a criterion for the process of authentication. For 
ease of denotation, we refer to the latter criterion as the ‘consensus vs. power’ 
criterion. 
 
As with the case of self-reference, the authentication process cannot reside in 
an individual alone. If this were the case, it would merely be an individual 
judging the institutions of his/her culture according to the ‘consensus vs. 
power’ criterion. Rather, what is needed is that the institutions of that culture 
embody that criterion.   
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We suggest that one type of institution can embody the consensus vs. power 
criterion. A culture can exhibit this criterion through institutionalising exit 
possibilities. Accordingly, there is no central agent needed to pass judgement 
on the dominant account of that culture. The culture exhibits something similar 
to the psychic system’s leap of faith by putting its institutions to the test of a 
power free consensus. Such a test is passed when an exit possibility is 
institutionalised.  
 
What does an institutionalised exit possibility entail? It would take a different 
form in different contexts. We discuss a few possible forms below. Essential to 
all of them is the notion that the individual rights of those members of the 
culture who do not subscribe to the dominant account, may not be 
compromised. Furthermore, the threat of excommunication and stigmatization 
needs to be negotiated if an exit possibility is to be truly effective.  
 
In multicultural disputes about language in the public sphere of a specific 
region, for instance, an exit possibility is secured by the availability of services 
in other languages in neighbouring regions. This, along with sufficient efforts 
and infrastructure in place to develop proficiency in the other language, would 
provide an individual ample opportunity to, for instance, study in the other 
language when s/he chooses to do so. Issues of official languages for minority 
cultures invariably occur in the context of a relatively small region that is 
surrounded, at least partly, by a much stronger culture represented by a 
stronger language. In the case of French Canadians and Inuits, for instance, 
this language is English. In such cases, we would argue, an exit possibility is 
ensured 1) when it becomes possible and feasible for an Inuit and/or French 
Canadian to study in English (this is already the case) and 2) the Inuit, for 
instance, does not lose his/her membership of his clan because s/he has 
opted to study in another language. That s/he can return when s/he wishes to 
do so, addresses the problem of excommunication.  
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In other cases regarding the public sphere, for instance in ‘The Spear’ 
debacle55, the exit possibility needs to be provided in the very same region, 
i.e. it cannot entail people being free to leave the country. That would simply 
be a form of ex-communication or even exile. In such cases, the exit 
possibility would simply take the form of the institution of freedom of speech. 
However, we have to point out that the manner in which freedom of speech is 
invoked is crucial, so that it is not experienced as an alien institution forced 
upon the culture. In Chapter 7, we develop certain guidelines according to 
which the introduction of institutions need to be the result of self-reference, 
rather than being imposed from the outside.  
 
Some reflection will reveal that certain other practices, defended on cultural 
grounds, cannot conceivably pass the ‘consensus vs. power’-test, nor can 
they accommodate an exit possibility. We will discuss these cases in some 
detail in Chapter 7, also developing guidelines that allow a liberal response to 
these practices to largely avoid charges of ethnocentrism.  
                                                 
55
 Recall from the Introduction that ‘The Spear’ is a a satirical painting depicting President 
Zuma of South Africa in a pose similar to a painting of Lenin, only with exposed genitals. This 
caused outrage, with  Zuma taking legal action (Subramy, 2012) to prohibit the gallery and 
City Press to display the painting (the latter on its website). Prominent members of the ruling 
party and the Cabinet also called for its removal (May & Nagel, 2012; Ntsaluba, 2012). The 
painting was later vandalised (Boshomane, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 7 
DELINEABLE CULTURES APPLIED TO MULTICULTURAL ISSUES 
 
In Chapters 2-6, we developed a model of cultures that defines them as 
systems of communicative relationships. Furthermore, we showed that 
multicultural conflicts provide the necessary conditions that enable us to 
delineate cultures in terms of their communicative relationships. While this 
would solve the problem of delineation in a somewhat superficial manner, the 
deeper problem, so to speak, would remain, namely the question of how a 
delineated culture would retain its character, while still allowing disagreement 
in its ranks. In Chapter 6, we have proposed that, if a culture can satisfy the 
criteria of completing an analogy with personal autonomy, it can be 
delineated, while still retaining its character and allow for disagreement. Thus 
a culture’s delineability depends on it being able to satisfy the requirement of 
completing an analogy with personal autonomy.  
 
It is very important to note that we do not propose that cultures in fact have 
personal autonomy. Our position remains a liberal position to the extent that 
individual autonomy remains axiomatic.  It is a supposition fundamental to our 
approach. Even when a liberal approach can contemplate the individual 
suffering or sacrificing him/herself for the collective or for a cause, it sees this 
sacrifice, has to see it, as something ultimately meaningful for the individual 
and a result of the individual’s choices. Thus individual freedom remains 
central.  
 
The purpose of our analogy with personal autonomy thus does not serve to 
violate or extend this axiom. Rather, the purpose of a culture’s analogy with 
personal autonomy is to show that meaningful delineation is possible. When 
delineation becomes possible, many of the problems faced by Taylor and 
Kymlicka can be addressed. This is the topic of the first section of this 
chapter. We will first show how our model of culture allows the application of 
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certain concepts, such as attachment, fairness and viability, to cultures. This, 
with the notion of the delineability of cultures, will help us to attend to some of 
Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s problems. 
 
The second section of this chapter will apply the same concepts to typical 
multicultural conflicts. In this regard, we note that what we propose is not 
definitive solutions to all these cases. Each requires an in depth enquiry into 
the facts involved. What we propose pertains more to developing guidelines 
for the process such enquiries should follow. Rather than offering any 
concrete answers, we concern ourselves with generating the right type of 
questions to ask. As we will show in section 7.2, these questions involve the 
concepts of fairness, threat and viability.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that we approach these multicultural 
issues from the perspective of an individual commentator (such as a 
legislator, politician, journalist, academic, etc.) commenting on multicultural 
conflicts. In Chapter 2, we maintained that only (individual) persons can 
process meaning. As such, only individuals can evaluate and adjudicate 
multicultural affairs. Cultures themselves can only exhibit second-order 
meaning processing. To repeat, cultures’ analogy with personal autonomy 
does not afford them autonomy, but cultural representivity, which solves the 
problem of delineability. The questions posed by multicultural conflicts thus 
pertain to how the individual commentator should approach the matters, when 
s/he can legitimately view the culture as a distinct entity and, relatedly, to what 
extent cultural claims can be met.  
 
Where sections 7.1 and 7.2 pertain to cases where delineable cultures are at 
stake, we recognise that not all multicultural issues involve distinct cultures 
(according to our definition). Nonetheless, using the concepts we developed, 
allows us to envision a special type of decision making process that would 
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apply to cases where the delineability of cultures cannot be shown. This is the 
topic of section 7.3. 
 
7.1 Communitarian arguments revisited 
In this section, we will apply the concept of culture developed in Chapters 2-6, 
to Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s arguments. As discussed in Chapter 1, both share 
similar problems. In this sense, whatever contribution our model of culture can 
make, would apply to both theories. As we regard Kymlicka’s argument as the 
stronger one of the two (as discussed in Chapter 1) we will focus mainly on 
his argument. 
 
With a strong analogy between cultures’ and personal delineation, it becomes 
reasonable to extend concepts we usually apply to persons, such as fairness, 
attachment and viability so that they can also apply to cultures. Though a 
liberal approach may never treat cultures literally as persons, the analogy 
allows a metaphorical use. Moreover, it is a useful metaphor, as it allows us to 
argue that cultural survival is a legitimate cause, not because cultures are 
things with minds of their own (for this would be a crude form of animism and 
a reification of culture), but because cultural protection is consistent with a 
liberal approach: where cultures satisfy the consensus vs. power criterion, 
personal autonomy is protected along with equality.     
 
One of the core characteristics of attachment, as we have used the term, is 
that it reduces the uncertainty the environment holds for any entity trying to 
survive in that environment. Attachment reduces this uncertainty by 
introducing a measure of permanence over time. In interpersonal attachment, 
attachment to the other person provides certainty and reduces anxiety. One 
example would be the infant’s attachment to his/her mother, where the infant 
plays and explores his/her world, possibly even leaving his/her mother’s field 
of vision, yet still returning, certain of her continued presence and availability.  
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This type of attachment is not restricted to persons. It is possible, for instance, 
for a person to be attached to objects, one’s home, or one’s environment. In 
fact, the examples of cultural upheaval Kymlicka uses could just as easily be 
used as examples of the pain felt at the upheaval of, for instance, forced 
removals.  
 
Attachments to both people and environments both pertain to a structure 
(reminiscent of Kymlicka’s notion of a ‘context of choice’) that allows one to 
have certainty, and that provides one with a basis from which explorations of 
the good life occurs. Seen in this light, it is understandable that cultures can 
serve a similar function in some people’s lives. The attachment that some may 
have to cultures can therefore, to a certain extent, be regarded as something 
valuable to some, that is, something worthy of protection.   
 
But if one’s culture is to be protected because of the hurt one would suffer if 
one’s attachment to it is severed or jeopardised, the culture needs to be 
delineated. In other cases, such as interpersonal attachment and attachment 
to one’s home, for instance, delineation is possible. People, homes, 
neighbourhoods, suburbs and cities have boundaries that are quite easily 
discernable. The question was whether cultures have similar boundaries. 
Thus, while the notion of attachment provides us with a possible solution to 
the legitimacy of the protection of cultures, it begs the question of the 
delineation of culture. As such, the two problems are intertwined.  
 
Furthermore, it was not clear how one could delineate cultures and without 
encroaching on the individual autonomy of certain people thus included in that 
culture. This also relates to the question of how far protection of cultures may 
go. Attachment to one’s home, for example, while understandable, does not 
mean that one has an inalienable right to live there. While we have a notion of 
fairly or unfairly evicting someone from his/her home, it is not clear whether 
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and how concepts such as fairness may be applied to one’s wish to protect 
one’s culture and one’s attachment to it.  
 
The conception of cultures we have developed from Chapters 2 to 6 has 
shown that it is possible to delineate cultures, by demonstrating that it is 
possible to view cultures in a manner analogous to how we view autonomous 
persons.   
 
7.1.1 Will Kymlicka’s argument revisited 
With the concept of culture we developed it becomes possible to fill some of 
the gaps in Will Kymlicka’s argument.  
 
One of our criticisms of Kymlicka’s argument was related to his notion of an 
individual’s attachment to a context of choice. Where he regarded this as a 
given for all individuals, we suggested that this position needs to be softened 
to say that some individuals might feel this way. Nevertheless, we would hold 
that such an attachment is understandable. Attachment need not be restricted 
to interpersonal attachments, and, as it is conceivable to be attached to one’s 
home or another environment, it is understandable that cultures, as contexts 
of choice, might fulfil a similar role in some people’s lives.  
 
However, despite softening Kymlicka’s position, a number of problems 
remained. Having developed our concept of culture, we can now address 
these issues. 
 
Firstly, if an individual’s attachment is to be protected, the culture needs to be 
delineated. Our concept of culture suggests this can be done with reference to 
communicative relationships. Specifically, we can define the boundaries of a 
culture as consisting of communicative relationships that are characterised by 
claims to cultural membership. 
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Secondly, we identified Kymlicka’s distinction between structure and content 
as problematic. This distinction is aimed at allowing for a culture that can 
accommodate difference and dissent, yet manage to continue existing as that 
culture. However, it is not clear from his argument what this distinction entails 
and whether such a distinction is in fact possible. The delineation of cultures 
we developed in Chapter 5 leaves room for difference and dissent. 
Furthermore, we proposed that a culture can stay true to itself, can continue 
existing as itself, in a manner analogous to personal autonomy, namely 
cultural representivity. Specifically, we argued that a culture may be regarded 
as analogous to an autonomous person if it has institutions that exhibit self-
reference and retains its members in accordance with the consensus vs. 
power criterion. The latter would be exhibited through an institutionalised exit 
possibility. The analogy between a culture and an autonomous person allows 
us to view a culture as maintaining its identity even though changes in its 
content may occur over time.  
 
A related problem in Kymlicka’s argument is the encroachment of individual 
autonomy. While he explicitly rules out the encroachment of individual 
autonomy, the problem nonetheless lingers due to the vagueness of his 
distinction between structure and content. The model we suggest clarifies this 
distinction by means of an analogy with personal autonomy. Furthermore, the 
model we propose, posits a central role for the consensus vs. power criterion.  
A culture could only be regarded as delineable if it satisfies the criterion of 
consensus vs. power, by which members would remain members of the 
culture because of its value to them, as opposed to being forced to do so. As 
such, individual autonomy is, as it were, a precondition for the delineability of 
cultures. Accordingly, we need not regard cultural protection and individual 
autonomy as competing ideals. 
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A fourth point of concern in Kymlicka’s argument was how concepts such as 
fairness can be applied to cultures. Without a strong analogy between culture 
and persons, extending a concept such as fairness would make little sense. 
Our model represents a strong analogy that allows a concept such as fairness 
to be extended to cultures, more specifically, to competition between cultures, 
or ‘intercultural fairness’. Furthermore, our model specifically generates a 
criterion for fairness through the consensus vs. power criterion. Presently, for 
we denote fairness as applied to cultural matters as ‘intercultural fairness’.  
 
Intercultural fairness can be defined in terms of the consensus vs. power 
criterion. In this regard, the criterion can be applied to past injustices, as well 
as present day competition between cultures. Accordingly, a culture would 
have been unfairly marginalised if this marginalisation occurred via acts of 
power (such as, for instance, conquest or colonisation) by other cultures, as 
opposed to losing representation in the public sphere through dissent 
amongst its members and a lack of relevance to its members.  
 
Likewise, competition between cultures in the present day can also be unfair if 
one culture gains ground by way of acts of power. In modern society, this 
need not take the form of military conquest or colonisation as was seen in 
previous centuries. Rather, acts of power could currently be more subtly 
present in the economic realities that have been shaped by past conquests. 
Moreover, intercultural unfairness need not only be another culture’s fault, so 
to speak. The broader society, which is not, strictly speaking, a culture, may 
provide an unequal playing field that disadvantages one culture. Likewise, 
global economic forces may do the same.56 The global reach of the British 
Empire, for instance, would not only afford a greater utility to English as lingua 
franca, but would also make it financially cheaper to import international 
                                                 
56
 A notable exception to charges of undue economic influence is where the culture itself 
proposes a mode of economic production that proves to be less effective than another 
culture’s. For this culture, this would then simply be the (unfavourable) outcome of fair 
competition. 
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cultural products, thus decreasing the space afforded e.g. by broadcasters, for 
local cultural products. Without this international influx, the playing field for 
local languages would in some cases57 be much more level, though local 
languages would still have to prove their utility in this area. We can therefore 
say that the historical influence of the British Empire (itself not a culture) has 
unduly influenced the competition between Francophone and Anglophone 
cultures in Canada. The above examples thus refer to unfairness as 
attributable to an unlevelled playing field, not the unlawful ‘actions’ of the two 
‘teams’.  
 
The concept of intercultural fairness places interesting restrictions on exit 
possibility. While an institutionalised exit possibility is necessary for the 
delineability of cultures, such an exit possibility would be a self-defeating 
institution if it does not serve to somehow redress past intercultural unfairness 
and go some way towards current intercultural fairness.  
 
In addition, another concept, that of ‘threat’ is pertinent. We define the term 
‘threat’ simply as denoting the risk a culture faces of ceasing to exist. Some 
form of threat is already constituted by the exit possibility. An exit possibility 
could lead to the deterioration or extinction of that culture. In fact, the very 
nature of an exit possibility, as we argued in Chapter 6, represents a 
willingness to place the culture’s existence at stake. However, it is also 
possible for a culture to face an unfair threat, that is, a threat to its existence 
due to acts of power by other cultures. In the following sections, we will mainly 
be referring to unfair threats. 
 
To some, this may seem like an extremely fine tightrope to walk. No doubt, 
parties involved in such matters would need to compromise. However, we 
                                                 
57
 Though not in all cases. In South Africa, for instance, English as lingua franca would have 
an upper hand even without international factors, purely due to the vast number of different 
local (official) languages that are not greatly concentrated geographically and the need for 
people of different groups to communicate 
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would hasten to point out that, without the delineability of cultures, 
compromise is not even on the table. Put differently, with the delineability of 
cultures, compromises and other innovative solutions are at least justified in 
principle, though implementing them may still pose thorny practical and 
political problems.  
 
As such, Kymlicka’s equality argument now has a stronger case. As we 
pointed out in Chapter 1, Kymlicka’s argument would be strengthened 
considerably if cultures could be conceived of as distinct entities. He would be 
able to show that his approach is consistent with a liberal approach. According 
to his equality argument, the continued existence of a person’s culture – if it 
can be shown to be delineable - may be protected on grounds of equality: 
(individual) members of that culture would be treated fairly, because they 
would enjoy the same opportunity to practice their way of life as members of 
the majority do. 
 
A further concept of importance is the concept of ‘viability’. Our model of 
culture allows us to define the viability of a culture in terms of its ability to 
thrive and continue to attract and retain its members, without violating the 
demands of intercultural fairness.  
 
The concept of viability allows us to solve a problem left open in Kymlicka’s 
argument, specifically, the problem relating to refugee communities. These 
would, if we take the concept of intercultural fairness into account, be entitled 
to some protection of their culture. However, being a disrupted community, 
often scattered and fragmented due to their flight from their home country, and 
typically small in relation to their country of asylum, their viability to continue to 
exist as a culture can be called into question. The cultural protection they 
require, and the rich attachment to a public place that is imbued with their 
culture, would typically be rooted in the society they have escaped. It would 
therefore be difficult to reproduce these conditions in the country of their 
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asylum. Thus while they may in principle have a claim to cultural protection 
based on intercultural fairness, it is a claim their host country would most likely 
not be able to honour. Their cultural protection is therefore not viable.  
  
7.1.2 Charles Taylor’s argument revisited 
To a large extent, the problems facing Kymlicka’s argument are shared by 
Taylor’s. Taylor needed to show how cultures could be delineated in order for 
his argument for measures for cultural protection to hold. As argued above, 
the model of culture we propose serves to solve the problem of delineation.  
Furthermore, as we argued in Chapter 1, Taylor’s theory requires a concept 
similar to Kymlicka’s notion of attachment to explain the necessity of the 
continued survival of a specific culture. Our model of culture serves to clarify 
the notion of attachment and shows that it is possible to apply the concept of 
attachment to cultures. Moreover, Taylor needed to show how the concept of 
fairness could be applied to competition between cultures. As discussed 
above, our model of culture allows us sensibly to speak of fairness in 
competition between cultures.  
 
7.2 Application to multicultural situations 
In the previous section, we demonstrated how our model of culture yields 
ways of defining fairness, threat and viability in cultural matters.  
 
We can now apply the concepts of viability, threat and fairness to the 
multicultural conflicts discussed in Chapter 5. At this point, we note that these 
conflicts need not represent a conflict between different cultures. They can 
also represent conflicts between a society and one of the cultures within that 
society. Recall from Chapter 2 that we distinguished the terms society and 
culture. Where culture is a system of communicative relations between 
people, societal systems encompass cultural systems alongside political and 
economic systems. Moreover, as is typically the case in multicultural conflicts, 
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a single society may contain many different cultures. The conflicts relevant to 
these cases typically arise from questions regarding society’s response to 
claims made by one of the cultures it encompasses. Furthermore, multicultural 
conflicts may also refer to an individual’s response (e.g. an expression by an 
artist, satirist or other commentator) to a culture.  
 
In Chapter 5, we briefly discussed three types of multicultural conflicts. The 
first type denotes cases where the cultural character of the public sphere is at 
stake. In these cases, there is a drive to retain the ‘Swiss’, ‘Christian’, ‘Dutch’ 
or ‘French’ character of the public sphere. The second type of multicultural 
denotes conflicts around freedom of speech, as opposed to respect for 
cultures. The third type of conflicts refer to cultural practices, particularly those 
that liberally-minded people find abhorrent, and whether and to what extent 
liberal responses to these practices can be justified. 
 
These concepts, we propose, provide crucial guidelines for the decision 
making process needed for multicultural conflicts. We reiterate that we do not 
propose definitive solutions to all these cases. Each requires an in depth 
enquiry into the facts involved. Rather, we propose certain guidelines for the 
process such enquiries should follow. We concern ourselves with generating 
the right type of questions to ask, rather than offering any concrete answers. 
As we will show in this section, these questions involve the concepts of 
fairness, threat and viability. 
 
7.2.1 The public sphere 
In cases where the character of the public sphere is at stake, the conflict 
centres around the preservation of a certain character or “heritage” of the 
public sphere. In Switzerland, the population voted to prohibit the future 
building of minarettes. As discussed in Chapter 5, the outcome of this 
referendum was deemed to be an expression of a wish to maintain the 
‘Christian’ or ‘Swiss’ character of the public sphere. A similar notion is at work 
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in the debate in France and the Netherlands around the public wearing of 
religious headwear and other religious symbols. In these cases Islamic 
headwear is seen to erode the secular nature of the French and Dutch 
societies respectively. Likewise, in the case of Quebec, proponents of pro-
French laws argue that pro-French laws are needed to prevent Quebec from 
losing its French character. Finally, aboriginals in Canada are protected by 
different types of external protections, depending on the nature of the threat to 
their community. In southern Canada, the aboriginal community requires 
arrangements whereby non-Indians would not have the right to own or stay on 
Indian lands. This is required because of the higher population density in 
southern Canada. The free trade of land would then allegedly result in the 
steady deterioration of the aboriginal communities and the way of life they 
hold dear. In northern Canada, rich in mineral resources, the influx of 
temporary workers could conceivably lead to the spending of public money on 
Westernised forms of entertainment such as resorts and movie theatres. In 
order to preserve their culture, aboriginal leaders “have proposed a three-to-
ten-year residency requirement before one becomes eligible to vote for, or 
hold public office, and a guaranteed 30 per cent aboriginal representation in 
regional government with veto power over legislation affecting crucial 
aboriginal interests.” (Kymlicka, 1989: 147). 
 
In these cases, at least one of the parties value the preservation and 
continued existence of their culture, and the conflict is about whether and to 
what extent the protection they require is justifiable in the light of the exclusion 
and marginalisation it causes. Furthermore, in these cases, there is no way to 
accommodate every culture; to make the public sphere as neutral as possible 
is already to erode the current character, and to maintain the current character 
is to exclude others from having a public space that is also “theirs”.  
 
Any claims for cultural grounds must first show that the culture can be 
delineated. As such, the culture needs to be characterised by cultural 
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representivity. Accordingly, the culture would need to exhibit self-reference 
through its institutions and have an institutionalised exit possibility.58  
 
Furthermore, the self-reflective communications exhibited by the culture must 
be aimed at answering questions around the extent of the (unfair) threat 
against that culture, whether an acceptable exit possibility can be provided, 
and whether, if the culture is thus protected, it can reasonably be expected to 
thrive and compete on fair footing with its competitor cultures. In this regard, 
we point out that it is those advocates for the protection of their own culture 
who need to answer these questions. They must show how they have arrived 
at their findings. Is it just their opinion, or are their findings the product of an 
open dialogue that freely allowed dissident and oppressed accounts? If they 
have proved the latter, they have also proved that the culture has a self-
referential character. As we will discuss below, the quality of dialogue and 
self-reference are aspects that can in principle be agreed upon. The 
advocates and those they wish to convince cannot allege that they disagree 
due to axiomatic cultural differences. Two parties may differ (as scientists also 
sometimes differ in their interpretation of data), but disagreements on these 
matters cannot be said to stem from cultural origins.  
 
If a self-referential investigation does not take place, or does not show a 
significant (unfair) threat, claims for cultural protection cannot be justified on 
cultural grounds. Such claims can then only represent the wishes of certain 
individuals (even a majority, though crucially, not the whole culture) and must 
be adjudicated using traditional liberal concepts, i.e. there would be no 
grounds to expand liberal concepts to include the notion of the protection of 
cultures. 
                                                 
58
 By using words such as ‘have’ ‘exhibits’, ‘competes’ etc., we do not imply that cultures have 
agency. Therefore, when a culture ‘exhibits’ or ‘has’ a certain quality, those words mean the 
same as if we were to say: “The electron exhibits spin.” Likewise we use ‘competes’ in an 
impersonal, non-agential manner: competition refers to the losing and gaining of members. A 
culture loses a member when that member stops identifying himself with that culture. When 
s/he identifies with another culture, that culture has gained a member. The agency thus lies 
with the member, not the culture. 
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Two points about self-referential investigations are pertinent here. Firstly, it 
does not matter who conducts these investigations. Cultural self-reference, 
strictly speaking, is not determined by individual persons reflecting on their 
culture. Rather, self-reference is determined by the character of the culture’s 
institutions. The question is therefore not whether there are people reflecting 
on their own culture and who they are and who they represent, but whether 
that culture has institutions that allow for the free dissemination of 
communications that reflect on the culture and problematise dominant 
accounts of that culture. Problematising accounts of a certain culture can be 
found in the media, and in academic institutions (particularly in disciplines 
such as cultural anthropology, sociology and the like). 
 
Secondly, as noted above, we approach these particular multicultural issues 
from the perspective of an individual commentator on cultural issues. This 
raises the question of ethnocentrism. Would the commentator’s judgement 
over whether a culture exhibits self-reference not be open to charges of 
ethnocentrism? Likewise, is the very use of criteria such as self-reference and 
exit possibility not particularly Eurocentric? We argue that it is not. While 
concepts such as self-reference and the like may have particular histories in 
“Western” thought, our use of them as criteria is generated by the logical 
implications of arriving at a concept of a delineable culture. As we briefly 
discussed in Chapter 1, we do not believe that the rules of logic (as opposed 
to the content of premises) can be open to charges of ethnocentrism. Thus 
employing concepts such as self-reference as criterion is a logical, necessary 
implication of treating cultures as distinct entities, and not a mere imposition of 
“Western” thought on other modes of thinking. Furthermore, while an 
individual commentator may argue and disagree with another person (for 
instance the person claiming protection for his/her culture) about whether self-
reference is present, such a disagreement is not cultural in nature. The 
presence of self-reference does not pertain to the content of any premises, 
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nor do they refer to any axiomatic differences. Rather, questions regarding the 
presence of self-reference pertain to the structure of the culture, not its 
contents. Thus, when a commentator holds that a culture does not exhibit self-
reference, s/he does not do so because s/he is from the West, but because 
the evidence provided did not convince him/her of the presence of self-
reference. By analogy, two judges in a contractual dispute can disagree over 
whether a contract was formed, without explaining their disagreement with 
reference to their places of birth, their background, or where they studied: they 
conduct their argument solely on the evidence in front of them.     
 
We now turn to the concept of threat. If the claim of a significant threat can be 
made, those making the claim need to show that the culture has an exit 
possibility. Firstly, an institutionalised exit possibility would be an indicator, like 
self-reference, that the culture fulfils the criteria of an analogy with personal 
autonomy, by virtue of which it becomes delineable and it becomes possible 
to speak of the culture as a whole and not just certain individuals speaking 
(allegedly) on its behalf. Secondly, the institutionalised exit possibility also 
acts as a balance against too far reaching protections. A culture that can be 
protected legitimately must – if it were given the proper opportunity to 
compete fairly against other cultures – be able to retain its members and 
thrive, i.e. be viable. Protections would therefore aim at rectifying past 
injustices, i.e. unfair gains by other cultures. However, an institutionalised exit 
possibility signifies an institutionalized willingness to put whatever cultural 
practice or value at stake in fair competition. As such, protection needs to be 
limited and balanced with members of a culture’s ability to opt out of that 
culture.  
 
With regard to institutionalised exit possibilities, and in the case of Aboriginal 
in Canada, for instance, we can ask the question as to the extent to which 
there is opportunity to participate in the broader Canadian society and regard 
oneself, primarily as Canadian. How easy and comfortable would it be for an 
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aboriginal to become part of a “Western” education system, and make use of 
nearby job opportunities? In the case of aboriginals in northern Canada, we 
would argue that the scenario leaders require protection against - public policy 
opening the door to “Western” resorts and job opportunities - would actually 
constitute such an exit possibility. If the “Western” style developments provide 
temporary jobs, and members of the aboriginal community take these jobs 
and unsettle themselves to go and work in “in another culture, in a different 
language” (Kymlicka, 1989, 147), would it be because of some form of unfair 
competition? We would argue no. Unless it can be shown that they were 
driven from another habitat and forced to reside in such an environment, then 
the way of life they wish to protect is inherently tied to a seasonal pattern of 
work, dictated by the (harsh) natural environment they inhabit. Protection 
against opportunities that would entice some to choose against this way of life 
then actually serves to confirm that their cultural way of life may not be valued 
by their own members if not enforced. Without the exit possibility in the form of 
nearby job opportunities, the culture these leaders wish to protect does not 
satisfy the criterion of consensus vs. power.  
 
Similarly, we can ask whether Francophone Canadians may have nearby 
educational alternatives to study in English. How far is it to the nearest 
English-medium school outside of Quebec? How does this distance compare 
to, for instance, a Francophone Canadian’s ability to go to a French-medium 
school in a predominantly English-speaking region? We would argue that, if 
Francophone Canadian have good access to French schools, then the option 
to go to English schools in Quebec represents an exit possibility. However, 
this exit possibility still needs to be balanced with the requirement of 
intercultural fairness.  
 
A possible solution to situations such as that in Quebec is to focus efforts to 
achieve a fair intercultural competition, not by restricting certain members’ free 
choice, but by laying claim to other types of governmental support. In this 
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regard, it is perhaps prudent to look to other means of enhancing the culture’s 
competitiveness. This may include funding for textbooks in French; funding for 
translation of important literary and academic works into French; ensuring that 
all public officials in Quebec can serve citizens in French; allowing businesses 
to only serve people in French if they so choose; providing incentives for 
Francophone Quebecois to enter teaching and research; and making grants 
available for theatre and poetry by Francophone Canadians. These measures 
should represent a differential support for French, 1) with the aim of adding to 
its competitiveness, 2) while addressing whatever historical (unfair) 
imbalances there may be between English and French.  
 
In the Swiss case, our appraisal would be that the presence of Minarettes 
constitutes the very exit possibility that is required in this case. The very 
presence of minarettes in the public sphere would serve to constitute the 
possibility of those who regard themselves as Swiss and Muslim to be 
represented in the Swiss public space. 
 
7.2.2 Freedom of speech 
Conflicts around freedom of speech and the protection of cultures by limiting 
freedom of speech, represents another type of multicultural conflict. These 
cases include controversies around art such as The Spear, the Satanic 
verses, as well as satire and parody, as seen for instance in cartoons.  
 
Once again, the concepts of threat and exit possibility are applicable. In all 
cases where limits of freedom of speech are called for, it would be very 
difficult to show that any threat to the continued existence of that culture is 
present. Moreover, freedom of speech itself is the embodiment of an exit 
possibility, because it allows for counter-arguments to be heard. The 
conventional limitation of freedom of speech, namely that freedom of speech 
does not include hate speech and libel, is therefore more than adequate for 
these situations. While artistic expressions such as The Spear might have 
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caused offence, there is no inalienable right not to be offended or insulted. 
Nor, we would argue, should there be.  
 
One could, however, argue that such artistic expressions, if culturally 
insensitive, constitute a low blow, a cheap shot in public discourse. This, we 
would argue, has more to do with the quality of public discourse than with 
respecting culture. If, for instance, a whole culture is indicted for a few 
people’s actions (as is sometimes the case in anti-Islamic parodies, 
documentaries and satire), this is simply a sloppy generalisation and should 
be pointed out as such, either by relevant editors or respondents in the public 
sphere. If, for instance, a nerve was struck accidentally, for instance an artist 
depicting someone naked, ignorant of the meaning this would have to many 
who would view his artwork, a simple apology should suffice. Moreover, 
greater sensitivity and awareness of others’ cultural sensibilities can do no 
harm. 
 
These scenario’s, however, concern the manner in which a message is 
brought across, not the actual content of the message. The latter should be 
left untouched – with the exceptions of hate speech and libel – because if a 
cultural value or way of life is in fact attacked59 it should be able to withstand 
public scrutiny and prove its value to its members. Moreover, freedom of 
speech is the very institution that would allow it a fair chance to do so.  
 
7.2.3 Cultural practices 
Multicultural issues concerning certain cultural practices and the liberal 
response to them can also be better understood with reference to threat and 
exit possibility. The relevant issues include ukuthwala, clitoridectomy, and 
polygamy. As we mentioned in Chapter 5, the powers afforded to traditional 
leaders can also be treated under this heading, as the controversy around 
                                                 
59
 One could indeed be suspicious that cultural grounds are sometimes invoked simply as an 
empty political gesture. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 211
traditional leaders often involve their support (tacit or otherwise) for similar 
problematic practices, including, in particular, the unequal treatment of 
women.  
 
As with all the cases discussed above, a self-referential investigation must 
first determine whether the practice is central to the culture and whether the 
culture as a whole would be threatened if the practice were to be stopped. 
Importantly, members of a liberal culture would also need to ask if allowing 
such a practice would in fact threaten liberal culture.  
 
In the case of polygamy, let us, for the sake of argument, assume that a self-
referential investigation concludes that allowing polygamy is in fact central to 
e.g. Zulu culture. The next step would be to consider whether there is an exit 
possibility. In the case of polygamy, the question would be whether women 
can freely choose against polygamy, that is, can they refuse to enter into a 
polygamous relationship and can a married woman refuse her husband the 
right to marry another woman before divorcing her? If the culture allows for 
this, that is, if it has an institution that allows this, then polygamy can actually 
be shown to be consistent with liberal values.  
 
Similarly, can those who are subjects of a traditional leader, choose not to be. 
To what extent can they choose to participate only in larger society? 
Importantly, one can also ask whether such traditional monarchies can 
actually satisfy the criterion of consensus vs. power. Our suspicion is that, 
currently, they would not. One possible way of providing an exit possibility in 
this case, would be to institutionalise regular referenda amongst the leader’s 
subjects, whereby they will have a choice to continue to support his monarchic 
rule or not.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 212
The question of traditional leaders may also be amenable to innovative 
solutions regarding self-rule, where traditional leaders may have authority on 
some issues, while a more liberal constitution would hold sway on other 
matters. One such a solution is represented by Schachar’s idea of 
“transformative accommodation”, as discussed by Baumeister (2003). 
According to this idea, government and a minority group can divide jurisdiction 
over important matters so that no group controls all aspects of the issue. 
Baumeister uses the example of marriage, where the minority group can have 
a say about the legitimacy of the wedding, i.e. whether it is recognised as a 
marriage, while the state can have a say about the financial and custodial 
aspects of the marriage (Baumeister, 2003: 753-754). Similarly, we would 
suggest that if a member of a certain culture were to refuse to adhere to 
cultural norms and implement a certain practice, or follow a certain ritual, (e.g. 
taking part in an arranged marriage) that s/he may be refused access to 
certain gatherings that pertain directly to that practice, but that s/he may not 
be ejected from the community totally. As such, s/he would retain residence 
and all his/her basic rights.  
 
In all possible solutions, however, the important question would be whether 
those who do not wish to be subject to traditional leaders’ reign have sufficient 
options available to them to live the lives of their choosing. 
 
Where the above case can be addressed with reference to the autonomy of its 
(often female) members, issues of cultural practices where minors are 
involved, are much more difficult. Even assuming that, as with the cases 
above, there is an actual threat to the culture if a certain practice were to be 
stopped, the issue of an exit possibility remains problematic. Parents having a 
say over their (minor) children’s lives is certainly not alien to so-called 
“Western” cultures. The issue is to what extent parent’s autonomy may be 
limited, for example, whether they may be prohibited from forcing certain 
practices on their children. An added complication is that who is regarded as a 
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minor is itself a cultural matter, the age of consent on different matters varying 
from culture to culture.  
 
In the case of minors, one pertinent question would be whether those children 
exposed to cultural practices would find it acceptable, in hindsight, when they 
themselves are adults and whether they would choose it for their children, 
having gone through it themselves. Crucially, though, this is a criterion that is 
inherently future-orientated. As such it does very little to allay fears that 
children presently are treated inhumanely. In these cases, even if there is an 
exit possibility – where parents may be allowed to opt out of certain cultural 
practices for their children – it remains dubious whether those who still choose 
for cultural practices are justified in doing so. As such, even if there is an 
institutionalised exit possibility, it does not satisfy the consensus vs. power 
criterion.  
 
Taking the above into account, we would therefore argue that multicultural 
issues involving cultural practices pertaining to minors, constitute special 
cases. These special cases are not significantly clarified by applying the 
criterion of an institutionalised exit possibility.  Moreover, because cultures 
claiming for respect for such practices cannot prove an exit possibility that 
would satisfy the consensus vs. power criterion, it means that that culture 
cannot be regarded as a delineable entity. This is because a culture’s 
delineability depends on it being able to satisfy the requirement of completing 
a strong analogy with personal autonomy.  
 
Simply applying liberal concepts to such cases are nevertheless not yet an 
optimal solution, unless the decision to apply liberal concepts is arrived at 
after taking seriously the possibility that a delineable culture is in fact at stake. 
Even then, commentators, policymakers and legislators condemning certain 
cultural practices, do so on the basis of a liberal axiom that holds individual 
freedom central. They cannot be proven by reason or science; they are the 
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suppositions from which we reason, and that underlie our scientific and 
philosophical endeavours. They themselves cannot be proven, we can only 
believe in them. Because individual freedom is axiomatic, its value cannot be 
proven, because it is the most basic assumption underlying all other 
arguments. It is for this reason that the process that preceded a decision 
based on individual freedom had included the possibility of a delineable 
culture being involved.  
 
By following the model we developed thus far, decision makers and 
commentators need not consider cultural protection as necessarily at odds 
with individual freedom. As such, decision makers and commentators can at 
least show that they did not dismiss the idea of cultural protection a priori. In 
our opinion, this diminishes the strength of charges of ethnocentrism.  
 
7.3 Self-referential decision making in multicultural dilemmas 
At this point we introduce a variant of the process model discussed above. 
Where the above model pertains to the process by which it is determined 
whether cultures in specific cases can be considered as delineable entities, 
the process model we introduce now pertains to a process by which liberal 
commentators and decision makers can justify their position on cultural 
practices in special cases.  
 
The key elements of this process are 1) self-reference and 2) empathy for 
other axioms. When considering cultural practices, the commentator needs 
to show that s/he has reflected on his/her own values/meanings and how it 
may colour his/her perceptions of the situation. This self-referential 
reflection, as with the cultural examples discussed above, would include 
the question whether the practices in question are in fact a threat to liberal 
values, or whether they just offend context specific sensibilities. The 
commentator also needs to actively try to understand the other culture’s 
values from within and not as if s/he is a neutral observer, studying mating 
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rituals in a far off tribe as if it were a lab experiment. In this regard, the self-
referential investigation by the members of the culture itself (as in the cases 
discussed above) would be an invaluable source of perspective and we can 
see how the two self-referential investigations would run parallel to each 
other, as two sides of the same coin. If the commentator then, after this 
process of self-reference and aware of the fact that the value s/he places 
on individual autonomy is axiomatic, still holds his/her liberal view, it has 
the character of an authentic decision (as discussed in Chapter 4). As 
such, s/he has not followed his/her cultural background blindly, but has 
argued from axiomatic fundamentals, knowing that s/he could be wrong, 
but believing, as a leap of faith, that s/he holds that axiom to be true not 
because s/he was culturally socialised into it, but because it does in fact 
represent a valuable idea.  
 
Though not escaping the charges of ethnocentrism, decisions that have a 
self-referential quality serve to diminish the problems associated with 
ethnocentrism. Where following one’s culture blindly and enforcing it on 
others implies an arrogant approach, wherein lies most of the offence 
caused by ethnocentrism, self-referential decisions represent an authentic 
response. We would argue that this serves to draw attention away from a 
response’s cultural origin, rather focus the interlocutors’ attention on the 
claim regarding the value of an idea, regardless of its cultural origin. This is 
the basis upon which dialogue can continue with the aim of a mutual 
understanding. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The notion that cultures cannot be distinct in any way, i.e. that they are 
necessarily vague and amorphous, does very little to contribute to dialogue. 
From the very beginning, it excludes the notion of a culture that is to be 
protected and the dialogue thus stops there and then. To be true to the 
principle of audi ad alteram partem, liberal approaches to multicultural 
conflicts must conceive of an alternative conception - whereby cultures can 
be thought of as distinct entities - provided that such a conception is 
logically possible. This may provide the dialogue with a much needed point 
of common understanding from which to proceed. 
 
In this dissertation, we have developed a model of distinct cultures. 
According to this model, a culture can be delineable in a manner analogous 
to how we think of distinct persons. Table 2 below summarises the analogy. 
 
Table 2 
 Personal identity Cultures as distinct entities 
Trivial boundary Organism’s boundaries Communicative relationships 
between group members, 
characterised by self-categorised 
group membership. 
Continuity Unity of conflict: a relationship between the 
“I” and repressed meanings, characterised 
by: 
o Self-reference 
o Doubt of core meanings 
 
Unity of conflict: a relationship 
between the dominant account 
and marginalised accounts, 
characterised by: 
o Self-reference 
o Exit possibility 
 
 
Personal 
autonomy Cultural re-
presentivity 
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Our model of personal delineation suggested a dual structure whereby a 
trivial boundary contains, so to speak, a unity of conflict. In persons, this unity 
of conflict lies in the relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings and 
this relationship, in order to provide some sense of unity, must be 
characterised by what we understand under personal autonomy.  
 
Cultures’ trivial boundaries can thus be defined by the particular character of 
their communicative relationships between group members and these 
communicative relationships in cultures are characterised by the claims that 
meet criteria (a)-(d): 
a) Group members’ shared claim that they belong to Group X. 
b) The dominant account of the group60 asserts that membership of that 
group is important to the extent that group membership is a core 
meaning for those members sharing the dominant account, i.e. it is a 
fundamental value to them that they are part of that group.  
c) Members who hold the dominant view assert a certain inclusion theory, 
and want all members to share this view. 
d) The aforementioned desire for agreement amongst all members is not 
just instrumental, but is sought for the validation it provides.  
 
Moreover, just as a psychic system is always embodied, so any culture is 
always ‘enmembered’, that is, cannot be thought of as existing separately 
from its group members.  
 
Furthermore, where personal autonomy is conceptualised as residing in the 
relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings, cultural representivity 
is characterised by the relationship between the dominant and marginalised 
                                                 
60
 Recall from p.152 that the dominant account refers to that inclusion theory which is agreed 
upon by the most people, that is, the inclusion theory that most people would agree upon if a 
poll were to be taken amongst all those involved. However, we must stress again that the 
dominant account remains a flawed account of the culture and is by no means to be 
considered as the only true account. 
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accounts of the culture. This relationship, in turn, must be characterised by 
the presence of institutions that ensure 1) self-reference in the culture and 
2) adherence to the consensus vs. power criterion. The latter is achieved 
by an institutionalised exit possibility.   
 
With a strong analogy between cultures’ and personal delineation, it 
becomes possible to rehabilitate Kymlicka’s equality argument. As we 
argued in Chapter 1, the main gap in his argument was the delineation of 
cultures. If this problem is solved, Kymlicka’s argument is successful in 
showing that cultural protection is consistent with a liberal approach. 
 
Furthermore, our concept of cultures allows us to extend concepts we 
usually apply to persons, such as fairness, attachment and viability so that 
they can also apply to cultures. Moreover, we can apply these concepts 
without alleging that we thus treat cultures as if they literally were persons:  
concepts such as intercultural fairness, attachment and viability, when they 
are applied to cultures, are defined in terms of the consensus vs. power 
criterion, and the latter is judged based on the quality of a culture’s 
institutions (specifically, the presence of an institutionalised exit possibility). 
We therefore never assume that the culture is itself a meaning-processing 
organism.  
 
One of the chief objections against cultural protection, in our opinion, is the 
intuitive response that allowing for such protection (against cultural 
extinction) leads us down a slippery slope, where everyone and anyone 
can conceive of some cultural difference by which they can lay claim to 
whatever they want. In this regard, concepts such as viability and the 
criteria of self-reference and consensus vs. power are quite reassuring. 
They posit stringent requirements to those laying claim to cultural 
protection. Furthermore, while these requirements are stringent, it is 
nonetheless possible, in principle, for those laying claim to cultural 
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protection to meet them. They therefore do not exclude claims to cultural 
protection ab initio. In our opinion, this is an important advance in 
intercultural dialogue in multicultural societies. The requirements of self-
reference and consensus vs. power (along with the concepts generated by 
them, such as viability) serve as rules of engagement that allow the 
dialogue to proceed, and to proceed, hopefully, to a greater mutual 
understanding.   
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